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INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1· A brief review of previous theories in learning and memory 
In this dissertation we will present a general theory for retrie-
val from long-term store. The theory combines elements of a search 
theory such as those proposed by Shiffrin (1970a) and Kundus (1973) 
with elements of associative network theories (e.g. the FRAN model of 
Anderson [ 1972 ]). Our theory extends the framework for information 
processing proposed by Shiffrin (1975, 1976). Our theory differs 
from the theory proposed by Shiffrin (see also Shiffrin, 1970a) in 
that (a) the associative structure in memory is explicitly specified 
by a consideration of contextual and interitem associations, (b) a 
careful description is given of how probe cues make use of this 
associative network during retrieval from long-term store, and (c) 
rules are given for combining probe cues. Moreover, explicit mathema-
tical models are given for the application of our theory to several 
experimental paradigms. Note that a distinction is made between the 
general theory and the specific models applied to various experimental 
paradigms. The specific models are based on the general theory but 
contain a number of additional, ad hoc assumptions, as required by the 
particular paradigm studied. The long-range goal of this research is 
the development of a general theory for memory search and retrieval 
that will simultaneously predict free recall, paired-associate learning 
and recognition, and forgetting in all of these. 
Although an extensive review of earlier theories in the area of 
verbal learning and memory is not appropriate at this place, we will 
nonetheless try to show how the present theory grew out of earlier 
theoretical developments in this area. 
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Until approximately 1965 verbal learning research was largely 
dominated by the functionalist tradition Jaiown as interference theory. 
Interference theory is generally regarded as one of the major accomplish-
ments of experimental psychology (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Crowder, 1976). 
Interference theorists used an associationistic framework to explain 
learning and forgetting. Originally (e.g., McGeoch, 1942), the only 
theoretical terms used were stimulus, response, and the association 
between these two. All forgetting was assumed to be the result of retro-
active and proactive inhibition. Various mechanisms were postulated to 
explain this inhibition, such as response competition, unlearning, and 
most recently response-set competition. Details may be found in Postman 
(1961), Postman and Underwood (1973), and Crowder (1976). As a result 
of all these modifications, interference theory has become gradually 
more complex and more difficult to apply to specific experimental 
results. "Interference theory today is in a state of ferment if not 
disarray" (Postman, 1975a, p. 327). Moreover, interference theory has 
come under vigorous attack, most notably in papers by Martin (1971) 
and Greeno, James and DaPolito (1971; see also Greeno, James, DaPolito 
& Poison, 1978). 
Starting in the 1960s, there was a gradual shift in emphasis from 
'verbal learning' research towards 'memory' research (see Tulving & 
Madigan, 1970). Generally speaking, memory researchers prefer to 
analyze learning and memory within an information processing framework, 
in terms of encoding (or acquisition), storage and retrieval processes 
(Wickelgren, 1977). It may be remarked that this approach is not so 
much an alternative to interference theory as it is a reformulation 
and specification of interference principles within an information 
processing terminology. At the same time, some theorists (most notably 
Estes) became dissatisfied with the kind of global theories used in 
verbal learning research, and started to develop precise, quantitative 
models for specific, simple learning tasks. Most of the more recent 
models seem to have their roots in Estes' (1955a, b, 1959) Stimulus 
Sampling Theory. Stimulus sampling theory gave rise to a nunber of 
Markov models. It soon became evident that in order to explain various 
spacing effects in paired-associate learning the notions of a short-
term and a long-term state were necessary (see among others Bjork 
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[ 1966 ] , Rummelhart [1967 ] and Young [1971 ] ). 
Martin (1968, 1971) developed the socalled encoding variability 
theory as an alternative to interference theory. Encoding-variability 
theory assumes that in paired-associate learning the nominal stimulus 
item possesses a variety of possible encodings. The selection of a 
given encoding is assumed to be governed by a random sampling process. 
It is assumed that the probability of sampling a particular encoding 
on a given trial is determined both by the characteristics of the 
response and by those encodings which have been dominant in the recent 
past. This theory is closely related to Estes' (1955a) stimulus-
fluctuation theory. Thus, it is not surprising that Bower (1972a) was 
able to develop a quantitative version of encoding-variability theory 
within the framework of stimulus sampling theory. 
The most important theoretical development however has been the 
development of socalled multistore theories of memory (e.g., Broadbent, 
1958; Waugh & Norman, 1965; Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). These theories 
make a distinction between a short-term store or working memory and a 
long-term store. The most influential theory of this type, in the sense 
of stimulating a great deal of research, probably has been the theory 
proposed by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968). 
Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) made a careful distinction between 
permanent structural components of the memory system and control 
processes in memory which could be readily modified. The permanent 
components include the "hardware" of the memory system and those 
built-in processes that do not vary from one situation to another. 
Control processes are strategies and modes of information processing 
that are under voluntary control of the subject (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 
1968, p. 106). Which control processes are used in a given experimental 
task depends on the nature of the instructions, the type of task 
given to the subject, and the past history of that subject. 
Probably one of the most important aspects of the approach of 
Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) was their specification of such control 
processes. The idea of an active agent, an executive monitor (see 
section 6.3.1), has a long history and is present in all cognitive 
theories. In fact, this idea can be said to be a defining characteris-
tic of the cognitive approach in psychology (see Neisser, 1967; Bower, 
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1972b). Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) showed that control processes 
could be scientifically investigated by inducing the subjects to adopt 
a common set of control processes. For a further discussion of the 
concept of control processes we may refer to Shiffrin (1977). 
Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) distinguished three structural compo-
nents: the sensory register, the short-term store (STS) and the long-
term store (LTS). They assumed that when a stimulus is presented, it 
enters a modality-specific sensory register, which holds the informa-
tion for a very brief period of time. Some initial processing was 
assumed to be carried out on the information in the sensory register, 
for example scanning of the stimulus for pattern recognition. When a 
subject (i.e. the executive monitor) attends to information in the 
sensory register, it is transferred to STS. If a stimulus is not 
attended to, the information decays very rapidly, within half a 
second or so. 
Short-term store served the dual purpose of maintaining informa-
tion in a readily accessible state through rehearsal and of transfer-
ring information to a more permanent long-term store through coding 
processes. STS was assumed to have only a limited capacity in contrast 
to LTS, which was supposed to have an unlimited capacity. The most 
important processes in LTS include retrieval through a search procedure 
and (possibly) decay and/or interference. 
In the second part of their paper, Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) 
showed how specific, quantitative models could be constructed within 
this general scheme. The best known model is the so-called buffer 
model, which was constructed to explain a number of short-term memory 
performances. (Note the distinction between short-term store and short-
term memory: the first refers to a structural aspect of memory, the 
second has an operational meaning and refers to performances where 
there is a short duration between presentation and test of a stimulus). 
It should perhaps be emphasized that the rehearsal buffer or push-down 
stack that played such an important role in that model, was not inter-
preted by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) as a structural aspect of the 
memory system. Instead they saw the maintenance and use of the buffer 
as a process entirely under the control of the subject. Such a buffer 
is set up by the subject in order to maximize performance in situations 
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which place a heavy emphasis on STS and in which LTS does not play a 
very useful role (see Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968, p. 113). 
Shiffrin and Atkinson (1969) gave a more thorough analysis of storage 
and retrieval processes in LTS. In contrast to the earlier paper, 
information in LTS was no longer assumed to be subject to decay and/ 
or interference, but was assumed to be permanently stored in LTS. 
Forgetting of information in LTS (i.e.: failure to recall) was postu-
lated to be the result of retrieval failure: over time the search for 
certain information becomes increasingly ineffective. A model based 
on these assumptions was applied successfully by Shiffrin (1968) to 
data from a continuous paired-associate paradigm. 
1.2. Reaent modifications of the Atkinson and Shiffrin theory 
Atkinson and Shiffrin (1971; see also Shiffrin, 1975, 1976) proposed 
a further modification. In this more recent version of the theory, STS 
is no longer viewed as separate from LTS, but rather as the temporarily 
activated portion of LTS (note that this idea is quite old, dating 
back to William James in the 1890s). Forgetting in STS is simply the 
reversion of currently active information to an inactive state in LTS 
(for similar ideas see Sanders, 1968; Sanders & Schroots, 1969). 
Furthermore, Shiffrin (1975, 1976) has combined the sensory registers 
with STS into a single structural component of the memory system, 
termed (also) short-term store. The major reason for this change was 
evidence showing that it is more parsimonious to think of coding in 
active memory as part of a continuum than as taking place in two 
structurally distinct stores (see below, section 2.2). Shiffrin (1975, 
1976) also stresses the importance of type of processing (i.e., rote 
vs. elaborative rehearsal) in STS for what gets stored in LTS and 
argues against an "automatic storage" view. This latter viewpoint was 
incorrectly attributed to Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) by a number of 
writers in this area. Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) saw rehearsal 
however as a control process and thus as subject to variations in 
strategy. For example, Craik and Lockhart (1972) argued that the better 
a given input was processed, the higher the probability of recall. 
They showed that the probability of retrieval from long-term store was 
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strongly related to how "deep" an item was processed. Thus, semantic, 
elaborative rehearsal leads to better recall than rote rehearsal (see 
also Bjork, 1975a). This socalled "levels of processing"-approach 
advocated by Craik and Lockhart (1972) is therefore not an alternative 
to the two-store model of Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968). On the contrary, 
this approach and the research done within it provide a nice illustra-
tion of the role of control processes in coding and storage. 
A more elaborate description of the differential characteristics 
of controlled versus automatic information processing was given by 
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977). 
Automatic processing refers to part of what was previously called 
structural features of the memory system. Automatic processes are not 
subject to capacity limitations in STS. They are however not under 
subject control once activated by a certain input and operate in 
parallel with other processes, automatic as well as controlled. 
Controlled processes on the other hand are limited-capacity processes. 
They are serial processes and do not operate in parallel with other 
controlled processes. They can however be modified fairly easily, which 
is not the case for automatic processes. Automatic processes are called 
"automatic" because their activation does not depend on the active 
control or attention by the subject. One important type of automatic 
process is the process whereby certain stimuli (those that have been 
consistently used as targets in search tasks) attract the attention 
regardless of other concurrent inputs even when this interferes with 
the ongoing controlled processing (see Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977, 
Experiment 1). 
Our present theory for retrieval from long-term store is closely 
related to these more recent elaborations of the general theoretical 
framework originally described by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968). It 
combinBS models formulated within this framework with models that give 
much more emphasis to the associative structure of LTS such as the 
FRAN-model of Anderson (1972) and the Anderson and Bower (1972) retrie-
val theory. The theory may be characterized as an associationistic 
theory of memory, and as such, it is closely related to interference 
theories of forgetting. 
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1.3. Basic experimental paradigms used in verbal learning and memory 
research 
1.3.1. Free recall 
In a typical free recall experiment a list of items (almost always 
words) is presented for study and subjects are later asked to recall 
as many items as possible in any order they like. Presentation mode 
may be auditory or visual and presentation time ranges from approxima-
tely one to five seconds. The list length usually is somewhere between 
10 and 40 items. 
Free recall is called "free" to contrast it with serial recall in 
which task the subject has to recall the items in the order in which 
they were presented. We will not discuss the serial recall paradigm 
in this study since that would require an, in our opinion, as yet too 
speculative specification of the retrieval cues used in those tasks 
(i.e., the problem of the functional stimulus). 
In some cases a short period of interpolated activity, usually some 
arithmetic, is given before recall to eliminate most of the short-term 
effects. We may distinguish furthermore between single-trial and multi-
trial procedures. In single-trial free recall a given list is presented 
only once, whereas in multitrial free recall a given list is presented 
more than once, each time in a different random order. Another impor-
tant procedural difference is whether the list is composed of a random 
selection of words (with certain restrictions as to length, familiarity, 
imagery-value, etc.) or of groups of related words, for example groiips 
of birds, furniture, foods, etc. In this latter case one speaks of a 
categorized list and categorized free recall. 
1.3.2. Paired-associate learning 
Traditionally probably the most widely used procedure in verbal 
learning research is what is called paired-associate learning. In this 
paradigm a number of pairs is presented, each pair consisting of two 
words, a word and a number, two nonsense syllables, etc. At test, one 
of the members of the pair is given and the subject has to recall the 
other member (practically always the first member is presented). Within 
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this paradigm two major testing procedures are used: the anticipation 
method and the study-best method. In the anticipation method each pair 
is tested and then presented for further study before the next item is 
tested. In the study-test method all pairs are on each trial first 
shown for study and then all are tested. 
Traditionally a fixed number of pairs (a "list") is presented again 
and again until some kind of criterion is reached such as two conse-
cutive trials with no errors on any of the pairs. We will refer to 
this procedure as a list structured design. A more recent variation of 
the paired-associates procedure is the socalled continuous paired-
associate learning paradigm. In this paradigm new items are introduced 
continually during the session. Items are presented a fixed number 
of times. This paradigm has been very useful in the study of spacing 
effects in paired-associate learning. In some studies (for example 
Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968) the stimulus members are re-paired after 
a given number of trials with new, different responses and the subject 
has to keep track of the most recent response. 
1.3.3. Recognition 
Recognition experiments follow in general the same study procedure 
as free recall experiments. The items are tested however in a different 
manner. In recognition the items that were on the list are mixed with 
socalled distractor items, items that are new. The subject has to 
decide whether an item was on the list or not. Basically two testing 
procedures are used. In a yes/no test the items to be tested are 
presented one at a time and the subject gives a yes-response if he 
thinks an item was on the list. Another form of recognition testing is 
the forced-choice test. In this procedure a list-item is presented 
together with one or more distractors and the subject has to choose 
one of these items as "old". Discrete-trials procedures as well as 
continuous recognition-memory paradigms have been used. 
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A GENERAL THEORY 2 
Our present theory for retrieval from long-term store is formulated 
within the general framework for information processing described by 
Shiffrin (1975, 1976). In the next paragraph we will first present a 
brief review of this general framework. In the following sections the 
elements are discussed in more detail. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 present 
the new theory for retrieval from long-term store. It is shown how an 
associative network approach may be conbined with a memory search 
approach. 
2.1. General overview of the theory 
Shiffrin (1975, 1976) has assumed that memory can be represented as 
an associative netuork: a large collection of nodes, with complex 
associations between these nodes. No specific assumptions are made as 
to the precise nature of this network. At the present time we do not 
want to comit ourselves to one type of representation such as a 
labeled graph (Anderson, 1972), a propositional representation (Anderson 
& Bower, 1973; Kintsch, 1974), or some kind of semantic or syntactic 
structure. Instead memory will be conceived as a graph in the most 
general sense. The individual nodes, the elements of the graph, are 
really bundles of highly interassociated elementary information units. 
A node is distinguished from its constituent features in that activa-
tion of any one of these features will activate most of them. A given 
node however will not always activate the same group of other nodes. 
Only two memory stores are distinguished by Shiffrin (1975, 1976): 
a short-term store (STS) and a long-term store (LTS). Thus, separate 
sensory registers are no longer postulated. Fig. 2.1 gives a picture 
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Fig. 2.1. A framework for human information processing 
(Fig. 1 from Shiffrin, 1975). 
of the general memory system. Information is said to be in STS if it 
is currently active. Thus, STS and LTS should not be viewed as physical-
ly separate stores as Fig. 2.1 might easily suggest. Rather, STS is 
the currently activated subset of LTS. This view is depicted in Fig. 2.2. 
This figure gives an analogic depiction of STS and LTS a short time 
after presentation of a simple visual stimulus, e.g. a word. Also shown 
are several hypothetical stages of feature extraction. "The early stages 
of processing are concerned with simple physical attributes - contrasts, 
dots, line segments, angles, open spaces. Later stages involve higher 
order codes like the names of letters and the name of the word, both 
visual and verbal. Still higher stages are concerned with linguistic, 
semantic, and conceptual correlates of the word and the previous 
occurrences of the word in particular contexts. Short-term store is 
depicted by the solid lines in this figure". (Shiffrin, 1976, p. 214). 
The term information refers to triples < i, j, s(i,j)> where i and j 
stand for two nodes in memory and s(i,j) denotes an association 
between i and j. 
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CONTRAST. LINES. PHONEMIC WORD \ 
COLOR ANGLES. CODES MEANNG; \ 
SROCES WORD 
IN CONTEXT 
Fig. 2.2. An analogic depiction of short-term store embedded 
within long-term store. Hypothetical stages of 
feature abstraction are indicated shortly following 
visual presentation of a word. (Fig. 2. from 
Shiffrin, 1975). 
Returning to Fig. 2.1 we see that information from the senses acti-
vates, through an automatic process, corresponding nodes in memory. 
Note that "automatic" refers to the assunption that this is a process 
that is not subject to capacity limitations and is outside the control 
of the subject. A similar assunption was made by Norman (1968) and by 
Anderson (19723. It is similar to the strategy-free component of 
memory assumed by Anderson and Bower (1973). According to the defini-
tion of STS given above it follows that this information has been 
entered in STS. The information is however rapidly lost (i.e., becomes 
inactive), unless it is maintained in STS through rehearsal processes. 
The allocation of processing capacity in STS is assumed to be a con-
trolled process unless disturbed by automatic attention responses. 
Automatic attention responses (see Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) refer to the fact that certain inputs 
automatically attract a kind of selector mechanism that controls the 
further processing of information in STS regardless of other concurrent 
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inputs. Forgetting of information in STS is simply the reversal from 
an active state in STS to an inactive state in LTS. Control of the 
information-processing system is carried out by this selector mechanism 
through a manipulation of the flow of information into and out of STS. 
Thus, STS functions as the bottleneck of the system (Deutsch & Deutsch, 
1963; Norman, 1968; Shiffrin & Geisler, 1973). There is no filtering 
prior to entrance into STS, as postulated by Broadbent (1958, 1971). 
In the framework proposed by Shiffrin (1975, 1976) learning is 
assumed to be the formation of new associations between nodes in LTS 
or the enrichment of old associations. These associations include as 
an important part temporal and contextual features that were simul-
taneously present in STS. As in the theory proposed by Shiffrin and 
Atkinson (1969) information in LTS is not subject to decay. Observable 
test performance is however determined not only by the information in 
LTS, but also by the retrieval processes used by the subject to get 
the correct information into STS. Information active in STS at the 
time of test (which includes again the general context) will activate 
through an automatic process associatively related information in LTS. 
The subject (i.e. the executive monitor) has some control over this 
retrieval through the choice of probe information, the retrieval cues. 
In this framework forgetting is not the result of memory traces 
becoming weaker as a result of disuse (decay) or interference, but is 
a consequence of the fact that information in LTS can only be recovered 
through retrieval cues in STS at the time of testing. More precisely, 
items have been stored in LTS in confcination with the context at the 
time of study, everything the subject thought about or felt during 
study of the item. At test however the subject is not able to reinstate 
those contextual cues completely, which results in an inability to 
recall the item. Thus, this theory proposes an associationistic frame-
work for learning and memory. 
2.2. Short-term store (STS) 
As discussed above, short-term store consists of the set of (tempo-
rarily) activated nodes and their interassociations in memory. A sub-
set of STS, the short-term working memory (see Fig. 2.1; note that we 
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have preferred to use the term 'working memory' instead of 'working 
store' in accordance with conventional terminology), the subset that 
is given controlled processing, is equated by Shiffrin and Schneider 
(1977) with "consciousness". 
Note that in the present formulation the sensory registers (see 
Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Neisser, 1967) have been incorporated into 
a unitary, generalized STS. Several lines of evidence may be adduced 
to justify this assumption. Such sensory registers were postulated as 
a result of experiments reported by Sperling (1960, 1963, 1967), 
Averbach and Coriell (1961), Averbach and Sperling (1961) and Estes 
and Taylor (1964, 1966) in the visual modality, and by Crowder and 
Morton (1969), Massaro (1970) and Darwin, Turvey and Crowder (1972) 
in the auditory modality (but note the differences between these 
various sensory registers, see p. 14). These studies showed that for 
a very brief period after the presentation of a stimulus, subjects 
have available much more information than they are able to report. 
This information decays however very rapidly (in a second or less). 
Only a small nunfcer of items (about five) can be retained for longer 
periods. Sensory registers were postulated to account for the fact 
that although certain information can be maintained in short-term 
store for a long time, most of the information that is briefly 
available decays very rapidly. It is possible however to develop a 
model for short-term forgetting that accounts for both these results 
thereby obviating the necessity to postulate two distinct short-term 
stores. 
The mechanism that is used to explain this short-term forgetting 
is a modified interference model (see Shiffrin, 1975; Shiffrin & Cook, 
1978). The momentary rate of loss from STS is assumed to be a function 
of the number of similar items that are simultaneously present in STS, 
with the loss rate decreasing as old items are lost, and increasing 
as new items are entered. (See Shiffrin, 1976, p. 225). Only the 
constant reactivation or strengthening of an item in STS will prevent 
it from being lost from STS. This rehearsal however is a controlled 
process and takes time so that only a small number of items can be 
held in STS for an appreciable period of time (which results in the 
famous "memory span"). Such a model can explain both the fast decay of 
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the non-rehearsed items and the maintenance of a few items in STS for 
longer periods. 
Secondly, as discussed by Shiffrin (1975), recent evidence suggests 
that the sensory register is not a unitary store with unitary rules. 
On the contrary, there seem to be a number of processing levels, each 
with its own characteristics. For example, in the visual modality, 
several different decay rates, depending on the nature of the experi-
mental task, have been reported, ranging from 250 msec to more than 
1 sec (compare for instance Sperling [ 1960 ] and Posner [ 1969 ] ). In 
the auditory modality Crowder and Morton (1969) and Massaro (1970) 
also seem to be studying different "sensory registers". Therefore a 
distinction within short-term store between exactly two distinct 
structural features of the memory systen would be completely arbitrary 
(Shiffrin, 1975, p. 198). 
Furthermore, one of the major functions of the sensory registers 
was the brief maintenance of large amounts of information from which 
some kind of attentional mechanism could select portions for trans-
mission to and further processing in STS. Such an assumption implies 
that the locus of selective attention occurs during perceptual 
processing, as for example in the filter model proposed by Broadbent 
(1958, 1971) and in the model proposed by Norman and Rummelhart (1970). 
Experiments by Shiffrin and Gardner (1972) and Schneider and Shiffrin 
(1977) however favor an alternative model for selective attention. 
Those experiments show that filtering does not occur (see also 
Van der Heijden, 1978). Shiffrin and Gardner (1972) showed that per-
formance in a task in which information on several channels was 
presented either simultaneously or successively, was identical in both 
conditions. Thus, equivalent amounts of information were processed in 
the simultaneous and the successive conditions. Such results contra-
dict models that assume that selection occurs during perceptual process-
ing, because those models predict that stimuli •"liât are presented 
successively should be better processed than stimuli presented simul-
taneously. Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) report a number of experiments 
that show that attentional limitations in perceptual processing may 
be bypassed. Thus, as a result of those studies we may conclude that 
selective attention does not occur during perceptual processing, that 
14 
information from all channels is dumped together into STS (Shiffrin, 
1975). Selective mechanisms occur only after the information has 
entered STS. First, the contents of STS are scanned and certain portions 
of the information are selected for further processing (see Shiffrin & 
Geisler, 1973). Rehearsal processes are then used to prevent the loss 
of the selected information, while most of the information is allowed 
to decay and to become lost. Note that such a model does not imply 
that there are no masking effects (as observed by Averbach & Coriell 
[ 1961 ] and Turvey [ 1973 ] ). Even if the encoding processes are auto-
matic, they may still be interfered with or interrupted by later 
stimuli. 
Thus, the encoding occurs in several stages. The earliest stages 
are completely automatic, that is they do not require processing 
capacity and are performed in parallel. Attentional deficits occur 
because scanning the contents of STS and higher order encoding are 
not automatic but controlled processes, that is they require time and 
part of the limited processing capacity of STS. Because rapid forget-
ting occurs in STS, most of the information will be lost from STS in 
less than a second. Thus, attentional deficits are equated with 
capacity limitations in STS. For a more complete discussion of auto-
matic and controlled processing and their role in short-term memory 
search and selective attention we refer to Shiffrin and Schneider 
(1977) and to Posner and Snyder (1975). 
The above arguments show that it is not necessary to assume that 
there exist separate sensory short-term stores and that all informa-
tion is entered into STS. Finally, note that the sensory registers 
shown in Fig. 2.1 simply refer to the various senses. 
We may conclude with the observation that in the present theory 
STS has two major functions. The first is maintaining information 
currently important to the organism in an active state (through 
rehearsal), and the second is the active control of thinking, problem 
solving, decision making, and other higher order control processes 
(Shiffrin & Schneider. 1977). 
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2.3. Learning: transfer from STS to LTS 
Learning means the formation (or strengthening) in permanent memory 
of 'information' not previously there (Shiffrin, 1975, 1976). Thus, in 
order to be able to speak of 'learning', it must be the case that some-
thing 'new' is being stored in memory. As discussed by Shiffrin and 
Schneider (1977) this consists of the association (in a new relation-
ship) of memory nodes in LTS. A necessary condition for the formation 
of this new associative structure is of course the simultaneous 
presence in STS of the separate elements to be associated. That is, 
the various nodes to be associated in a new relationship must be 
activated in STS. Thus, learning or transfer of information from STS 
to LTS does not imply that this information is removed from STS, nor 
does it mean that new subunits are placed in LTS that were not already 
present in either LTS or STS. Thus, learning or transfer simply refers 
to the formation of new associations (or the enrichment or strengthen-
ing of old associations) between memory nodes not previously associated 
(or strengthened) in LTS (Shiffrin 8, Schneider, 1977, p. 157). These 
associations normally include temporal-oontextual infomation that was 
present in STS at the time of transfer. This contextual information 
includes everything the subject thought about or felt at the time of 
storage (see also McGovem, 1964). Note that this is a contiguity 
theory of learning. 
It is assumed that the causative agent in transfer is the controlled 
processing given to an item: what is stored is what is attended to and 
given controlled processing (Shiffrin, 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977). Two frequently distinguished types of controlled rehearsal 
processes are: maintenance rehearsal which serves mainly to keep 
information in STS, and coding rehearsal which serves mainly to store 
information effectively in LTS. Experiments by Bjork (1975a) and 
Craik and Watkins (1973) have shown that maintenance rehearsal is 
rather ineffective in storing information in LTS, at least when 
measured by recall tasks. It does however seem to be helpful for long-
term recognition. Of course, it does lead to better short-term 
retention than coding rehearsal. Coding rehearsal refers to those 
activities under control of the subject in which the item is actively 
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related to other items on the list, to the context and to general 
knowledge in long-term store (Shiffrin, 1976, p. 207). It is well known 
that the type of coding or elaborative rehearsal in STS plays a deci-
sive role in long-term recall (see among others Bjork, 1975a; Bower, 
1972b; Craik & Jacoby, 1975; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 
1975; Lodchart & Jacoby, 1976). Coding strategies that may be used in 
verbal learning include associative strategies, chunking, fonming an 
interactive image, etc. 
2.4. The representation of LTS 
As stated earlier, long-term store (LTS) is assumed to be a perma-
nent repository of information. It is assumed furthermore that this 
LTS structure can be represented as an associative network. In contrast 
to several other recent models (for example Anderson & Bower, 1973; 
Kintsch, 1974) we make no assumptions about the format in which the in-
formation in LTS is stored, except for the rather general assumption 
that the information in LTS can be conceived as a network of more or 
less unitary nodes, bundles of features and elementary information 
units that have the property that they function as a group, that is 
that activation of one of these features will activate most of them. 
Experiments on semantic memory that pretend to show that the 
organization in LTS is of one particular type (for example Collins & 
Quillian, 1969; Anderson & Bower, 1973) may also be interpreted (and 
will be in the present framework) as showing some active, subject-
controlled search and decision process within STS. In general it 
may be remarked that most of those models lack retrieval mechanisms 
(other than direct and automatic access). In the present theory the 
retrieval process is essential for understanding why recall or 
recognition fails. 
A central assumption in the present theory involves the notion of 
contextual associations in LTS. This concept may be illustrated by an 
example. Suppose the subject studies a list of 5 items. During study 
of these items all the information in STS that is given controlled 
processing will be stored in LTS. The information in STS of course 
includes a lot of other things beside the list items themselves. 
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All this other information will be referred to as context information, 
or the list context. The list context includes everything the subject 
feels or thinks about during study of the items. Thus, the context in­
cludes such things as the temperature of the room, the time of the 
day, whether the subject is hungry or not, the behavior and appearance 
of the experimenter and the other subjects and also more list-related 
information as for example the serial position of the list within the 
session, the length of the list, positional cues, particular instruc­
tions given before study of the list, etc. 
Thus, because the subject studies the items in the presence of those 
contextual cues, it follows from our conception of transfer from STS 
to LTS that associations will be formed between elements representing 
the item and elements representing the context. These associations 
will be referred to as contextual or item-to-oontext associations. 
Beside these item-to-context associations there will be formed asso­
ciations between different list items. The latter will be referred to 
as item-to-item associations or interitem associations. We do not 
assume however that these interitem associations are completely 
context-independent. That is, we assume that these are really associa­
tions between item A within the present context and item В within the 
present context. In Fig. 2.3 a schematic depiction is given of the 
various associations that are formed after study of a five-item list. 
The item information is indicated by the solidly outlined areas in 
this figure. The context information associated to the item informa­
tion is also enclosed by solid lines to the left, and the strength 
and direction of association is given by the solid arrows. The dashed 
regions enclosing both context and item features indicate images of 
an item within the present context. These images are associated to 
other such images (for other items), and the strength and direction 
of these interitem associations is indicated by the dashed arrows. 
CAssociations between features are complex and are not shown in this 
figure). 
Notice that the associations are not necessarily bidirectional, 
although in general it seems logical that if an association has been 
formed between item A and item В there will also have been formed an 
association between item В and item A in the sense that placement of 
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ITEM 1 
ITEM 2 
I T E M 3 
J I T E M 5 
CONTEXT TO ITEM ASSOCIATION 
(ITEM • CONTEXT) TO (ITEM • CONTEXT) ASSOCIATION 
Fig. 2.3. A schematic depiction of the associative network in 
long-term store after study of a five-item list. 
Shown are the directional associations between con­
textual elements and the list items and between dif­
ferent list items. X's refer to various features. 
See text for explanation. 
item В in STS will also tend to lead to retrieval of item A. The two 
associations may of course be of different strength, for instance in 
the case of forward and backward associations in a conventional paired-
associate paradigm. Note that these associations may be interpreted as 
consisting of an overlap between sets of features. 
This notion of contextual associations is of course not new. For 
example, the notion of "list tags" plays a prominent role in theories 
proposed by Kintsch (1970), Bower (1972a) and Anderson and Bower (1972, 
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1973). Interference theorists postulated contextual associations to 
account for the response-learning stage in paired-associate learning 
(see McGovem, 1964; Tulving, 1968; Postman, 1968). The role of a 
general context factor was also emphasized by Postman and underwood 
(1973) in their most recent version of interference theory. Direct 
evidence for the effect of context on recall was obtained by Bilodeau 
and Schlosberg (1951), Bower, Monteiro and Gilligan (1978), and Smith, 
Glenberg and Bjork (1978). A similar distinction as was made above 
between two types of associations was also proposed by Anderson and 
Bower (1972), Humphreys (1976, 1978), McGovem (1964) and by Rabinowitz, 
Handler and Barsalou (1977). 
The assumption of contextual associations may be related to the 
concept of "episodic" memory introduced by Tulving (1972). Episodic 
memory deals with events that are defined by experiences in specific 
temporal and spatial locations. It stands in contrast to "semantic" 
memory which refers to the organized store of knowledge that a person 
has about the world. In Fig. 2.1 a similar distinction is shown between 
a long-term working memory (episodic) and a long-term repository 
(semantic). We do not interpret this distinction however as a structu-
ral feature of the memory system. The long-term repository probably 
evolves from the working memory. When we are shown for the first time 
that 2+2=4 this event will be associated with the context at that time. 
After some time however this knowledge will be associated with so many 
different contextual elements, that it is so to speak independent of 
any specific context. As another example, the knowledge that President 
Nixon had to resign because of his "Watergate"-problems is probably 
stored in semantic memory in relation to other facts about the USA, but 
it may also be associated with the experience of seeing the movie "All 
the President's men". 
2.5. Forgetting and retrieval from LTS 
In the present theory retrieval of information from LTS (to STS) 
refers as in Shiffrin (1970a, p. 381) to the entire process of deciding 
what to search for, whether to search and how to search, and to the 
process whereby the subject recovers the information necessary to 
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produce the response from the (partial) information found in the LTS 
search. Retrieval is assumed to be governed by the information active 
in STS at the time of test. This information is assumed to consist of 
probe-cues placed in STS by the subject in an attempt to direct the 
search (for example previously recalled items in free recall or the 
stimulus member of a pair in paired-associate recall) and of contex-
tual cues which are also (and inevitably) present in STS. These 
(retrieval) cues will activate through an automatic associative 
mechanism related information in LTS. Note that the assumption that 
this aspect of retrieval (i.e. the activation of related information) 
is an automatic process (and thus not under control of the subject) 
is similar to the assumption of a strategy-free component of memory 
in the theory proposed by Anderson and Bower (1973). 
2.5.1. Shiffrin'a 1970 search model for retrieval from LTS 
The present theory for retrieval from long-term store is a modifi-
cation and extension of the search model proposed by Shiffrin (1970a). 
Therefore a brief recapitulation of that model is in order. The 
retrieval process as conceptualized by Shiffrin (1970a) is shown in 
Fig. 2.4. Thus, the subject first generates probe information and 
places it in STS. Then a search-set is selected based on this probe 
information. This search-set consists of a number of elementary informa-
tion units (I-units). These I-units (or features) are closely inter-
associated and stored as groups. Retrieval of one of these I-units 
will tend to lead to retrieval of the associated I-units (Shiffrin, 
1970a, p. 376-379). 
Fig. 2.5 gives a schematic view of this process: the I-units inside 
the large irregularly shaped area are those stored in LTS; those in the 
large solidly outlined area (called the search-set) are those through 
which the search is made; the information in the small dotted circles 
is that making up the particular images (Shiffrin, 1970a, p. 377). 
Note that Fig. 2.5 depicts a more general situation than that assumed 
in the specific model for free recall, since it is assumed that there 
may be I-units in the search-set not connected to a particular image. 
From the search-set one I-unit is randomly selected. Next, related 
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TEST INFORMATION 
(Stimuluf. type of respon·· 
requested, etc.) 
ЕХЕСІЛІ Е DECISION ИМЕВ 
(Whether t o s e a r c h j what memory s t o r e t o 
s e a r c h ; what s t r a t e g y t o u s e ; should 
search be t e i v l n a t e d u n s u c c e s s f u l l y t 
what s e a r c h - s e t i s t o b* de f ined ) 
SELECTION OF THE SEARCH-SET 
(Defined by o v e r a l l s t r a t e g i e s , cues 
prov ided In t e s t i n f o r m a t i o n , cues 
uncovered in p r e v i o u s draws) 
(An I - u n i t l a randomly s e l e c t e d fron 
the c o l l e c t i o n o f I - u n i t s making up 
t h e s e a r c h - s e t ) 
( I - u n i t e a s s o c i s t « d w i t h the I - u n i t 
drawn are r e c o v e r e d and ежашіпеа) 
RESPONSE DECISIONS 
(Whether t o respond or c o n t i n u e search) 
what r e s p o n s e t o emit ) 
«Γ ν 
Fig. 2.4. 
The recursive search and 
retrieval model of Shiffrin 
(Fig. 2 from Shiffrin, 1970a). 
I-units are recovered. Thus in Shiffrin's model two processes are 
distinguished: a sampling process whereby one I-unit is selected, and 
a recovery process whereby I-units associated to the sampled I-unit 
are "recovered". The probability of sampling a given item (i.e. an 
I-unit from a particular image) is of course dependent on the number 
of I-units in the other images present in the search-set. The recovery 
process however does not depend on the number of I-units outside the 
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Fig. 2.5. Organization of long-term store into search-sets 
and images following study of a paired-associates 
list. X's refer to I-units. (Fig. 1 from Shiffrin, 
m o a ) . 
image selected (i.e. the image of which one I-unit was sampled), but 
depends only on the number of I-units stored with the image selected. 
The probability of a successful response is determined by both the 
sampling process and the recovery process. The subject then decides 
whether the appropriate information has been found (i.e. some kind 
of, not explicitly specified, recognition process) and whether the 
search is over. If the search is continued the recursion loops back 
to the executive decision maker for possible selection of a new search-
set and continuation of the process. The process ends of course with 
the making of a response. 
A mathematical model was developed by Shiffrin (1970a) based on 
these principles and applied with considerable success to single-trial 
free recall. A different but related model was applied to two conti-
nuous paired-associate experiments (see also Shiffrin, 1968). 
In Shiffrin's 1970(a) model for free recall some general contex-
tual cue defined a search-set in LTS from which items were sampled with 
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replacement (after the contents of the STS buffer were retrieved). The 
sampling weights were assumed to be proportional to the strength of 
the image for an item. These items strengths were assumed to arise 
from a rehearsal process during study of the item. A buffer was used 
to model this rehearsal process: a fixed number of words (r, the buffer 
size) was assumed to undergo rehearsal on any trial in the buffer; 
once the buffer had been filled each succeeding word would enter the 
buffer and randomly replace one of the items currently being rehearsed. 
Note that in this case, 'trial' refers to presentation of one item 
from the list studied. The strength built up in LTS for a particular 
item was assumed to be a linear function of the time spent in the 
buffer (Shiffrin, 1970a, p. 394). 
Let the US-strength of item i (i=1 to N, the number of items on the 
list) be given by s.. Technically, s. stands for the number of I-units 
in the image representing item i; the better an item is studied the 
more I-units are stored in LTS. Then the probability of drawing item i 
(or more precisely an I-unit from the i-th image) is given by 
Pídj) = Sj/S (2.Í) 
where S is the combined strength stored for the entire list (= Ss.). 
As stated above, sampling of an item was assumed to be only part of 
the retrieval process. In addition to a sampling process, a response 
recovery process was postulated, as is shown in Fig. 2.4. The proba-
bility of emitting a correct response, if the image under examination 
indeed encodes the correct response, was assumed to be a function of 
the strength of the image. That is, the reasonable assunption was 
made that the probability that enough I-units were stored to enable 
the overt production of a response depends on the number of I-units 
originally stored. If R- denotes the emission of the (correct) 
response encoded in the i-th image, then 
PiR.ld^ = fis.) = 1 - expt-s^. (2.2) 
That is, the probability of correct recall given sampling of the 
correct image, was assumed to be an exponential function of the strength 
24 
of the item· The exponential function was used for no other than histo­
rical reasons (its use in older learning models) and simplicity. It 
is one of the simplest ways to transform a variable in the range (0,») 
into a probability value in the range (0,1): when the strength equals 
0 the probability of recovery equals 0, and when the strength is very 
high the probability of recovery approaches 1. 
It was assumed that a fixed number of draws was made during each 
recall period. This could be the result of a limited response period 
or of a decision by the subject to give up trying to recall new items. 
However, no reason was given why the subject would stop recalling after 
the same number of draws from a long list as from a short list. This 
assumption did however make it possible to fit the model to a variety 
of free recall experiments in which list length and presentation time 
were varied. It is not difficult to see that because of the assumption 
of a fixed number of draws the model predicts a list-length effect in 
free recall, one of the most reliably found results in this task. The 
list-length effect refers to the lower probability of recall for an 
item from a longer list conpared to an item from a shorter list. 
2.5.2. A new theory for· retrieval from LTS 
In later papers by Shiffrin (1975, 1976) and in a model (for cate­
gorized lists) proposed by Kundus (1973) but never worked out in 
detail, a process was postulated that would result in a relatively 
smaller number of draws from the stored representation of a long list 
than from that of a short list. They proposed that when an item is 
recalled from LTS its LTS-strength is increased, resulting in a 
higher probability of sampling that item on the following draws, since 
the sampling weights are proportional to the (current) LTS-strength. 
Coupled with an assumption that the subject stops recall after a 
criterion of say к total failures or к consecutive failures has been 
reached, this would account for the list-length effect. A major motiva­
tion for this kind of approach (in addition to the phenomena of output 
interference which will be discussed later) was the observation of 
most experimenters that after a recall period of about one minute 
subjects simply stare at the ceiling or in other ways seem to have 
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stopped trying to recall items unless they arc explicitely instructed 
and motivated to continue searching (see Roediger, 1978; Roediger & 
Thorpe, 1978). 
Our present theory for retrieval from LTS combines these assumptions 
with the notion of an associative network in LTS that is used in recall. 
The theory also gives much more explicit discussion of the role of 
contextual and interitem associations in the retrieval process. 
As stated above, in the present theory it is assumed that memory 
may be represented as a large and complex network of item-to-context 
and interitem associations. Fig. 2.6 gives a diagram of the present 
retrieval model similar to that in Fig. 2.4. Confronted with a question 
for information that may be stored in LTS the subject makes a retrie­
val plan. This retrieval plan includes such things as an initial 
decision whether to search LTS, how to search LTS (for instance in a 
temporal order or by using some alphabetical strategy), the type of 
probe cues likely to be succesful (e.g. whether recalled items will be 
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used as new retrieval cues), whether to search first for preliminary 
cues to guide later search, how long to search, etc. This retrieval 
plan is constructed on the basis of information that the subject has 
available in STS or on information in the test query. 
Next, the subject assembles the probe cues to be used in retrieval. 
These probe cues may consist of (a) information the subject has about 
the context at the time of study, (b) previously retrieved items (in 
free recall), and (c) items presented by the experimenter (in paired-
associate recall and recognition). The present context will also 
inevitably and always be part of the probe cues. Thus, the probe cues 
consist of all the information that is present in STS. The following 
phase is the search process (in a restricted sense). The information 
active in STS (the probe cues) will activate through an automatic 
process associated, related information in LTS. Since more information 
may be activated than can be handled by the limited-capacity processes 
in STS, the attention of the subject is directed to part of this 
information. Thus, in this part of the search process features corres-
ponding to a particular item are sampled. The third part of the search 
process is the recovery of context and item features, i.e. features 
related to the sanpled aggregate of features are activated and enter 
STS, where they may be used for evaluation, a conparison of recovered 
context features with the context cues in STS to determine whether 
the correct information has been recovered. As in the model of 
Shiffrin (1970a) the probability of recovering enough features to 
enable the production of a response depends on the amount of informa-
tion stored for the sanpled item. If not enough features are recovered, 
this retrieval attempt has ended in a failure and the subject must 
decide whether to stop or to make a new retrieval attenpt. 
This search process is formulated in the present model as follows: 
the searoh-set consists of the intersection of the search-sets induced 
by all probe cues separately; the probability of sampling a given item 
(i.e. the stored representation of that item in LTS) is proportional 
to the product of the associative strengths of that item to the probe 
cues; and the probability of recovery is a function of the sum of the 
associative strengths. Thus, if only a single retrieval cue is used 
(for example only a context cue at the start of retrieval in free 
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recall before any items have been recovered), the search-set consists 
of all the items (or images) associated to this retrieval cue. Let 
s(1,i) be the associative strength between this retrieval eve and 
item i. Then in this case all the items with s(1,i) ¿ 0 are members of 
the search-set. The probability of sampling item i is given by 
PCd.) = s(1,i)/Ss(1,j) (2.3) 
where the summation is over all items j with s O J ) ^ 0. The probabi-
lity of recovery given sampling is as in Shiffrin (1970a) given by 
PCRjId^ = 1 - expl-sd.i)]. (2.4) 
Note that this gives the probability that enough features are recovered 
to enable the production of a response. 
If there is more than one retrieval cue (for example a context cue 
and the stimulus member of a paired-associate item) we need some rule 
which describes the combined effect of the retrieval cues. A new aspect 
of the present theory for retrieval from LTS is this ability to specify 
sampling probabilities when a combination of probe cues is used. Let 
s(1,i) and s(2,i) be the associative strengths between cues 1 and 2 resp. 
and item i. As stated above wc will assume that the probability of 
sampling item i is proportional to the product of these associative 
strengths. Thus, if either s(1,i) or s(2,i) is equal to 0, item i will 
not be sampled (in this retrieval attempt); only items that are in the 
intersection of the search-sets of cue 1 and cue 2 will be in the 
search-set of the combination of both cues. Thus, in this case the 
probability of sampling item i is given by 
s(1,i)s(2,i) 
P(d.) (2.5) 
Ss(1,j)s(2,j) 
Two things may be noted about Eq. 2.5. First of all, the rule used 
is a product rule. Such a rule has the property that it limits the 
search to the intersection of the sets of items associated to each cue 
separately, and leads to the selection of items that are strongly 
associated to both cues (rather than to one cue alone, as would be 
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true for an additive combination rule). This product rule follows if one 
assumes that the probability of sampling an item should be proportional 
to each of the associative strengths separately. Secondly, note that 
the denominator includes the strength of the association of an item to 
itself. This association may be interpreted as representing the tendency 
of a given probe cue to elicit the image stored for that probe cue, in 
conparison with the tendency to elicit other images in the search-set. 
The inclusion of this association is particularly important in recogni-
tion tasks in which the subject must attempt to recover the stored 
representation of the tested item. It is also inportant in free recall 
because it tends to reduce the efficiency of using an item as a probe 
cue. 
Suppose now that item i has been sampled using these two retrieval 
cues. Then the probability of recovering the information (i.e. the 
probability that enough information is recovered to determine the 
name of the item represented and to determine whether the context of 
the image is appropriate for the list being recalled) is assumed to be 
PCRjIdj) = 1 - exp[-s(1,i)-s(2,i)]. (2.6) 
The probability of recall, on one loop of the search, is of course 
given by the product of the sampling and recovery probabilities: 
PCRi) = PCd^PCRildj). (2.7) 
Several reasons may be adduced for making the probability of 
recovery dependent on the total associative strength between the re-
trieval cues and the information stored in LTS. First of all, we may 
think of this phase of the search process as a kind of pattern comple-
tion process (Selz, 1922; Kintsch, 1974): the greater the overlap in 
features between the probe cues in STS and the sampled informational 
node(s) in LTS, the higher the probability of recovery, the probability 
that enough inactive features associated with this node become active 
to enable the production of a response. This overlap is obviously 
determined by both contextual as well as interitem associations. Further-
more, in the context of the present model this assumption is necessary 
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in order to explain the effects of interitem associative strength in 
free recall as reported by for example Deese (1959). Deese found that 
recall is better when items are generally easier to associate (i.e. 
have a higher preexperimental association value as demonstrated in free 
association tasks). If one does not want to assume that this means that 
more associations are formed in the case of a highly interassociated 
list (as in Anderson, 1972), but only that the strength of the associa-
tions formed during study of the items is higher, this will be repre-
sented in the model by an increase in the absolute strength of the 
interitem associations. However, the sampling probabilities do not 
depend on the absolute strengths, but only on the relative strengths, 
so this increase would not affect the sampling probabilities. There-
fore, it seems necessary to make the probability of recovery in this 
case dependent on the strength of both the contextual as well as the 
interitem associations. 
The final part of the retrieval process consists of various deci-
sions that will have to be made. First of all, the subject has to make 
a number of evaluations: was this item on the to be recalled list, was 
this item the response member of the tested pair (in paired-associate 
recall) or is it an intrusion, etc. This evaluation is based on a 
comparison of the retrieved context features with the context cues in 
STS. Thus, this is a kind of recognition process (as in Anderson & 
Bower, 1972). Depending on the outcome of this evaluation the subject 
makes a decision whether to output the item or not. If the item is 
not given as a response and if there is still some response-time left, 
the subject may continue his memory search either with the same or 
with slightly different probe cues, or he may give up trying to recall 
the information if he believes that further searching is useless. 
Note that we have indicated in Fig. 2.6 which parts of the retrieval 
process we consider to be automatic and thus not under subject control. 
As indicated there, in our conception the search process (in the 
restricted sense) is a completely automatic retrieval process. This is 
an important assumption because without it there would not really be 
a retrieval problemi If the subject would have control over which nodes 
are selected and how much information is recovered, he would always be 
able to find the information he seeks (given that it was stored in LTS). 
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Only time limitations would prevent him from finding the information. 
Furthermore it follows from our general conception that also the 
selection of probe cues has an automatic component. As stated earlier 
this probe information includes the general contextual information 
present in STS at the time of retrieval, in addition to the specific 
cues the subject uses to facilitate retrieval. The general context is 
not completely under subject control however, since it includes for 
example the environmental context and internal states (moods etc.) 
which may be difficult to alter. Thus, the probe cues will not be 
completely under subject control, and this fact is in the present 
theory one of the causes of retrieval failure. 
In the present theory forgetting in LTS is sijnply assumed to be a 
question of retrieval failure. That is, information is assumed to be 
permanently stored in LTS and is not subject to decay or extinction 
processes. Recall is not perfect however because the retrieval process 
is fallible. This is of course a quite common assunption in recent 
theories of memory. The distinction between availability of informa-
tion in memory and accessibility of that information was introduced 
by Tulving and Pearlstone (1966). The phenomenon that information 
becomes more and more difficult to retrieve with the passage of time 
is handled in Shiffrin's framework by a consideration of the role 
of contextual associations and context cues in retrieval: information 
is stored in LTS in connection with the context at the time of study 
(presentation); retrieval is mediated by the context at test (which 
will differ in general from the context at study since the context 
is continually changing) and by what the subject is able to reconstruct 
of the context at study; because of these factors the context cues 
that are used in retrieval will become more and more different from 
the context that was present during study, and will become less 
effective in aiding retrieval (Bower, 1972a; Bower, Monteiro & 
Gilligan, 1978; Smith, Glenberg & Bjork, 1978). 
A second factor in our explanation of retrieval failure has to do 
with the phenomenon of output interference that has recently attracted 
a great deal of attention. Output interference refers to the detrimen-
tal effects of recall of a given item on the probability of retrieving 
other items. This will be explained as follows. The probability of 
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retrieval is determined among other things by the strength of the 
associations to context cues. If a given item has been retrieved it 
enters STS for a short while, and it is attended to and given some 
controlled processing. In accordance with our assunption about storage 
in LTS it therefore follows that the associations to the probe cues 
(including the present context) will be increased in strength. 
Consequently, the probability will be increased that this already 
recalled item will be sampled on the next search cycle since the pro-
bability of sampling an item is dependent on the relative associative 
strengths. Thus it becomes progressively more difficult to find new 
information in LTS, the search becomes less and less effective. This 
mechanism will play an important role in our model for free recall 
(see chapter 3). We will defer a detailed examination of this 
phenomenon until that time. 
In the following chapters we will first apply the present theory to 
a number of experiments in single-trial free recall (both categorized 
and uncategorized lists) and then present the results of a new study 
on list-length effects in free recall and paired-associate recall, 
followed by a brief discussion of the application of the present frame-
work to recognition. 
32 
A MODEL FOR SINGLE-TRIAL 3 
FREE RECALL 
3.1. Uncategorized lists 
As stated earlier, memory is conceived to be a large associative 
network. This network may be represented by a matrix of associations. 
TVo types of associations are distinguished in this case: item-to-
context associations and interitem associations. For simplicity these 
interitem associations are assumed to be bidirectional so that the 
forward and backward associations have the same strength or, stated 
differently, the association of item i to item j is equal in strength 
to the association of item j to item i. In the present applications we 
will assume that the context may be represented by a single general 
context cue, the "list context". Note that this assumption is an over-
simplification, made only for simplicity and mathematical covenience. 
Thus, our matrix of associations has n+1 rows and columns (where η is 
the number of items on the list): 
I 
η 
s(n) 
s(l,n) 
s(2,n) 
s(n,n) 
SCI) 
s(2) 
"1 '2 
s(l) s(2) 
s(l,l) 8(1,2) 
s(2,l) 8(2,2) 
s(n) s(n,l) s(n,2) 
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The off-diagonal elements are the item-to-context associations 
denoted by s(i), and the interitem associations denoted by s(i,j). What 
we put on the diagonal seems to be largely arbitrary in that different 
choices (for instance a fixed constant or the value of the item-to-
context association) will lead to approximately the same results. 
Because of the way we have chosen to represent the combined effect of 
retrieval cues (see p. 28), those elements should not however be set 
equal to 0 since that would mean that an item that is used as a probe 
cue cannot lead to retrieval of its own LTS representation. In the 
present analyses we have set the value of the diagonal elements equal 
to the item-to-context associative strengths. This may be justified 
as follows. s(i,i) represents the association of item i to itself, 
i.e. the tendency with which presentation of the item in the context 
at test leads to retrieval of the stored representation of item i in 
the context at study. This association may be interpreted as represen­
ting the overlap between the features of item i at test and the features 
of item i in the list context. It seems natural to assume that the 
longer item i has been studied the higher will be the probability that 
presentation of item i (e.g. in a recognition task) leads to retrieval of 
the memory code representing item i in the relevant context. Setting 
the value of s(i,i) equal to the item-to-context associative strength 
does just that. Thus, a "strong" item has a higher probability of 
sampling itself than a "weak" item (everything else being equal). This 
choice also makes it possible to adjust the relative values of the two 
types of associations since an increase in the contextual associations, 
while holding the interitem associations constant, means a decrease in 
the effectiveness of the items as retrieval cues. 
An associative network that consists of both types of associations 
is developed in LTS through rehearsal in STS. In the present applica­
tions we will assume that all rehearsal that goes on in STS is coding 
rehearsal (elaborative rehearsal). Thus we assume that the strength 
of the association between two elements is directly proportional to 
the time the two elements were together in STS. Therefore, if we let 
θι resp. θ 2 be the itern-to-context resp. the interitem associative 
strength stored in LTS per second of study in STS, we get: 
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sii) = θιί. t.: number of secs that item i is in STS 
v i
 1 1 
sfi.j) = e2t.. t. .: number of sees that items i and i I · J 4
 '
J
'
 ¿
 13 ij J 
are together in STS 
The range of both Ъ\ and θ2 is (O,»). Note that units do not have 
to be specified for these two associative strengths due to the formula's 
used for the probabilities of recovery (see Eqs. 3.7 and 3.10). Speci­
fication of these units would only introduce an additional, unestimable 
parameter in those formula's. 
Because of the lack of a theoretical alternative we use a rehearsal 
buffer in STS (see Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968) as a model for the 
rehearsal process in STS. One should however keep in mind that this is 
an auxiliary assunption, independent of the basic assumption that in­
formation is stored in LTS whenever two items are studied together or 
whenever an item is studied in the presence of a contextual cue. This 
point should perhaps be emphasized since it is ignored in some recent 
papers by Brodie and Murdock (1977) and Murdock and Metcalfe (1978). 
In those papers two types of serial position curves are conpared: 
"nominal" serial position curves where the items are ordered according 
to their presentation position, and "functional" serial position 
curves where the items are ordered according to the time they were 
last rehearsed. They showed that longer presentation times enhanced 
recall of the early and middle nominal positions, but enhanced recall 
of the terminal functional serial positions. On the basis of these 
results they argued that two-store theories (e.g. Atkinson & Shiffrin 
(1968 ], Glanzer [1972 ] and the present theory) and several other 
theories (e.g. Craik & Lockhart [ 1972 ] ; Tulving [ 1968 ] ) were contra­
dicted by those results. However, their data can be predicted very 
well if one knows the rehearsal time and the retention interval of 
each item as Brodie and Murdock (1977) themselves show. The influence 
of rehearsal time is of course completely consistent with a two-store 
theory. It seems as though Brodie and Murdock (1977) erroneously 
believe that two-store theories assume that as long as recall is from 
long-term store it does not matter how long the item has been in 
short-term store or what type of processing went on in STS. As to the 
influence of the retention interval, Fig. 4 in Murdock and Metcalfe 
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(1978, p. 316) clearly shows this to be a short-term forgetting process, 
just as one would expect from a two-store theory. Thus, these theories 
are not contradicted by those results; on the contrary, these theories 
can explain those data without any difficulty. Parenthetically, it may 
be noted that the "criticism" of Brodie and Murdodc (1977) is almost 
exactly the reverse of the arguments raised by levels-of-processing 
theorists (e.g. Craik & Lockhart, 1972) against the Atkinson and 
Shiffrin approach. The latter believed that Atkinson and Shiffrin held 
the position that only rehearsal time and not what type of rehearsal 
(e.g. maintenance or elaborative rehearsal, see also Craik & Watkins, 
1973) is used, determines the probability of long-term recall. 
Of course it may be true that the proposed buffer model is not 
entirely accurate in predicting which items will be rehearsed at 
different points in time, but as yet we do not have a simple alterna­
tive model. Moreover, the present theory maintains that this rehearsal 
strategy is a subject-controlled process and therefore there is no 
such thing as one particular rehearsal model that is correct in every 
situation. 
The present rehearsal model is one of the simplest versions of a 
buffer model. A fixed nuniier of items (r, the size of the buffer, i.e. 
the maximum number of items that can be rehearsed at the same time) is 
assumed to be rehearsed at any one time in the buffer. Items will be 
kicked out of the buffer by succeeding items only if the buffer has 
been filled. Once the buffer has been filled each succeeding item 
replaces one of the items in the buffer. For simplicity, we will assume 
that every item in the buffer has the same probability of being replaced 
irrespective of how long that item has been in the buffer. This parti­
cular auxiliary assumption affects only the shape of the recency part 
of the serial position curve. With other, more complicated assumptions 
a more S-shaped recency effect is obtained. Because we use this buffer 
process only as a means for storing an associative network in LTS, 
we have chosen the most simple version, although it is recognized that 
this version may not be correct in several minor details. 
If η is the number of "trials" that an item stays in the buffer and 
if t is the presentation time per item, then the item-to-context 
associative strength is equal to Sjtn. Thus we have the following 
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probability distribution for s(i) (see Shiffrin, 1970a): 
P[s(i) = θ^π ]· 
η < r- i , i < г 
CI - ф П - 1 - Г * і ф n > r - i , i < r (3.2) 
Ι ( і - ^ ф i > r 
Note that for the moment we ignore the complexities introduced by 
the fact that the buffer does not continue to operate indefinitely. 
Presumably rehearsal stops when recall begins. In the simulation 
program that incorporates the present model we have made the assumption 
that rehearsal stops after the last item has been presented unless 
there is some interpolated activity in which case the buffer continues 
to operate. Therefore, the above equations are an approximation to the 
real distribution of s(i) when no interpolated task is given. The 
expected value of s(i) is given by 
E[s(i)] = 
te^Zr-i) 
tSjr 
i < г 
i > г 
(3.3) 
Thus in the present model the primacy effect (the higher probability 
of recall for the first few items) is accounted for by a higher 
associative strength for those items (as in the earlier models of 
Atkinson and Shiffrin [1968] and Shiffrin [1970a)). It is assumed to be 
a storage effect rather than a retrieval effect. (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 
1971; Shiffrin, 1973). The major other explanation of the primacy 
effect is in terms of positional retrieval cues (Sanders, 1975). This 
hypothesis has the advantage of being able to accomodate proactive 
inhibition effects on the recall of the first few items. It should 
be evident that the present model for retrieval could be adjusted to 
include the effect of positional retrieval cues (as part of the 
context cues). Note however that there is no necessary opposition 
between these two alternative hypotheses. Both hypotheses may be used 
simultaneously. 
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Similarly, the probability distribution of s(i,j), the interitem 
associative strength, is: 
P[s(i,i+j)=e2tn]= 
(n> 1) 
n-^
n
"
1
"
r + i +Jf?i 
i < г, j < r-i, η < r-i-j 
i < г, j < r-i, η > r-i-j 
,- 1-.І-Г+І,·, 2-,n-1,2^  . _ . . (1--)J (1~) (-) ι < r, j > r-i 
l-J)j(1-|)n_1(f) i > r 
Ρ [ s(i,i+j) = 0] = 1 - P[s(i,i+j) > 0] . 
(3.4) 
As before, these distributions are only an approximation to the real 
distributions generated by our simulation program. The expected value 
of s(i,i+j) is: 
E[s(i,i+j)] = 
Jt92(3r-2i-2j) 
!t9 2r(1-^-
r + i 
Itezrd-J)3 
i < r, j < r-i 
i < r, j > r-i 
i > r . 
(3.5) 
Note that the expected interitem aasooiative strength between items i 
and ò azareases with the number of items interpolated between i and j'. 
In this way an associative network is developed in LTS similar to that 
in many other theories (e.g. Anderson, 1972). 
At the beginning of the recall period the subject first recalls 
the contents of his STS-buffer. This produces in our model the socalled 
recency effect, the very high probability of recalling the items 
presented last. Recall of these items from STS does not result in a 
higher LTS strength, since they have not been recalled from LTS. This 
assurrption is also necessary because if these STS-items also had an 
inhibiting effect, one would expect that the erasion of STS by an 
interpolated task would increase the probability of recall for the 
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other items (in the beginning and middle of the list). Such an increase 
has not been observed however (Glanzer & Cunitz, 1966; Postman & 
Phillips, 1965). A similar conclusion was drawn by Bjork (1975b) on the 
basis of recent research on negative recency. 
It should perhaps be emphasized that the present buffer model should 
not be interpreted as a model for retrieval processes from STS. We 
merely use the buffer model as a means for predicting high recall 
probabilities for the most recent items. There is however considerable 
evidence that the recency effect reflects a retrieval process from 
STS that depends on the use of temporal retrieval cues (see Baddeley, 
1978; Baddeley & Hitch, 1977; Sanders, 1975; Shiffrin, 1970a). Such 
an explanation of the recency effect is consistent with the finding 
that under certain special conditions there is a long-term "recency" 
effect (Bjork & Whitten, 1974) which does not disappear by inter-
polating an interfering task between study and recall. Thus, this 
hypothesis states that whenever items are temporally distinghuisable, 
temporal (i.e. recency-sensitive) retrieval strategies may be used, 
resulting in a higher probability of recall for the items presented 
last. It should be noted furthermore that in the present theory the 
"buffer" does not coincide with STS or the working memory. Our 
assumption of a buffer process as a model for the rehearsal process 
is quite similar to the "articulatory loop" assumption proposed by 
Baddeley and Hitch (1977). These remarks suffice to show that the 
explanation of recency effects may be considerably more complex than 
our simple assumption might suggest. However, since we are not 
concerned with short-term retrieval but only with long-term retrieval, 
we will not digress any further on this topic. 
After the contents of STS have been recalled, the subject starts 
his retrieval from LTS. Fig. 3.1 gives a flowchart corresponding to 
this part of the simulation program. In the present version of the 
irodel recall goes on until a criterion of KMAX total failures is 
reached. A failure is every retrieval attempt that does not lead to 
recall of a new item. The choice of this particular stop-rule is 
largely arbitrary. We could just as well have taken a criterion of 
say m consecutive failures. Most subjects probably use a criterion 
that lies somewhere between these two extremes. Anyway, it does not 
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seem to be that important which rule is used since simulations show 
that if we hold everyting else the same, a rule of 30 total failures 
(the value assigned to KMAX in the present simulations) gives almost 
exactly the same results as a rule of 12 consecutive failures. 
Thus, at the start of the recall from LTS the total failure counter 
К is set equal to 0 (see Fig. 3.1). Next, the subject uses the general 
context cue, representing the context during study of that particular 
list, to sample from the items that are associated to that cue. Thus, 
the probability of sampling a given item i on this retrieval attempt 
is given by 
PCd.) = s(i)/Ss(j) (3.6) 
Note that in this model we ignore the occurrence of intrusions. Because 
context cues are used as retrieval cues and because items that were 
not on the list are not likely to be strongly associated to the list 
context, it follows that non-list items will not be sampled often. 
Мэгео ег, it is assumed that intrusions that do occur, are recognized 
as such and will be considered as failures. Therefore, the neglecting 
of intrusions has no serious consequences on the predictions of the 
model. The effect is simply a small, uniform decrease of the probability 
of successful recall, which can be handled by slightly lowering the 
probability of recovery. 
Now suppose that item i has indeed been sampled. As is shown in 
Fig. 3.1 this is a failure if the item is "old" or if the item is not 
recovered. An item is considered "old" if it has already been sampled 
at least once using this cue. Note that it does not matter whether the 
item was indeed recalled at that time, i.e. it may not have been re­
covered. Thus, it is assumed that an item that was not recovered upon 
selection, will fail again on a later selection using the same probe 
cues with probability 1.0. This may be justified by the assumption 
that the probability of recovery depends on the overlap between the 
features of the retrieval cues and the features stored for the sampled 
item. A given, fixed set of probe features will always lead to recovery 
(i.e. activation) of the same set of features stored for the sampled 
item. Thus, this recovery process is not itself a probabilistic process. 
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What is probabilistic is the event that this set of recovered features 
includes those features necessary for the production of the response. 
If the item was not recovered on its first selection, it follows that 
the overlap in features was not large enough to activate all features 
necessary for the recall of that item. When the item is selected again 
on a later draw using the same probe cues, more or less the same 
features will presumably be activated and therefore the recovery will 
fail again. We have furthermore assumed that items that were already 
recalled are recognized as such (in most cases they are written down, 
and will therefore be available to the subject). 
If the item is not "old", it is recovered with probability 
PCRjIdj) = 1 - exp[-s(i)]. (3.7) 
Upon recovery the associative strength between this item and the 
context is increased as follows: 
s'Ci) = s(i) + э (3.8) 
where s(i) stands for the old value of the associative strength and 
s'(i) for the new value. Note that the associative strength in in­
creased only on the first retrieval of an item. This assumption is 
based on the following reasoning. The increase in associative strength 
depends on the "attention" given to the item. Most "attention" will 
presumably be given to the item on its first retrieval : it is assumed 
that an item will be used as a new retrieval cue only upon its first 
retrieval; icon subsequent retrievals it will be discarded quickly, 
since it was already used as a cue and therefore it is not likely that 
that same item will lead to retrieval of new items. 
Upon its first recovery, the recalled item is used as an additional 
retrieval cue to access items that are associated to that item. So in 
this case two retrieval cues are used. Following our general model 
the probability of sampling a given item j is given by 
s(j)s(i,j) 
P(d,) . (3.9) 
3
 Ss(k)s(i,k) 
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Suppose item j has been sampled. Then as before this is a failure 
if the item is "old" or not recovered. Note however that in this case 
an item may have been sampled but not recovered before, using only 
the context cue (or the context cue in combination with a different 
item) and still be considered "new". An item is considered "old" only 
if it has been sampled before using this particular cue combination, 
or if it was already recalled before. Note that if an item was already 
sampled before and not recovered using this particular cue combination, 
it follows from our conception of recovery that a new sampling of this 
item will lead to activation of (more or less) the same set of features 
as were activated the first time. Therefore, the information necessary 
for the production of the response will again not be available, and 
therefore this retrieval attempt will result in a failure. Furthermore, 
it is assumed (see above) that if a sampled item that was already 
recalled before> is recovered again on this retrieval attempt, the 
subject will be able to recognize the item as an already recalled item. 
The probability of recovery in this case is given by 
POjIdj) = 1 - exp[-s(j)-s(i,j)] . (3.10) 
If item j has been sampled and recovered the associative strengths 
between item j and the two retrieval cues are increased: 
s'Ü) = s(j) + Θ3 (3.11) 
s'Ci.j) = s(i,j) + ц. (3.12) 
Since we have assumed that the interitem associations are bidirectional 
the backward association is also increased in strength: 
s'CJ.i) = s(j,i) t e„. (3.13) 
After item j has been recovered, that item is used as a new retrieval 
cue along with the general context cue. In this way extensive use is 
made of the interitem associations in the associative network stored 
in LTS. If item j has not been recovered a new retrieval attempt is 
made using item i as a retrieval cue. 
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This continues until a criterion of LMAX consecutive failures is 
reached (see Fig. 3.1), i.e. until the subject feels that further 
search using this item will not be useful. Then a new retrieval attempt 
is made using only the context cue. This recursive process continues 
until a criterion of KMAX total failures is reached. 
In our present model we have included the additional assumption that 
at the end of recall the subject performs a final "check": he uses each 
of the items that he has recalled (presumably they are written down and 
hence available) in a last attempt at recall of additional items (ІЖХ 
attenpts with each recalled item). Any new items recovered in this 
process are also "rechecked". This was done because we wished to let 
the search continue until it could be argued that the subject feels 
his memory to be exhausted. However, for the parameter values that we 
conmonly use this does not result in much additional recall. 
It is not too difficult to see that our model is at least potential­
ly able to explain a variety of data in free recall, especially if one 
recognizes that the model combines features of two powerful models, 
namely the model of Shiffrin (1970a) and the FRAN model of Anderson 
(1972). In the following sections we will discuss a number of empirical 
results that the present model is able to explain. 
3.1.1. Serial position curves, list-length effects and the effects of 
presentation time 
In view of the results obtained by Shiffrin (1970a) it should come 
as no surprise that the present model does a good job in describing 
the general shape of the serial position curve. However, as was remar­
ked by Norman (1970), any model of memory that wishes to be taken 
seriously must pass this test. It is only a necessary and not a suffi­
cient condition for the acceptance of that model. Primacy and recency 
effects are predicted by our model as a consequence of the buffer 
assumption. These effects are therefore easy to predict but they are 
not very informative concerning the LTS retrieval process. Note 
however that more complex retrieval processes may be involved in the 
primacy and recency effects (Baddeley & Hitch, 1977; Sanders, 1975). More­
over we will not be concerned with proactive inhibition effects on the 
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serial position curve which seem to require the assumption of positional 
retrieval cues (Sanders, 1975). 
A more interesting result is that the model is able to describe the 
serial position curves for different list lengths and presentation 
times with the same set of parameter values. Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 
show the serial position curves obtained by Murdock (1962) and those 
predicted by our model. In Murdock's experiment six groups of subjects 
each had a different combination of list length and presentation rate. 
The six conditions were 10-2, 20-1, 15-2, 30-1, 20-2 and 40-1, where 
the first nunfcer refers to the list length and the second number 
indicates the number of seconds that an item was presented. Thus, we 
have three groups of two conditions each that are matched for total 
presentation time (this was done in order to test the socalled total-
time hypothesis, see below, p. 48). 
The parameters of our model were estimated by a Monte Carlo 
simulation technique from the data of conditions 10-2, 20-1, 20-2 and 
40-1, within limits of computertime. These parameter estimates should 
not be regarded as optimal however since only a limited search of the 
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parameter space was feasible. Moreover, the parameter space is quite 
shallow, so that many other combinations of parameter values will give 
a fit about equally good. Because of this, no attempt was made to 
estimate the parameter values beyond the first two significant digits 
(in the case of Θ3 and ^ only one significant digit). Furthermore 3 
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Fig. 3.4. Serial position curves for conditions 15-2 and 
30-1 obtained by Murdock (1962) with predictions 
of the model. 
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and θι, were always assigned the same value. The predicted values are 
based on 1200 simulation runs (i.e. simulated "subjects") with the 
following paranieter values: θι = 0.065, г = 0.015, з = 0.6, θι, = 0.6, 
г = 4, КМАХ = 30 and ШАХ = 3. It is interesting to note that the 
estimate of the buffer size turns out to be around 4, since this 
corresponds nicely with the minimal size of the memory span (see Sanders, 
1968). The fit is quite impressive especially when one keeps in mind 
that a single set of parameter values was used to predict the data of 
all six conditions. 
Note that both the predictions of the model and the data show a 
list-length effect: the probability of recall is a decreasing function 
of list length. This list-length effect is predicted by the model 
because the search termination criterion is exceeded sooner for the 
longer lists, relative to the list length, i.e. relatively fewer draws 
are made from a longer list than from a shorter list (this follows 
from simple probability theoretical considerations, see also Eq. 3.18). 
The probability of sampling an item is therefore lower for an item 
from a longer list. This effect is predicted by the model even when 
the criterion is set very high (KMAX = 100) or when a stop-rule of 
m consecutive failures is used. Thus, this predietion is a aonsequenae 
of the basic structure of the model: a sampling-with-replacement 
retrieval process in which a general context cue is used as a retrie­
val cue, coupled with a fixed termination criterion (i.e. the 
criterion does not vary with list length). 
The present version of the model predicts somewhat less primacy 
than observed in conditions 20-1 and 30-1. This might be remedied 
either by using a slightly different buffer model in which the amount 
of information transferred to LTS is dependent on the number of 
other items concurrently in the buffer (see Atkinson & Shiffrin, 
1968, p. 181) or by assuming that positional information is used as a 
retrieval cue (Sanders, 1975). However, such a revised buffer model 
gives a worse fit presumably because it predicts too much primacy 
for all conditions with a 2 sec presentation time per item (although 
this may not be a necessary result of a positional cue assumption). 
The present model also predicts somewhat less recency than was ob­
served. This might be remedied either by a different replacement as-
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sumption in our buffer model, i.e., a higher probability of replacing 
the oldest item in the buffer, or by a positional retrieval cue 
assumption (Sanders, 1975; Baddeley & Hitch, 1977). The main features 
however that we are interested in, the list-length effect and the 
effect of presentation time, are predicted quite well by our model. 
Moreover, one should perhaps not adopt a too stringent criterion in 
fitting these data since there appear to be some unexplainable abbera-
tions in these data. For example, no model would probably predict that 
the mean number of words recalled would be higher in condition 30-1 
than in condition 40-1, yet Murdock obtained a mean of 8.82 (30-1) 
versus 8.24 (40-1) which is highly significant (t = 9.37, df = 27981) 
although the difference is not very large in absolute magnitude. 
Next we will consider the total-time effect. On the basis of a 
number of experiments Murdock (1960) concluded that the number of items 
recalled is determined by the total presentation time and thus it 
should not matter how that time is divided up into number of items 
and presentation time per item. Postman and Warren (1972) found that 
indeed approximately the same number of words were recalled for 20-3, 
30-2 and 60-1 lists. A second hypothesis advanced by Murdock (1960) 
states that there is a linear relationship between the number of 
words recalled and the total presentation time. Waugh (1967) however 
found that the number of words recalled increased in a negatively 
accelerated fashion. Roberts (1972) suggests that the discrepancy 
between the results obtained by Murdock (1960) and those obtained by 
Waugh (1967) might be explained by the fact that Murdock used a kind 
of cued recall procedure: the subjects were given alphabetically 
arranged answer sheets. That is, subjects were given answer sheets 
containing the letters of the alphabet and were asked to write their 
answers next to the initial letter of the word recalled. Thus, Murdock's 
subjects may have been able to overcome retrieval limitations normally 
present in free recall. However, several arguments may be raised 
against such an explanation. First of all, it is a dubious assumption 
that there are no retrieval limitations in paired-associate recall. 
Indeed, further on (see chapter 4) we will present abundant and clear-
cut evidence that list-length effects do occur in single-trial paired-
associate recall. Secondly, if there were no retrieval limitations in 
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Murdock's procedure one would not expect the list-length effect found 
by Murdock. 
Roberts (1972) reported the results of a large, well controlled 
study, where four list lengths (10, 20, 30 or 40 items) and five presen­
tation rates (.5, 1, 2, 4, or 8 seconds per item) were varied in a 
factorial design. His results are shown in Figs. 3.5 and 3.6, where we 
have averaged the data for the auditory and the visual presentation 
modes (see Roberts, 1972). Note that these results include recall from 
short-term store since no interpolated task was given. These results 
not only show that the mean number of words recalled is not a linear 
function of the total presentation time but a negatively accelerated 
function as found by Waugh (1967), but they also clearly show that the 
total-time hypothesis is incorrect: equal total presentation times do 
not yield equal levels of recall. 
Figs. 3.5 and 3.6 also show the predictions derived from the present 
model. These predictions include of course the recall from the STS-
о 
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Fig. 3.5. Mean number 
of words recalled as a 
function of total pre­
sentation time with 
list length (LL) as the 
parameter. Top half: 
data from Roberts 
(1972); bottom half: 
predictions of the 
model. 
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Fig. 3.6. Mean number of 
words recalled as a function 
of total presentation time 
with presentation time (PT) 
per item as the parameter. 
Top half: data from Roberts 
(1972); bottom half: pre-
dictions of the model. 
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Fig. 3.7. A comparison of 
the predicted and observed 
probabilities of recall 
for the 20 conditions of 
Roberts (1972). 
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buffer (since the data also include a STS component). It can be seen 
that the model does an excellent job in describing the relationship 
found by Roberts (1972). The predicted means are based on 300 simulation 
runs with the parameter values : θ ι = 0.12, θ 2 = 0.10, O3 = 0.7, 
4 = 0.7, г = 4, КМАХ = 30 and LMAX = 3. These parameter estimates 
were not really estimated in the usual sense. The previously obtained 
estimates (those used to describe Murdock's [1962] serial position 
curves) were adjusted to get the means in the correct range: г, KMAX 
and LMAX were kept constant, and θχ, θ2 and Θ3 were varied (
 4 was 
always assigned the same value as 3). Therefore it is even more sur­
prising that the fit is as good as it is. Fig. 3.7 gives an indication 
of the goodness-of-fit. It shows a comparison of the predicted and 
observed probabilities of recall for each of the 20 conditions of 
Roberts' experiment. Note that in our model presentation time per item 
has its effect mostly on the probability of recovery, not on the pro­
bability of sampling (see Eqs. 3.6 and 3.7). There is only a small 
effect on the probability of sampling due to the fact that the increase 
in associative strength upon successful recovery is the same constant 
in all conditions and thus relatively higher in the case of a lower 
presentation time per item. Parenthetically, it may be noted that the 
fact that the present model produces the same kind of relationships 
as obtained by Roberts (1972) not only lends credence to the model 
but also makes it reasonable to assume that these data and not those 
of Murdock (1960) or Waugh (1967) describe the "true" relationship 
between total presentation time and the level of recall. It should 
perhaps be emphasized that the list-length effects and the effects of 
presentation time predicted by our model are the result of the basic 
structure of the model and not of the particular parameter values 
used. 
Note finally that a list-length effect is evident in these data. 
As was explained above, our model predicts such effects because rela­
tively fewer samples are made from a longer list. Thus, the list-
length effect is assumed to be a retrieval effect, not a storage 
effect. It cannot be a storage effect since it is observed also when 
the subjects do not know how long the list is going to be. Another 
explanation was given by Murdock (1960; 1967b) and Craik (1968). They 
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suggested that in Murdock's linear equation that described the total 
number of words recalled as a function of the total presentation time 
(see p. 48), the intercept could be interpreted as reflecting the 
fixed number of items recalled from short-term store. The slope of 
that equation would then give the proportion of items recalled from 
long-term store. Thus, they essentially argued that the list-length 
effect is an artifact resulting from the fact that recall from short-
term store is not proportional to list length. However, this position 
is untenable since a similar list-length effect is observed when an 
interfering task is interpolated between study and recall. Moreover, 
the data of Roberts (1972) show that for a fixed presentation rate, 
recall is a curvi-linear function of list length, not a linear one. 
Finally, interference explanations based on proactive and retroactive 
inhibition effects (e.g. Postman & Phillips, 1965) cannot explain the 
result obtained by Shiffrin (1970b). In that experiment subjects were 
asked to recall not the list presented last, but the list presented 
prior to that one. The results showed that the probability of recall 
depended only on the length of the list tested, not on the number of 
items preceding presentation or intervening between presentation and 
test of that list. 
3.1.2. Temporal eharaateristios of free recall 
The present model makes a number of predictions about temporal 
aspects of recall. Below we will compare the results of several expe­
riments on interresponse times and cumulative output curves with the 
results of simulations of our model. In order to see which assumptions 
in the model produce these results it seems helpful to consider brief­
ly a related but much simpler model for retrieval. Let us assume that 
the subject samples from a pool of η items using a single probe 
cue. It is further assumed that the associations of all items to 
this cue are equally strong. Thus, all the sampling weights are equal 
(see Eq. 3.6). For simplicity we will assume that all items that are 
sampled are also recovered and that these items are not strengthened. 
This situation may be represented by the following physical model. 
An urn contains m black balls and η red balls. A ball is drawn at 
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random from this urn. If it is a black ball (a failure) it is replaced 
and a new ball is sampled. If it is a red ball (i.e. a new, not pre­
viously sampled item) it is replaced by a black ball before a new ball 
is drawn. Note that this corresponds to the assumption made earlier 
that an already recalled item is always recognized as such. This 
process continues until the last red ball is sampled. 
If we assume that the waiting time between successive red balls is 
a continuous random variable with range 0 < t < » , it follows.that 
these waiting times have a negative exponential distribution (because 
for each s > 0, the distribution of the remaining time t-s given that 
the ball has not been sampled by time s, is the same as the uncon­
ditional distribution of t, and this is the defining property of the 
negative exponential distribution [sM Clarke & Disney, 1970, p. 185; 
Feller, 1968, p. 459]). Thus the time between the sampling of the 
(i-1) and the i red ball is given by: 
f j W = X ie' Xi t i=1,2,...,n (3.14) 
with 
(η-ί+1)λ 
λ. (λ-λΟ . (3.15) 
Such a process is called a pure death process. McGill (1963) shows 
that the density function of the time until the (k+1) red ball 
(item) is sampled, is given by 
g k + 1(t) = (n-k)£(£)(e-
X t / n) n- k(1-e- X t / n) k. (3.16) 
The probability distribution of the number of items retrieved by time 
t can be shown to be the following binomial distribution (McGill, 
1963): 
Ρ [n(t)=k] = (!b(e" U / n) n" k(1-e" x t / n) k · (3.17) 
To see why this results in a binomial distribution, it is helpful to 
consider the probability that a partioular item is retrieved by time 
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t. This probability is given by the cumulative distribution of the 
negative exponential distribution with parameter -At/n (i.e. the 
distribution of the time between the (n-1) and the η item). This 
cumulative probability is equal to 1-e:xp(-Xt/n). Thus, the probability 
that к out of η items are retrieved by time t is given by the binomial 
distribution in Eq. 3.17, since the sampling probabilities are inde­
pendent. The expected number of items retrieved by time t is then 
given by 
E [n(t)] = n(1-e" X t / n) . (3.18) 
We will now consider some empirical results that are consistent 
with this simple model. Bousfield^nd Sedgewick (1944) showed that 
in their experiments the total number of items that a subject could 
produce from a specified category (e.g. animals, U.S. cities) within 
time t, could be adequately described by the equation 
n(t) = n(-)(1-e"at) . (3.19) 
Note that this was not a free recall task but a "free production" 
task. Subjects were simply asked to generate as many examples from a 
given category as possible. Comparison of (3.18) and (3.19) shows that 
their data are consistent with a sampling-with-replacement assumption. 
Several investigators have reported data that show an inverse relation­
ship between the rate of recall (a) and the asymptotic number of items 
recalled (n(»)) (Johnson, Johnson & Mark, 1951; Bousfield, Sedgewick & 
Cohen, 1954; Indow & Togano, 1970). This is exactly what is predicted 
from our simple model (compare Eqs. 3.18 and 3.19): 
λ λ 
(3.20) 
η n(">) 
That it is indeed the sampling-with-replacement process (i.e. 
retrieval of an item does not lower its probability of sampling) that 
is responsible for the negatively accelerated growth of the number of 
items recalled, was nicely demonstrated by Indow and Togano (1970). 
They reported data from an experiment in which the subject was either 
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asked to list cities in Japan in a predetermined order (e.g. north to 
south) or was given no instructions regarding order of output. In the 
latter case the usual growth function (i.e. Eq. 3.19) was obtained. 
In the former case however the number of cities recalled by time t 
was described by a straight line through the origin, i.e. 
n(t) = ct . (3.21) 
This result is predicted from the assumption that the rate of recall 
is constant. This assunption is consistent with the idea that the 
subject goes through the items in a predetermined order, that is he 
does not sample with replacement using a single general retrieval 
cue ("Japan") but an ordered series of "smaller" retrieval cues 
(successive parts of Japan). 
Can this simple model also be applied to a free recall situation? 
This question was investigated by Bousfield, Sedgewick and Cohen 
(1954). A free recall task differs from a free production task in 
that the search-set is not defined by a semantic relation but by the 
occurrence on a previously presented list. In Tulving's terminology 
(Tulving, 1972), free recall is an episodic memory task, whereas free 
production is a semantic memory task. Bousfield et al. (1954) found 
that in a free recall situation the number of items recalled by time 
t was not described very well by their simple growth curve (Eq. 3.19): 
recall of the first few items was too rapid in comparison with that 
of the later items. This might be explained in several ways. First of 
all, the first few items may have been recalled from STS. This would 
under quite reasonable assumptions about relative retrieval rates in 
STS and LTS result in faster retrieval of the items recalled from 
STS and relatively longer interresponse times for the other items. 
Secondly, the sampling weights of the items, the strengths of the 
associations to the probe cues, may not be equal. Thus, the "strong" 
items would come out relatively fast and the "weak" items relatively 
slow (see Shiffrin, 1970a). A third reason could be that the recalled 
items are strengthened and that therefore these items are more likely 
to be sampled later on. This would also result in a relatively slower 
retrieval rate for the items recalled last. 
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Albert (1968) performed an experiment the procedure of which probably 
comes closest to the realization of the assumptions of the simple 
model described above. In his experiment subjects were given study 
and recall trials until a criterion of one correct reproduction of 
the list was reached. For the calculation of the mean interresponse 
times only the data of the trial on which for the first time 8, 9, 10, 
... or 16 (out of 16) items were recalled, were used, irrespective of 
the number of trials that a subject needed to reach that criterion. 
Thus, the data were analyzed separately for each of those criteria. 
Although not many results are given, Albert (1968) does give the data 
for the criterion of 16 recalled items. Note that in this case it 
seems more reasonable than in the usual case to assume that (a) all 
items that are sampled are also recovered (otherwise one would not 
get all items correct), and (b) all items are already overleamed so 
that strengthening has relatively little effect. The results for this 
criterion of 16 correct conform nicely to those expected from a 
sampling-with-replacement model: Albert's estimates for λ., the 
parameter of the negative exponential distribution for the successive 
interresponse times, were a linear function of i, as predicted from 
(3.15): 
Xi = ( Π ~ η * 1 ) λ = λ ( 1 + ^  • Φ 1 · ( 3 · 2 2 ) 
Thus, it seems likely that moat of these results must be explained 
by some kind of sampling-with-replaoement process during retrieval. 
Not surprisingly therefore, all the models that we are aware of that 
attempt to explain interresponse times do indeed postulate such a 
sampling-with-replacement process at some point during retrieval. For 
example, Anderson (1972, p. 337) suggests that a subject samples 
items randomly from the ENTRYSET (although this assunption was not 
incorporated into the FRAN program). Murdock (1974, p. 221) suggests 
that the data on interresponse times in free recall may be explained 
by assuming that there exists a store of available items from which 
items are sampled with replacement. To avoid repetitions, each sampled 
item is conpared against the pool of already recalled items. This 
comparison process is assumed to be serial and self-terminating. It is 
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assumed furthermore that this comparison process accounts for most of 
the interresponse time; the time needed for resampling is assumed to 
be negligible. 
Returning to our original model, it seems likely that the gross 
predictions are still more or less the same. There are of course a 
number of differences between the "full" model and the simple model 
described above. First of all, due to the fact that the sampling weights 
are not all equal and to the incrementing of recalled items the mean 
interresponse times should increase somewhat faster than in the simple 
model and the curve that gives the number of items recalled by time t, 
should grow less rapidly later on (since the items sampled first will 
have a higher probability of being sampled again on later draws). 
Secondly, due to the assumption that a recalled item will be used as 
an additional retrieval cue there will be some clustering in recall 
that is not predicted by the simple model. Such clustering has been 
observed repeatedly (Bousfield & Sedgewick, 1944; Pollio, 1964; Pollio, 
Kasschau & DeNise, 1968; Pollio, Richards & Lucas, 1969; Roediger & 
Thorpe, 1978). It is not evident however what effect this will have 
on the mean interresponse times. Most probably, the distribution of 
the interresponse times will deviate somewhat from a negative exponen-
tial distribution but the extent of this deviation is not clear. Final-
ly, the effect of the inclusion of a recovery process is difficult to 
judge but it seems doubtful that it has a large qualitative effect. 
We will conpare the predictions of our model with the results 
obtained by Murdock and Okada (1970). In their experiment each of 72 
subjects was given 20 free recall lists of 20 words each. The words 
were presented visually and the spoken recall was tape-recorded. Two 
presentation rates were used: 1 word per sec or 2 words per sec. In 
Fig. 3.8 the interresponse times (IRT) are shown partitioned on the 
total number of words recalled. For this analysis the data were pooled 
over presentation rate. According to Murdock and Okada (1970, p. 265) 
the graphs for the two presentation rates separately were virtually 
identical. Because there were insufficient cases where fewer than 4 
or more than 9 words were recalled those curves are not shown in 
Fig. 3.8. 
Fig. 3.9 gives similar curves generated by our simulation model. We 
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Fig. 3.8. Mean interresponse time as a function of ordinal 
position in output. The data have been partitioned 
in terms of total number of words recalled (4-9). 
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Fig. 3.9. Predicted mean interresponse times partitioned 
on the total number of words recalled (6-10). 
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did not attempt to fit the exact data of Murdock and Okada (1970), 
since their data include a STS-component. Simulation of their expe­
riment would therefore necessitate the prediction of retrieval rates 
from STS. Because our main interest is on retrieval from LTS, this did 
not seem to be desirable. The predicted interresponse times are shown 
for "subjects" who recalled from 6 to 10 items of a 15 item list pre­
sented for 2 sec each. The same model was used as before except that 
the STS-buffer was cleared before recall began. The predictions are 
based on 1000 runs with the parameter values that were used in the 
simulation of Roberts (1972): ^ = 0.12, г = 0.10, θ3 = 0.7, ц = 0.7, 
г = 4, КМАХ = 30 and Ш А Х = 3. The separate curves are based on resp. 
128, 223, 246, 179 and 97 "subjects" (resp. 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 words 
recalled). The remaining curves are not shown because they were based 
on too few cases (55 or less). 
The predicted curves are very similar to the empirical curves ob­
tained by Murdock and Okada (1970). Several features that were noted 
by Murdock and Okada are also evident in the simulated data. First of 
all, the interresponse times increase in a positively accelerated 
fashion as recall proceeds. Secondly, for a fixed output position, the 
interresponse times were shorter the more words there were yet to 
recall. Finally, at any given output position the interresponse time 
is a good predictor of the number of words yet to recall. For example, 
the interresponse time between the second-to-last and the last item 
recalled is for all curves on the average around 10 or 11 sec. These 
results are probably a consequence of the fact that a stop rule is 
used that is related to the number of failures made thus far. A long 
IRT indicates a large number of failures. If the number of failures 
(and hence the IRT) between the (n-l)-th and the n-th item is large 
(relative to the criterion number of failures), the subject is more 
likely to stop before the (n+1)-th item is recalled. The number of 
failures made between successive items recalled (the IRT) will there­
fore be a predictor of the number of search attempts yet to be made, 
and hence of the number of items yet to be recalled. Conversely, if 
the subject stops recall before the (n+1)-th item is recalled, it is 
more likely, on the average, that there has been a long IRT between 
the (n-l)-th and the n-th item recalled than if he does not stop recall 
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before the (n+1)-th item is recalled. Note furthermore that the factors 
that produced a long IRT between the (n-l)-th and the n-th item recal­
led (such as large variations in associative strength, high increments 
in associative strengths) persist after the n-th item has been recalled, 
and will make it even more likely that there also will be a long IRT 
before the (n+1)-th item is recalled (or that recall stops before the 
(n+1)-th item is recalled). A final result that was noted by Murdock 
and Okada was that the interresponse-time distributions were approxi­
mated very well by a negative exponential distribution. This is of 
course consistent with a sampling-with-replacement model for retrieval 
from LTS. 
Fig. 3.10 shows cumulative outputcurves as predicted by our model 
for four different conditions: free recall lists with either 10 or 40 
items and a presentation time of either 1.0 or 8.0 sec per item. These 
predictions are based on the same model as before with the STS-buffer 
cleared before recall began. 300 simulations were run with the same 
parameter values as before (p. 51), i.e.: Sj = 0.12, Θ2 = 0.10, 
63 = 0.7, ц = 0.7, г = 4, ШАХ = 30 and ШАХ = 3. Note that the model 
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correctly predicts that the lower the asymptote, the higher the rate 
of approaching that asymptote, i.e. the same result as was predicted 
from the simple sampling model described earlier. As was mentioned 
earlier, this prediction is confirmed by several sets of data (see 
also Roediger, Stellon & Tulving, 1977). 
3.1.3. Extended recall· tests and hyperrmesia 
In all of the above analyses a stop-rule such that the subject 
would stop trying to recall additional items after a certain number 
of failures, was used. This corresponds to the usual practice of most 
experimenters in this area, who give only one or two minutes recall 
time. Recent research by Buschke, Roediger and others (Buschke, 1973, 
1975; Roediger, 1978; Roediger, Stellon & Tulving, 1977; Roediger & 
Thorpe, 1978) shows however that under appropriate instructions a 
longer recall period will result in retrieval of additional items. 
Buschke (1973, 1975) reports a number of experiments the results of 
which lead to the conclusion that most of the recall failures repre-
sent retrieval failures rather than either encoding failures or loss 
from LTS. In one of these experiments (Buschke, 1975, p. 96-100), 
subjects were given repeated extended recall tests after only one 
presentation of a single list of 20 names of animals. Eventually 
almost all of the items were recalled. Roediger and Thorpe (1978) 
report data that show that even after 21 minutes the number of words 
recalled has not yet reached asymptote (see Fig. 3.12). 
These results are consistent with the present theory if one makes 
the assumption that under appropriate instructions •subjects may choose 
not to use a stop-rule. Since the stop-rule is not considered to be 
a fixed, structural characteristic of the retrieval system, it is 
conceivable that the subject may also decide to continue searching 
LTS. In Fig. 3.11 are shown the results of a simulation of the model 
with the stop-rule deleted. Except for this, the same model was used 
as before. The STS-buffer was again cleared before recall began. One 
additional change was made: after every 50 draws an attempt to recall 
is made using the items recalled thus far as retrieval cues. This was 
done in order to simulate somehow the strategy of a subject that makes 
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(Fig. 3 from Roediger and Thorpe, 1978). 
maximum use of the interitem associations. The list length was 40 
items and the presentation time was set equal to 4 sec per item. This 
corresponds to the rather long presentation times that are commonly 
used in these experiments. The predicted results are based on 100 runs 
with the same parameter values as before, i.e.: θι = 0.12, 02 = 0.10, 
з = 0.7, θι» = 0.7, г = 4 and ІЖХ = 3. 
As expected the model indeed predicts that the number of items re­
called will continue to increase although at a rapidly decreasing rate. 
With a stop-rule of KMAX equal to 30 (as was used previously) the mean 
nmber of items recalled is about 18. Without such a rule subjects will 
recall many more items but at a frustratingly slow rate. In the present 
case the mean number of items recalled after 500 draws from LTS is 
29.48. 
This result (i.e. that subjects will be able to recall a large 
number of additional items when they are given unlimited recall time) 
has severe implications for the interpretation of the phenomenon of 
hypermnesia as was pointed out by Roediger and Thorpe (1978). 
Hypermnesia refers to the phenomenon that is sometimes observed that 
subjects who are given two or more successive recall tests recall 
more items on the second test than on the first. Note that this is 
similar to the "reminiscence" phenomenon described by Ballard (1913; 
see also Erdelyi & Kleinbard, 1978), the "remembering of the forgotten 
without releaming". Erdelyi and Kleinbard (1978) interpret 
hypermnesia in ways that depart radically from the conventional logic 
adhered to by most memory psychologists. They interpret the phenomenon 
as showing that material that was not available on the first test has 
become available between the first and the second test or on the 
second test, a kind of "negative forgetting". As Roediger and Thorpe 
(1978) pointed out, this increase in the number of words recalled 
might have been the result of allowing the subjects more recall time 
(Brown, 1923). In their experiments one group of subjects was given 
three successive recall tests of 7 min each and a second group was 
given a single recall test of 21 min. Thus, the total recall time 
was the same for both groups. Fig. 3.12 shows the mean cumulative 
number of unique items recalled for subjects who were presented either 
pictures or words and who were given either three successive recall 
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periods or one long recall period. Subjects who were given three 
successive recall tests were given credit for an item the first time 
they recalled that item irrespective of whether they recalled that 
item also on the following recall tests. Although the groups that were 
given three successive recall tests did show the hypenmesia effect, 
the results in Fig. 3.12 make it clear that this is simply the result 
of the additional recall time, since subjects who were given three 
successive 7-min recall periods recalled the same number of words 
(or pictures) as subjects who were given one 21-min recall period. 
Thus, the hypermnesia effect may be explained by assuming that not all 
available items will be accessed in a single recall test due to retrie-
val difficulties (Brown, 1923). It is not necessary to assume that the 
items not recalled on the first recall test were indeed unavailable 
(and thus unrecallable) at that time. There is no reason to postulate 
a true "reminiscence" effect. The above reasoning is consistent with 
the finding that reminiscence or hypermnesia does not occur when 
subjects are given a delayed test after a period of interpolated 
activity (Amnions & Irion, 1954). 
Roediger (personal communication, 1978) has suggested that the 
amount of hypermnesia may be related to the level of recall: the higher 
the asymptote the lower the rate of approaching that asymptote (see 
below), and therefore the higher the asymptote the higher the propor-
tion of recallable words that has not yet been recalled after the 
first recall test. Thus, one would expect to find more hypermnesia for 
conditions with a higher asymptotic level of recall. 
A possible test of this hypothesis may be found in Roediger and 
Thorpe (1978, Exp. 2). They presented subjects with lists of 60 words 
composed of 30 high and 30 low imagery words (using the norms of 
Paivio, Yuille and Madigan [1968]). Their results are shown in the 
upper left comer of Fig. 3.13. They found slightly more hypermnesia 
for high imagery words than for low imagery words. The differences 
are not that striking however, a result that could be due to the fact 
that both types of words were mixed in a single list and not presented 
in separate lists (i.e., interitem associations may have been formed 
between high and low imagery words, reducing the difference in level 
of recall). 
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Fig. 3.13. Mean number of words recalled in successive 
retrieval periods. Upper left: data from 
Roediger and Thorpe (1978). The other graphs 
show the performance of the model under various 
conditions. See text for explanation. Open 
circles: high associative strengths, closed 
circles: low associative strengths. 
Although it is evident that our model in its present form will pre-
dict a hypermnesia effect, it may be interesting to see how much 
hypermnesia the model predicts and what type of manipulations are pre-
dicted to have an effect on the amount of hypermnesia found. In Fig. 
3.13 the results are shown of simulations with several versions of the 
model. All of these results are based on a model with the stop-rule 
deleted. This was done because Roediger and Thorpe (1978) report that 
hypermnesia is only obtained when long recall periods are used. In 
all cases therefore 150 draws are made and after every 50 draws the 
items recalled thus far are used as retrieval cues to aid recall of 
additional items. 
All the analyses the results of which are shown in Fig. 3.13 are 
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based on a model that assumes that items that were recovered in a pre-
vious retrieval period will always be recovered again (when sampled in 
a later period) no matter through which cues they were originally 
sampled. Thus, if item j was sampled and recovered with the context 
and item i as retrieval cues, it will in a following retrieval period 
also be recovered when it is sampled with the context cue alone or 
with the context cue and an item cue. Note that this assumption does 
not imply that all items recalled previously will be recalled again: 
they must also be sampled in that retrieval period. This assunption 
was made to accomodate the obvious dependency between the probabili-
ties of recalling an item on successive response periods. One inter-
pretation could be that the successful recall of an items strengthens 
the interassociations between the item features stored for that 
particular item in LTS more or less independent of the increments in 
associative strength of that item to other items and to the context: 
sampling of any one of the item features would then always result in 
activation of all features necessary for the overt generation of the 
response, i.e. the item would always be recovered again. 
The first version to be considered assumes that items that were 
sampled but not recovered on a previous trial, may be recovered (and 
thus recalled) if they are sampled with a different set of probe cues. 
Thus, if item j was sampled on the first trial but not recovered with 
the context and item i as cues, it may be recovered on a second trial 
when it is sampled with the context and another item as cues but not 
when it is sampled with the context alone or with the context and that 
same item i as cues. This assunption is referred to in Fig. 3.13 as the 
"alternative vetrieval voûtes" assumption. Note that this assunption 
was also made earlier when only a single retrieval period was simulated 
(see p. 43). 
The upper middle graph shows the results for a list of 40 items pre-
sented for 1 sec each (100 simulation runs). The upper curve gives 
the results for a higher level of recall (θ) = 0.2, г = 0.1), the 
lower curve for a lower level of recall (θι = 0.1, θ2 = 0.05). The 
increments in associative strength upon successful retrieval were in 
this case relatively small (Θ3 = 0.7, θι, = 0.7). In this graph and the 
remaining ones in Fig. 3.13 the values of resp. і, г, з and Ъь, are 
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given between parentheses. 
We see that the model indeed predicts "hypermnesia", and that more 
hypermnesia is predicted for higher levels of recall (although the 
difference is not very large). One further result that needs to be 
mentioned is that the present model due to the incrementing of recalled 
items predicts much more overlap between successive recall trials than 
the earlier version of Shiffrin (1970a). For example, for the higher 
level of recall 16.2 items are recalled on the first trial of which 
15.1 items are also recalled on the second trial and of which 14.4 
items are recalled on both the second and the third trial. 
The upper right graph gives the results for the same model but with 
larger increments (Θ3 = 3.0, І, = 3.0). It is evident that although 
the level of recall is affected the hypermnesia effect remains 
approximately the same. This is somewhat surprising since one might 
have expected that there would be more hypermnesia in this case because 
the probability of sampling previously recalled items will be greater 
and those items will be sampled relatively sooner, thus leaving more 
time for retrieving new items. This reasoning is not correct because 
although there will indeed be more time for retrieving new items the 
probability of sampling a new item instead of an old item will be 
smaller in this case due to the higher strength of the items recalled 
previously. Thus, this assumption of increments in associative strength 
upon suceessful retrieval is not responsible for the observed 
hypermnesia. An even more striking demonstration of this is given in 
the middle graph of the bottom row of Fig. 3.13. The same model was 
used as before except that the items were no longer incremented upon 
recovery. 
Which features of the model then are responsible for the predicted 
hypermnesia effect? Our analyses show that there are two assumptions 
in the model each of which separately is sufficient to produce some 
hypermnesia. The most important of these is the alternative retrieval 
routes assumption. If one deletes this assumption and assumes that an 
item that is missed once will always be missed no matter with which 
cues it is sampled, most of the hypermnesia disappears. This can be 
seen in the bottom left graph of Fig. 3.13. The hypermnesia that 
remains is the result of the incrementing of successfully retrieved 
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items. Note that we have shown above that deleting this latter assump­
tion is not enough to make the effect go away. Only if both the 
alternative retrieval routes assumption and the assumption of incre­
ments upon recall are deleted will the hypermnesia effect completely 
disappear. This can be shown as follows. If the associations are not 
incremented the probability of sampling an item is the same on all 
retrieval periods. Let the probability of sampling item i on a 
particular trial be given by p.. An item will be recalled on the j-th 
trial only if it has been sampled and recovered before and if it is 
sampled again on this trial, or if it has not yet been sampled before 
and it is sampled and recovered on this trial. The probability that 
item i was sampled before is equal to 1 - (1 - p·)"1 and the proba­
bility that it was also recovered at that time is given by 
[1 - (1 - PiP^Jti, where t^ denotes the probability of recovering 
item i. The probability that item i was never sampled before'is 
given by (1 - Pi)·1" . Thus, the probability of recalling item i in 
the j-th retrieval period is equal to 
poYj) = и-а-рр^п^+а-р^ - 1?^ = p it i, сз.гзз 
i.e. PCRJJ) does not depend on j. 
One further result that needs to be mentioned is that the hyper­
mnesia effect does not disappear when instead of assuming that the 
associative strengths are incremented only after the first successful 
retrieval in any of the retrieval periods, it is assumed that these 
strengths are incremented again after the first retrieval in each of 
the successive retrieval periods. The bottom right graph of Fig. 3.13 
shows that the effect is still present for both the model with the 
alternative retrieval routes assumption and the model without that 
assumption, although the effect is (not surprisingly) somewhat 
reduced. 
One interesting, recently obtained finding with the present model 
is that this model does not predict much hypermnesia when a short 
recall period (i.e. a small value of KMAX) is used, in accordance with 
the empirical findings (see Roediger & Thorpe, 1978). 
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3.1.4. The use of interitem associations in free recall 
One feature of the model that has not really been used thus far 
concerns the role of interitem associations during retrieval from long-
term store. Most of the experimental data that we have considered thus 
far could probably just as well have been explained by a simpler model 
in which only item-to-context associations are stored and used in 
retrieval. These interitem associations were included however in the 
model in order to be able to explain a number of well known results 
such as correlations between input and output order, beneficial effects 
of increased associability of the list items, the development of 
subjective organization in multitrial free recall, etc. We will brief­
ly discuss each of these results. 
A number of researchers (e.g. Jenkins, Mink & Russell, 1958; Deese, 
1959; Glanzer & Schwartz, 1971) have shown that stronger preexperimental 
interitem associations lead to higher levels of recall. There seem to 
be basically two ways of handling this fact in an associative network 
model. Firstly, Anderson (1972) proposed in his FRAN-model (Free Recall 
in an Associative Network) that preexperimental interitem associations 
existing in LTS prior to study are tagged during study with a list-tag, 
i.e. are associated to the list context. In this framework items with 
strong preexperimental associations simply have more associations 
between them that may be tagged with a list-tag. Secondly, it may be 
proposed that interitem associations are formed during study, i.e. 
the subject connects the two items by means of some kind of mnemonic 
or by forming a mental image. This second approach is used in the 
present model. Such a model could be made very similar to the FRAN-
model (with respect to the storage processes) if it is assumed that 
the formation of an association between two items is an all-or-none 
process: the probability of associating two items could be assumed 
to be equal to ί - a where t is the time that two items reside to­
gether in STS and a depends on the preexperimental associative 
strength. This latter approach is not taken in the present model, 
associations are not assumed to be all-or-none. The approach taken 
in our model is also computationally simpler. Thus, the fact that 
stronger preexperimental interitem associations lead to higher 
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levels of recall is interpreted in the present framework as the result 
of more information being transmitted to long-term store, i.e. a 
higher value of Θ2, the interitem associative strength transferred to 
LTS during 1 sec study in STS. This may be justified by assuming that 
during study in STS information in LTS concerning the relation between 
two items is activated and associated to the context. When two items 
have a higher preexperimental associative strength, more information 
will be activated, leading to a higher strength of the association 
between the two items in the present context, i.e. θ2 depends on the 
preexperimental associative strength. 
By way of illustration we have simulated an experiment reported by 
Glanzer and Schwartz (1971; see also Glanzer, 1972). In this experiment 
104 subjects were given a series of lists contsisting of 8 unassociated 
items and 4 pairs of associated items, associated in the sense that one 
of the members of the pair will sometimes be given as a response to the 
other member in a free association task. These associated pairs were 
placed contiguously in the list, i.e. in successive serial positions. 
The presentation rate was 1 word per 2.3 sec. In Fig. 3.14 the serial 
position curves are shown for associated and unassociated items sepa­
rately. Also shown are the predictions of our model. These predictions 
are based on 1000 simulation runs for a list of 16 items presented 
for 2 sec each. The parameter values for the unassociated items were 
taken from the simulations of Murdock's (1962) data (see section 
3.1.1): θ] = 0.065, г = 0.015, з = 0.6, Bk = 0.6, г = 4, KMAX = 30 
and LMAX = 3. For the associated items the same parameter values 
were used except that ? was set equal to 0.15. The purpose of this 
experiment was to show that the associability factor had its influence 
on the LTS part of the serial position curve and that this factor has 
no influence at all on the recency part, the recall from STS. This is 
of course consistent with the assumptions of our model. These data 
were simulated for illustrative purposes only, just to show that the 
strength of the interitem associations does indeed have an influence 
on the predictions generated by the model. 
From our conceptualization of the rehearsal process in short-term 
store and its influence on the strength of the interitem associations 
it follows iimediately that the present model predicts certain relation-
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Fig. 3.14. Serial position curves obtained by Glanzer and 
Schwartz (1971) for items that were or were not 
presented as associated pairs. The unbroken lines 
give the predicted serial position curves. 
ships between input order and output order. Among other things, the 
model predicts that items that were in adjacent input positions have 
a higher probability of being both recalled than would be expected if 
the items were retrieved independently, a result that was reported 
by Shiffrin (1970a). A related result that was reported by Kintsch 
(1970) and Anderson (1972) is that items that were in adjacent input 
positions have a higher probability of also being recalled in adjacent 
positions than would be expected if recall order was random. The 
above two results are obviously predicted by our model because inter-
item associations tend to be formed between adjacent items (see 
Eq. 3.5) and these interitem associations are used in recall. Finally, 
Deese and Kaufman (1957) report data that show that STS items are 
recalled first, followed by items recalled from LTS, in order of 
strength. These results are of course consistent with our model since 
we assume that the probability of sampling an item is determined by 
the associative strengths. 
A final result that has been interpreted as showing the formation 
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of interitem associations is the development of subjective organization 
found in multitrial free recall (Tulving, 1962), the observation that 
items that are recalled in adjacent positions have a high probability 
of also being recalled in adjacent positions on the next trial (with 
changing input orders on each trial). Although the present theory has 
not yet been applied to the multitrial situation, it seems likely in 
view of the results obtained by Anderson (1972) with his associative 
network model that the theory is at least potentially able to account 
for this aspect of the data. 
3.1.5. The part-list cueing effect 
Recently however, the viewpoint that interitem associations are 
formed during study of a free recall list and that these are used 
during recall, has been challenged as a result of a number of experi-
ments on part-list cueing. In these experiments subjects are given 
a subset of the list items as cues to aid retrieval of the remaining 
items. The performance of these subjects on the remaining iteras is 
then compared with the performance of a control group on the same 
items. This paradigm was devised by Slamecka (1968) as a rather 
direct test of the role of interitem associations in recall. Slamecka 
reasoned that any theory that assîmes that interitem associations are 
used in recall would predict that at least some of these list-cues 
would facilitate recall of items that would otherwise not have been 
recalled. Failure to find recall facilitation should (according to 
Slamecka) lead to the conclusion that interitem associations are not 
formed during study or not used during recall. 
Slamecka (1968, 1969) reported several experiments the results of 
which show that even if short-term effects are controlled for, cueing 
with a random proportion of the list items has no beneficial effect 
at all or even a slightly negative effect. Similar results have been 
reported by a number of people for uncategorized lists as well as 
for within-category recall when categorized lists are used. For 
example, Roediger, Stellon and Tulving (1977) report a negative 
effect for uncategorized lists, and Anderson (1972) and Allen (1969) 
obtained only a small positive effect, although both had arranged 
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their experiments in such a way as to favor the formation of interitem 
associations. Allen (1969) presented pairs of related words contiguous-
ly in the list and cued with one member of each word pair and yet this 
did not result in a substantial increase in the number of words 
recalled. Roediger (1974) has summarized a number of experiments with 
categorized lists. None of these (for example Slamecka, 1972; Roediger, 
1973; Rundus, 1973) show a positive effect on within-category recall. 
On the contrary, the usual effect (see also Watkins, 1975; Mueller & 
Watkins, 1977) is a slight negative effect. The positive effects on 
the total number of words recalled that are frequently obtained (see 
for example Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966; Slamecka, 1972; Roediger, 
1978) are the result of more categories being accessed and not of 
higher within-category recall. 
From these results, Roediger (1973, 1974) has derived the genera-
lization that retrieval cues improve recall as compared to noncued 
conditions when they allow access to more higher-order units than 
could be recalled unaided, but they impair recall to the extent that 
they provide more information than is necessary to gain access to 
the higher-order unit. This hypothesis could presumably also explain 
the positive effects of cueing obtained by Blake and Okada (1973). 
In their experiment subjects were given 10 study-test trials on a 
16-item list, followed by 10 study-test trials on a second, inter-
polated list. Following this interpolated learning they were tested 
on the first list. In this experiment cueing on the final test trial 
had a positive effect. This is consistent with Roediger's principle 
if one assumes that in multitrial free recall learning a subjective 
hierarchical organization is formed. 
These results are interpreted by practically everybody as evidence 
against the role of interitem associations in free recall. For example, 
Roediger ((1973, 1974, 1978) argues that only vertical or hierarchical 
associations are necessary to explain organized recall, and Slamecka 
(1968) has proposed that items are stored independently and that 
organized recall is the result of an organized retrieval plan. There 
is however one theoretical difficulty with these hypotheses that has 
not been noted thus far. This difficulty may be best explained by 
considering the results of one of Slamecka's experiments (Slamecka, 
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1968, Exp. VI). In this experiment three types of lists were used: a 
list of 30 rare words, a list of 30 common words and a list conposed 
of the word "butterfly" and 29 of its most popular associates. Half 
the subjects were given 15 randomly selected list items as cues, the 
other half was not given any cues. The mean number of critical items 
recalled for the control group was 5.58 for the "rare" list, 7.04 for 
the "comron" list and 8.50 for the "butterfly" list. For the cued 
group these means were 4.70, 6.79 and 8.97 respectively. The difference 
between the cued and the noncued condition was not significant (F < 1), 
as was the interaction between this cueing factor and the type of 
list (F < 1). The differences between the three types of lists were 
however highly significant. The difficulty with the independent storage 
hypothesis is how the increase in the number of items recalled with 
increasing associability should be explained. If one assumes, as 
Slamecka (1968) does, that this is a consequence of an organized 
retrieval plan, one needs to specify how this retrieval plan works. 
Slamecka (1968, p. 511) writes: "He" (i.e. the subject) "encodes and 
stores this general representation of the list structure, while at the 
same time the specific item traces are being stored independently. 
Later if free recall is requested he uses this general representation 
of the list to form a retrieval plan which then guides his search, 
more or less successfully, for the independent item traces". The 
problem with this type of explanation is that it does not specifiy 
how this retrieval plan is retrieved, how the subject recalls the 
general representation of the list structure. Moreover, if this retrie-
val plan works in such a way that associated or associable items have 
a higher probability of being retrieved (as the data show) then why 
doesn't cueing with the list items increase the effectiveness of the 
retrieval plan? Thus, the assumption of a retrieval plan does not 
escape the problem posed by these studies, it merely translates the 
problem into a new problem. 
The conviction of many researchers that these results argue against 
the assumption of interitem associations was probably reinforced 
considerably by the fact that the only existing explicit model for 
free recall in which an associative network was postulated, Anderson's 
(1972) FRAN model, predicted a much larger advantage of part-list 
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cueing than was in fact found. However, despite Slameoka's contention 
that the part-list cueing effect shows that interitem associations 
are not used in recall·, we will show that the part-list cueing effect 
is consistent with a model that relies heavily on the use of inter-
item associations. 
Let us note first that it is extremely important that the subject 
is given a random sample of the items from the list as cues. Other­
wise, the cues may turn out to be quite helpful. This is illustrated 
in the results of one of the experiments that will be reported later 
on (see chapter 4.3). In this experiment subjects were given lists 
of randomly paired words. These pairs were presented as paired 
associates with the instruction to link together the two members 
of a word pair into a single unit. All the items were presented first, 
followed by 20 sec of interpolated arithmetic. Next, half the subjects 
were given either the first or the second member of the word pairs 
and asked to recall the other members. In this test phase all the 
items that were given as cues, were presented simultaneously and the 
subjects were instructed to recall the associated items (for more 
details, see section 4.3). This test was therefore essentially a 
paired-associate recall test. Thus, this group was given half of the 
list items as cues. The other group was asked to recall as many words 
as possible. Three list lengths were used: 5, 15 or 30 pairs. The 
probabilities of recall for the three list lengths were: 0.68, 0.50 
and 0.23, respectively, for the cued group, and 0.30, 0.16 and 0.09, 
respectively, for the noncued group. Thus, in this case a large 
advantage was found for the cued group. 
In order to show that a model that incorporates an associative net­
work does not necessarily predict a positive effect of cueing with 
list items, we have applied our model to this type of experiment. In 
this application we have assumed that at the start of recall the sub­
ject uses each of the list cues as a retrieval cue along with the 
general context cue. Each of these cues is used until a criterion of 
Ш Х failures is reached. Retrieval of one of the list cues counts as 
a failure. Note however that a list cue may not only retrieve one of 
the other list cues but also its own LTS-code instead of one of the 
other items. Thus, only recall of a new item, of a target item, counts 
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as a "success". It is assumed that list cues that are retrieved and 
recovered get the same increase in associative strength as target 
items. After all the list cues have been used, the subject goes 
through the same recall routine as was used before, except that of 
course retrieval of a list cue counts as a failure. This continues 
until a criterion of KMAX total failures is reached. Following this 
the subject performs the usual final "check". However, in this case 
both list cues as well as recalled target items are used in this 
final attempt at recall of additional items (again Ш А Х attempts with 
each item). In the case of the control group (the noncued group) the 
usual recall routine is followed. Finally, the STS-buffer was cleared 
before recall began so that the results are based on recall from LTS 
only, and each subject in the cued group received a different random 
sample of list cues. 
We simulated six conditions differing only in the value assigned to 
the interitem associative strength parameter (Θ2). The list length was 
set equal to 30 items and the presentation time per item was set at 
2 sec. The cued group was always given half of the list items as cues. 
The cued and the noncued group consisted of 300 "subjects" each. A 
pairwise matching procedure was used, that is: each "subject" in the 
control group was matched with a "subject" of the cued group in that 
both started their recall with the same matrix of interitem and item-
to-context associations. Except for θ2 the same set of parameter values 
was used in all simulations: Sj = 0.1, Θ3 = 0.6, ц = 0.6, r = 4, 
KMAX = 30 and LMAX = 3. 
The results are presented in Table 3.1. As can be seen there, cueing 
with list items does not result in an appreciable increase in the mean 
number of target items recalled. At the same time an increase in the 
number of items recalled is predicted for both groups with increasing 
associability of the items (increasing 2). Thus, the present associa­
tive network model predicts similar results as were obtained by 
Slamecka (1968, Exp. VI). Slamecka (1972, p. 331) writes: "A truly 
associative theory of learning, one which identifies learning with the 
active elaboration and strengthening of interitem linkages cannot, in 
our opinion, convincingly incorporate these findings without abandoning 
a central feature of the term "association". The unique force of the 
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Table 3.1: Predicted mean number of critical words recalled with 
or without 15 list cues (list length » 30). 
θ2 
0.02 
0.10 
0.20 
0.40 
0.70 
1.00 
with cues 
4.10 
5.95 
6.76 
7.62 
8.06 
8.18 
without cues 
4.51 
6.02 
6.93 
7.60 
8.13 
8.39 
proposition that items A and В are associated is that presence of A has 
the power to elicit B: that A can "pull out" B". Our simulation results 
show that this conclusion (that is rarely disputed, neither by opponents 
nor by proponents of associative network models) is not correct. Even 
when the interitem associative strengths are so high (82= 1.00) that 
list cues will almost certainly lead to retrieval and recovery of 
other list items, the model does not predict a difference between the 
cued and the noncued group. 
Further simulations showed that this lack of an advantage for the 
cued group does not depend on the assumption that associations are 
incremented upon recall. Even when no incrementing is assumed (63= 
ц = 0), the lack of an advantage is maintained. This incrementing 
assumption is therefore not necessary to explain the part-list cueing 
effect. Such an explanation was proposed by Kundus (1973) and by 
Roediger, Stellon and Tulving (1977). 
What then produces this effect in our model? Several factore are 
at work. First of all, in both groups extensive cueing is taking place: 
the control group makes use of self-generated cues. So there is no 
reason to expect a very large difference between the two groups. 
Secondly, when using experimenter-provided cues (i.e. the list cues), 
the subject does not switch cues, as when he uses self-generated cues. 
To understand in detail why the model is predicting this result, 
one must look into the structure of the model more deeply. The most 
important factor is that our sampling assumptions lead to an advantage 
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for the control group (when recovery is not important). In order to 
show this a simplified version of the model was investigated. In 
this version it is assumed that items are pairwise associated, i.e. 
each item is associated to exactly one other item. Using an item as a 
cue will always result in recall of the associated item. All associa­
tions are assumed to be equally strong. It was assumed furthermore that 
items that are sampled are always recovered. Both groups were also made 
exactly equal with respect to the way they treated the items retrieved: 
new items retrieved are always used as a new retrieval cue and the 
first retrieval of a list cue is not counted as a failure. Moreover, it 
was assumed that if a list cue was already retrieved before it will not 
be used as a new retrieval cue. Thus, when both members of a pair A-B 
are list cues and when A is used first as a list cue, A will lead to 
retrieval of В. В will then be used as a new retrieval cue, leading 
to retrieval of A. A will then be used as a new probe cue until І Ж Х 
failures have accumulated. Note however that these retrieval attempts 
are doomed to fail since it is assumed that A will always lead to 
retrieval of B, and В was already retrieved before. Retrieval of any 
pair Α-B will therefore always "cost" LMAX failures. Note that the 
higher the value of LMAX, the sooner the criterion of KMAX total 
failures will be reached. When the subject later encounters В as one 
of the list cues, В will not be used as a probe cue: the total 
failure counter is incremented by one and the subject switches to the 
next cue (i.e. search is not continued until LMAX consecutive failures 
have occurred). Note that the same number of failures (i.e., LMAX) 
are incurred by both the cued and the noncued group in the first 
retrieval of any pair of items. In the noncued group A may be retrie­
ved by the context cue, and when A is subsequently used as a new 
retrieval cue, it will lead to retrieval of B. The subject then 
switches to В as a new probe cue. These search attenpts are of course 
doomed to fail since В will always lead to A, and A was already 
retrieved before. This goes on until the criterion of LMAX failures 
is reached. Upon reaching this criterion, the noncued group switches 
back to the context cue. Any subsequent retrievals of either A or В 
are of course failures, and therefore A and В will be used only once 
as a probe cue, just as in the cued group. Finally, no "rechecking" 
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is assumed. Thus, -if the noncued group would sample the same items with 
the context cue as are presented to the cued group as list cues, recall 
would be exactly equal in both groups. The only difference is that upon 
reaching the criterion of LMAX consecutive failures, the cued group 
does not switch to the context cue, but to the next list cue (or to 
the context cue, if there are no more list cues). Any difference found 
between the cued and the noncued group must therefore reflect a dif-
ference in the type of items sampled with the context cue and with 
the list cues. 
Table 3.2 gives the results (for 999 "subjects") predicted by this 
simple model for various values of KMAX and LMAX. It is evident that 
this model predicts an advantage for the noncued group. This (pro-
portional) advantage decreases with increasing KMAX and decreasing 
LMAX. This may be explained as follows. Subjects in both groups get 
only credit for recall of critical items. Let X be any list cue and Y 
any critical item. Initially, the cued group uses each of the list 
cues in order to recall items associated to these list cues. They are 
therefore recalling only pairs of items of the two types X a - Xj, and 
X,- - Y^ (remember that in this simplified version both items of a 
pair are always recalled together). The noncued group however will, 
Table 3.2: Predicted mean number of target items recalled with or 
without 15 list cues (list length = 30). 
KMAX 
15 
20 
30 
50 
75 
condition 
cued 
noncued 
cued 
noncued 
cued 
noncued 
cued 
noncued 
cued 
noncued 
LMAX 
1 2 3 4 5 
8.09 4.74 3.52 2.76 2.00 
9.65 6.67 4.86 3.94 3.02 
9.61 6.02 4.32 3.42 2.78 
11.16 8.40 6.50 5.01 4.03 
12.53 9.33 6.51 5.08 3.98 
13.13 11.06 8.86 7.19 5.95 
14.39 13.39 11.32 8.55 6.60 
14.51 13.84 12.60 10.89 9.42 
14.86 14.69 14.21 13.21 11.46 
14.91 14.78 14.46 13.75 12.66 
79 
in addition, also sample pairs of the type Y e - Y£. The cued group will 
therefore have a higher probability of retrieving list cues (X) than 
of retrieving target items (Y). Each of these three pairs lead to the 
same number of failures that are added to the total failure counter, 
К (LMAX failures are added for each pair). Therefore, the noncued group 
has a better ratio of the number of criticai items recalled to the 
number of failures incurred during retrieval of these items. Thus, 
two types of critical items should be distinguished: those that are 
associated to one of the list cues, and those that are not associated 
to a list cue but to one of the other critical items. The cued group 
has a higher probability of sampling critical items of the first type, 
but has (initially ) no chance of sampling critical items of the 
second type, which have the property that two critical items are 
recalled at the "cost" of only LMAX failures. The higher the number 
of retrieval opportunities that the cued group has left after all the 
list cues have been used, the smaller will be the difference between 
the two groups (see Table 3.2). This explains why the proportional 
advantage for the noncued group decreases with increasing KMAX and 
decreasing LMAX. The lower LMAX, the higher the number of retrieval 
opportunities the cued group has left after all the list cues have 
been used (for fixed KMAX) and therefore the higher the probability 
that pairs of items of the type Y
e
 - Yf will be sampled. Obviously, 
the higher KMAX (for fixed LMAX), the higher the number of retrieval 
opportunities the cued group has left after all the list cues have 
been used. 
Note finally that this difference between the two groups in the 
type of items sampled disappears when the list cues are chosen in such 
a way as to be consistent with the associative structure, i.e. in 
this case one item from each pair. In that case the cued group is 
obviously superior. For example, for KMAX = 15 and LMAX = 1, the cued 
group will recall all of the 15 critical items, whereas the noncued 
group still recalls 9.65 critical items. 
The approximately equal recall in the simulations with our original 
model (see Table 3.1) may be the result of several factors. The cued 
group has a higher probability of recovering an item that is sampled 
with a list cue and the context cue compared to the probability of 
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recovering an item that is sampled by the noncued group using only the 
context cue since the probability of recovery depends on the sum of 
the associative strengths to the probe cues. Moreover, in the final 
"check" the cued group does not only use the "recalled" list cues but 
also the "nonrecalled" list cues, whereas the noncued group uses only 
recalled items. 
Thus, the part-list cueing effect is a consequence of the fact that 
with a random sample of list cues these list cues will not only lead 
to retrieval of target items but also to retrieval of other list cues. 
Retrieval of these latter items has an interfering effect on future 
recall (output interference) due to (among other things) the strength-
ening of associations and to the fact that these retrievals count 
as failures. Moreover, as a result of the cueing with list items, the 
cued group is forced (at least initially) to sanple items that are 
less likely to be target items, while the noncued group has an equal 
probability of sampling target and nontarget items. Further work 
(which we will not go into in any detail) has shown that there are 
several other factors which influence in small ways the direction and 
magnitude of the effects. The largest of these remaining factors is 
the variability in the strengths stored in LTS, which tends to give 
an advantage when the subject generates the cues himself (as in the 
control group). 
We have found furthermore that the present model tends to predict 
that the cued group will eventually reach an asymptote close to the 
noncued group when large numbers of samples are made (i.e. a large 
value of KMAX). Under some variations of the model as presented, the 
control group remains superior to the cued group while under other 
assumptions asymptotic equality occurs. Therefore, the result obtained 
by Roediger, Stellon and Tulving (1977) that the level of recall of 
the cued group stays below that of the noncued group, can be consis-
tent with our present model. It is of course possible that factors 
outside the bounds of the present model are operating. In particular, 
one might assume that the rate of sampling decreases with the number 
of failures incurred. In all of our simulations we have assumed that 
time is proportional to the number of samples. That is, each sanple 
whether early or late in the recall period takes the same amount of 
time as does the time between successive samples. If one assumes 
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however that the rate of sampling is a decreasing function of the 
total number of failures that have occurred up to that point, then it 
follows that the rate of sampling for the cued group will be lower 
than for the noncued group, since the cued group gets more retrieval 
failures. 
We may end our discussion of single-trial free recall of uncatego-
rized lists with the conclusion (supported by the above analyses) that 
it is possible to construct a model based on our general theory of 
retrieval that is consistent with all the major empirical facts that 
are known about this paradigm. It should perhaps be stressed once 
more that the qualitative features of our predictions do not depend 
on the specific parameter values used, but are a consequence of the 
basic structure of our model for free recall. 
3.2. Categorized lists 
In categorized free recall the list of words that is presented to a 
subject is divided into a number of conceptual categories (e.g. four-
footed animals, professions, tools, etc.). The words belonging to a 
particular category may be presented contiguously (blocked presenta-
tion) or in random list positions (random presentation). Subjects may 
or may not be informed of the nature of the list. The present theory 
will be applied to a blocked presentation procedure only. It is assumed 
that subjects are aware of the categorical nature of the list, either 
because of the instructions or because it is very obvious. The results 
mentioned by Cohen (1966) suggest that if subjects are aware of the 
categorical nature of the list there are no qualitative differences in 
the gross results between blocked and random presentation. 
It is assumed that during study item-to-oontext associations and 
item-to-category associations are stored in LTS. To keep the model as 
simple as possible we will disregard the formation of item-to-item 
associations. This has no serious consequences since interitem associa-
tions will tend to be formed between members of the same category and 
therefore the effects of interitem associations will in this case not 
be discernible from the effects of itern-to-category associations. 
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Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that the subject will adopt the 
strategy to use only the category name as a recall cue (in addition to 
the context cue) and not the category members. 
A further simplification is that we no longer simulate a particular 
study or rehearsal strategy. Thus, no buffer model for the rehearsal 
process in STS was postulated. This was done in order to avoid imprac-
tically long computation times. Moreover, we don't really need a buffer 
model in this case since the results to be predicted don't require 
variability in associative strengths. Instead it is assumed that the 
value of the contextual associative strength is equal to θ it, where t is 
the presentation time in sec per item. Similarly, the value of the item-
to-category associative strength is assumed to be equal to θ2t. Note 
that θ it and θ2ί refer to the total strength accumulated during study 
(disregarding the residual associations). Thus, the value of θ it 
corresponds to the value of 9itr (see Eq. 3.3) in the model for un-
categorized lists. Note finally that we disregard variability due to 
differential rehearsal. A further assumption that we have not made (and 
needed) before is that we assume that all associations start out at a 
residual value denoted by 63. This assumption is necessary in order to 
be able to explain list-length effects in cued recall and output inter­
ference between successive categories recalled (see p. 94). Thus, the 
items are not only associated to their own category label but also to 
other category labels (although weakly). No associations are assumed 
between different category labels. The effect of these associations 
would be similar to the effect of associations between an item and 
other category labels. 
At recall, two procedures have been used (see for example Tulving 
& Pearlstone, 1966): oued reaall in which the category names are 
given as retrieval cues, and nonaued recall in which the subject has 
to generate the category names himself. In both cases we have assumed 
that all items are recalled from LTS and not from STS. 
a) Cued recall of categorized lists 
In the case of cued recall it is assumed that each category cue is 
used until a criterion of LMAX failures is reached. The items are 
sampled using both the context and the category cue. The probability 
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of sampling is therefore proportional to the product of the item-to-
context associative strength and the associative strength between that 
item and the category that is tested. If s(i) denotes the strength of 
the association between item i and the context and if 5(с^,і) denotes 
the strength of the association between item i and category k, the 
probability of sampling item i when category к is being tested is 
given by: 
s(i)sCc
v
,i) 
P(d,) = 5 . (3.24) 
1
 SsCjîsCc^.j) 
The probability of recovery is given by the usual exponential trans-
formation of the sum of these two associative strengths: 
PCR-ld.) = 1 - exp[-s(i) - sCc^i)] . (3.25) 
Note that in this case retrieval of an item outside the category being 
tested is a failure. It is assumed that a subject always recognizes 
whether an item belongs to the category being tested. This may be 
safely assumed since it would be surprising indeed if a subject was 
unable to recognize whether "table" (i.e. an item from the category 
"furniture") belongs to the category "animals". As before, the 
contextual and category associative strengths are increased upon success-
ful recall of an item: 
s'(i) = s(i) + з (3.26) 
s'(ck,i) = sO^.i) + θ,, . (3.27) 
Note that due to the assumption of a non-zero strength of the associa­
tion between a category and an item belonging to a different category 
the model predicts an effect of the nunter and the contextual associa­
tive strength of the items belonging to other categories. 
b) Noncued recall of categorized lists 
In the case of noncued recall it is assumed that the subject first 
samples one of the items using only the context cue. Upon successful 
retrieval of an item the subject will generate (with probability 1.0) 
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the category name of which that word is a member. Next, the subject 
tries to recall items from within that category untili he reaches a 
criterion of 1 Ж Х failures. Contextual cues as well as the category 
cue are used in this restricted search. As before, retrieval of an 
item outside the category tested is counted as a failure. Thus, this 
category search is exactly the same as in the case of cued recall. When 
the criterion of LMAX failures has been reached the subject discards 
the category cue and continues sampling using only the context cue. 
This goes on until a criterion of KMAX total failures with the context 
cue has been reached. Note that failures that are made during category 
searches are not counted as part of these KMAX failurs. Thus, recall 
stops when the subject believes that he can find no more new categories. 
The above model for categorized free recall is similar to the model 
proposed by Shiffrin (1970a) and that proposed by Kundus (1973). 
However, both of these models do not incorporate the influence of con­
textual cues on within-category searches. Therefore these models cannot 
explain the output interference effect between categories reported by 
Smith (1971) and Roediger (1973). We will return to this point later 
on (section 3.2.2). A minor difference between the present model (and 
that proposed by Shiffrin) and the Rundus model is that we assume that 
when the subject samples using only the context cue he samples not 
categories but particular list items, whereas Rundus (1973) assumes 
that category cues (or, more generally, retrieval cues) are sampled. 
These two versions seem to be equivalent however especially when one 
assumes (as Rundus does) that the probability of sampling a category 
is proportional to the sum of the strengths of the associations between 
that category and the items associated with that category (see Rundus, 
1973, p. 44). 
In the following three sections we will apply the above model for 
free recall of categorized lists to the most important phenomena that 
have been observed in this paradigm. 
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3.2.1. The effects of cueing with category names 
One of the most obvious results that are obtained with categorized 
lists is that most experimental manipulations that have an effect on 
the probability of recalling a category (i.e. recalling at least one 
member of a category) have no detectable effects at all on the number 
of words recalled per recalled category. This effect has been 
emphasized by Cohen (1966). In his experiments (see also Cohen, 1963a, 
b) Cohen varied such things as the number of categories that are pre-
sented, the serial position of a category, etc., and observed that 
there was almost no effect on the number of words recalled per cate-
gory accessed in recall (i.e. those categories of which at least one 
member is recalled). These results were obtained with both exhaustive 
(e.g. north, east, south, west) and nonexhaustive (e.g. vegetables) 
categories, although more words were recalled of the exhaustive cate-
gories. This latter difference may be handled by our model by assuming 
that with exhaustive categories the subject may generate all members 
of a category and perform a simple recognition check whether the item 
was on the list (this recognition check is of course only necessary 
if the subject is not sure whether the category was exhaustive or 
nonexhaustive). The lack of effect of presentation rate is not pre-
dicted by the present model. This result seems however to be of limited 
generality. It was obtained only when different presentation times 
were used for different categories within the same list. Both Cohen 
(1963b) and others (e.g. Smith, 1971) have observed effects of pre-
sentation time if this variable is varied between instead of within 
lists. This might be the result of merged rehearsal patterns since 
categories were not presented in a blocked fashion. 
The general picture that emerges is consistent with the assumption 
that during recall of a categorized list the subject makes, upon recall 
of a member of a category, a restricted search through that category 
which is relatively independent of the remaining list items. Note 
however that the present model does predict some effect of the number 
of other items on the list due to the contextual associations. We will 
return to this point later on (see p. 90). In the meantime the reader 
should keep in mind that these effects although predicted may be too 
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small to be detectable in the usual experiments. 
This interpretation of the data of Cohen (1966) is consistent with 
the results of a study reported by Tulving and Pearlstone (1966). In 
their experiment Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) varied three independent 
variables: (a) list length - 12, 24 or 48 list items, (b) number of 
words or items per category - 1, 2 or 4 items per category, and (c) 
type of recall test - either a cued or a noncued recall test. In non-
cued recall the subjects were given a standard free recall instruction, 
i.e. they were told to write down all the words they could remember as 
having been on the list. In cued recall the subjects were given a list 
of all the category names and then tried to recall as many words as 
possible. In this experiment the members of each category were presented 
in a blocked fashion, preceded by the category name. Subjects were 
instructed carefully that they were only to remember the category 
members, not the category names. The presentation time was 1 sec for 
each item and 3 sec for each category name. The amount of recall time 
given was proportional to the list length (1 min for every 12 items). 
Following the first recall test all subjects were given a second recall 
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test. This second test was always a cued recall test. We will first 
discuss the results of the first recall test. 
The results for this first recall test are shown in Fig. 3.15. Also 
shown are the predictions of our model. Each predicted value is based 
on 300 simulation runs with the parameter values: öj = 1.0, г = 1.5, 
э = 2.0, 8ц = 2.0, θ
β
 = 0.2, КМАХ = 20 and LMAX = 15 ( 3 and θ,, were 
always assigned the same value). These parameter values were estimated 
by minimizing in a grid-search procedure a weighted least-squares 
criterion. Note that these parameters are defined differently from the 
corresponding parameters for the model for uncategorized lists due to 
the fact that in this application no particular rehearsal assumptions 
were made. For example, in the model for uncategorized lists, the 
expected value of the contextual associative strength was given by 
tejr (see Eq. 3.3), whereas in the present model this expected value 
is simply equal to tSj (+
 8 ) . 
It is evident from Fig. 3.15 that the model predicts these data 
rather well. In Fig. 3.16 are shown the observed and predicted mean 
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numbers of recalled categories (i.e. the number of categories of which 
at least one member was recalled). This aspect of the data is also 
handled very well by the model. Inspection of Figs. 3.15 and 3.16 
reveals that the advantage of cueing with the category name decreases 
with increasing category size (for constant list length) and increases 
with increasing list length (for constant category size). The model 
predicts these effects because with increasing category size relatively 
more categories are accessed in noncued recall thereby eliminating the 
advantage of the cued group. With increasing list length however 
relatively fewer categories are accessed in noncued recall, which in­
creases the advantage of cueing. 
These data were analyzed by Tul ving and Pearlstone (1966) in terms 
of the two response measures used earlier by Cohen (1963b): category 
recall (R
c
), the number of categories of which at least one member was 
recalled, and words-within-category recall (1^/
с
), the ratio of the 
total number of words recalled to the number of categories recalled. 
Thus, a category is not considered to be "recalled" when no member 
of that category is recalled. Analyzed in this way the data show that 
the probability of recalling a category was higher for the cued group, 
that this probability decreased with increasing list length in both 
the cued recall and the noncued recall condition, and increased with 
increasing category size in both conditions. When the predicted data 
are analyzed in the same way, the same effects are obtained. The 
reasons why the model predicts these results are evident except maybe 
for the effect of list length on the probability of category recall 
for the cued group. This effect of list length is not predicted by 
the model of Shiffrin (1970a) nor by the model of Rundus (1973), because 
those models assume that recall of category members, given that the 
category is accessed, is independent of the nunfcer of items outside 
the category. In our model this effect is predicted because the pro­
bability of sampling an item outside the category when both context 
as well as category cues are used is not zero. These items are asso­
ciated to the context as well as to the category name (due to the 
assumption of residual associations) and therefore the product of 
these two associative strengths (and hence the probability of sampling) 
is not equal to zero. 
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The other response measure however, the words-within-category recall, 
did not depend on the recall condition. This is consistent with the 
interpretation that the only advantage of the cued group lies in the 
fact that they are given access to the categories. Once a category is 
accessed the retrieval is the same in both conditions. These scores 
also seemed to be independent of list length, although this is only 
true for lists of 24 or 48 items. The present model predicts some 
effect of list length on within-category recall. The conclusion of 
Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) that within-category recall is indepen-
dent of list length, may be a methodological artifact however. They 
implicitly assumed that a category of which no member has been recal-
led, has not been accessed. If one assumes that categories may have 
been accessed even when no members have been recalled, the results 
might come out differently. For example, we might assume (as was 
done in our model) that in cued recall all the categories are 
accessed. This seems quite reasonable since they are presented to the 
subject at recall. Table 3.3 gives the mean ninrber of words recalled 
per accessed category in cued recall under this assumption. Also 
shown are the means predicted by our model. This analysis shows that 
there is a clear list-length effect in within-category recall, which 
conclusion is diametrically opposed to the conclusion reached by 
Tulving and Pearlstone (1966), although both analyses are based on 
the same data. It should be noted furthenrore that the output inter-
Table 3,3. Observed and predicted mean number of words recalled 
per cued category in cued recall. (Data from Tulving & 
Pearlstone, 1966) 
List length 
12 0 B S , ¿
 PRE 
24 0 B S 
" PRE 
/я 0 B S 4 8
 PRE 
items per category 
1 
0.89 
0.93 
0.90 
0.98 
0.74 
0.75 
2 
1.82 
1.71 
1.61 
1.62 
1.49 
1.38 
4 
3.33 
2.93 
2.52 
2.73 
2.47 
2.45 
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ference effect between successive categories obtained by Smith (1971) 
and Roediger (1973) also leads to the conclusion that there must be 
a list-length effect in within-category recall. 
One other interesting finding observed by Tulving and Pearlstone 
(1966) is that the probability of recalling a member of a category, 
given that at least one member was recalled, was a decreasing function 
of category size. This is of course similar to the usual list-length 
effect in (uncategorized) free recall, and this result is predicted by 
our model for exactly the same reasons (see also section 3.1.1): the 
probability of sampling a particular item before a (fixed) criterion 
number of failures is exceeded decreases with increasing list length 
(or search-set). 
As was mentioned above, Tulving and Pearlstone(1966) gave all sub­
jects a second recall test which was always a cued recall test. They 
found that the mean number of words recalled by subjects who had 
previously been tested under cued recall instructions, was "practically 
identical with the mean number of words recalled on the first test" 
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Fig. 3.17. Mean number of words recalled in cued recall as a 
function of list length and items per category 
for subjects who were either given these cues on 
the first recall test or not until the second re­
call test. (Data from Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). 
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(Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966, p. 385). The mean recall scores for sub-
jects who had previously been given a noncued test are shown in 
Fig. 3.17, together with the results of the first test for subjects 
who were cued with the category names on the first test. A large in-
crease was observed for the noncued group, a result that confirms the 
hypothesis that these items were not accessible on the first test 
although they were available. The recall scores on the second test for 
this group were however lower than those of the group that was given a 
cued test on both trials. This difference was not explained by Tulving 
and Pearlstone (1966). 
As is shown in Fig. 3.17 we have applied our model to these data 
of the second recall test. In this simulation the output of the first 
recall test was used as input to the second test. It was assumed that 
items that had already been recalled received an additional increment 
on the second retrieval. This assumption seems to be able to explain 
the difference between the group that was given a cued recall test on 
their first recall trial and the group that was given a cued recall 
test following a noncued test. It may be remarked that in the experiment 
to be reported in section 4.3 we observed a similar effect in cued re-
call following free recall of lists of paired associates. Thus, it 
seems likely that this effect is not some aberration in the data but 
a reproducible feature of these kinds of data. 
This effect may be explained by the assumption that contextual asso-
ciations are used in cued recall. Prior noncued recall leads to an 
increase in the contextual associative strength of those items that 
were recalled. The items that were recalled on the noncued test will 
have a higher probability of being recalled on the cued test. However, 
the number of items recalled from categories that were not accessed on 
the first test will be decreased (compared to the group that was given 
a cued test on their first recall trial) since the interfering effect 
of items outside the category being tested will be increased due to 
the increased contextual associative strength of those items outside 
the category being tested. This might produce a net decrease in the 
number of items recalled on the cued recall test. 
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3.2.2. Output interférence in categorized free recall 
In categorized free recall two manifestations of output interfe-
rence may be distinguished: a within-category effect and a between-
category effect. We will discuss these two effects separately. 
a) Output interference within categories 
The within-category effect refers to the decrease in the probabili-
ty of within-category recall when one or more members of a particular 
category are presented as retrieval cues. This is similar to the 
effects of cueing with list cues in uncategorized free recall discussed 
earlier. We will use the term "output interference" that is commonly 
used in this connection, although this term is not necessarily adequate 
in this case, since it implies a particular explanation of the effect 
(i.e., the effect results from an implicit recall of those items that 
are presented as cues). An excellent review of this work may be found 
in Roediger (1974). Roediger (1974, p. 265) sunmarizes a number of 
experiments that show that the higher the proportion of items from a 
particular category that are given as recall cues, the lower the pro-
bability of recalling the remaining items from that category. For 
example, Rundus (1973) obtained recall probabilities for the remaining 
category members of .36, .34, .29 and .28 for cueing with resp. 1, 
2, 3 and 4 category instances. Similar results were obtained by 
Slamecka (1968, 1972) and Roediger (1973). 
These results are explained in the present framework in a similar 
way as was done by Rundus (1973) and Roediger (1973, 1974). It seems 
likely that in categorized free recall most of the coding effort will 
be directed at the item-to-category relation. Interitem associations, 
as distinct from that association that both items have to the category 
name, are less likely to be formed, at least they will not be very 
strong. Therefore, the strategy of the subject in categorized free 
recall will be to use only the category name as a retrieval cue (in 
combination with the context) and not the category members (this stra-
tegy was used in our simulations). Moreover, recent work indicates 
that the explicit inclusion of interitem associations and item cues 
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in recall doesn't change much in the results, as would be expected 
from our work on the part-list cueing effect in uncategorized free 
recall. Presentation of a category instance as a recall cue will 
therefore only lead to a higher probability of retrieving the category 
name but not to a higher probability of retrieving other category instan-
ces given retrieval of the category name. Moreover, if category instances 
are sampled with replacement when the subject is using the category 
name and the context as retrieval cues, and if a fixed stop criterion 
is used that is related to the number of retrieval failures (which in-
clude in this case retrievals of the list cues), then it follows that 
presentation of category instances as recall cues has a detrimental 
effect on the probability of recalling the remaining category instances, 
and this detrimental effect increases with the number of items given 
as cues. The assunption that retrieval of an item increases its asso-
ciation to the category name (and to the context) magnifies this 
negative effect because it seems likely that presentation of an item 
as a retrieval cue leads to an implicit retrieval of that item and the 
category name, thereby increasing the strength of their interassocia-
tion. Thus, the present explanation is analogous to those offered by 
Rundus (1973) and Roediger (1973, 1974). 
b) Output inter f erenee between catégories 
A theoretically more important result is the output interference in 
recall of successive categories. This effect refers to the result ob-
served in cued recall that the probability of recalling category 
members is highest for the first category tested and decreases in a 
systematic way for successively recalled categories. This result seems 
to have been found first (independently of each other) by Dong (1972) 
and Smith, D'Agostino and Reid (1970). More systematic studies are 
reported in Smith (1971) and Roediger (1973). In the experiments of 
Smith (1971) blocked presentation of categorized words was followed 
by cued recall. A significant decline in word recall for successive 
categories tested was observed. This output interference effect was 
not dependent on the inclusion of the last input category nor was it 
decreased by introducing an interpolated task between study and test. 
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Thus the results cannot be attributed to a short-term forgetting 
process. More output interference was observed when a long recall 
time per category (60 sec) than when a short time (30 sec) was given. 
In one of his experiments (Smith, 1971, Exp. IV) presentation time 
per item and category size were varied in a between-list design. More 
output interference was observed with longer categories and with a 
higher presentation rate. Roediger (1973) varied category size within 
a single list and found no effect of category size. Thus, one may 
conclude that the effect depends on the absolute number of items pre-
viously recalled rather than on the nunber of items per category stored 
in memory. 
Roediger (1973) observed that the probability of recall for succes-
sively tested categories decreased in an approximately linear fashion 
with a slope of about -0.007. Fig. 3.18 shows the predictions of our 
model for cued recall for a list of 20 categories of 4 items each. These 
results are based on 1000 simulation runs with the parameter values 
that were estimated from the results of Tulving and Pearlstone (1966). 
It is evident that the model predicts this output interference effect. 
In our simulation we obtained a slope of -0.0063, so the magnitude of 
the effect is also predicted quite well. This is a significant accom-
plishment since no other theory has been able to account for this 
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effect (Roediger, personal coraraunication, 1978). The effect is pre-
dicted because the model assumes that contextual cues are used in 
cued recall and because of the assumption of residual associations 
between a category name and items outside the category. Upon recall 
of an item its association to the context is strengthened and there-
fore the interfering effect on the recall of items within other cate-
gories tested later is increased. The model also predicts that the 
effect will be stronger the lower the strength of the associations 
because with a lower strength the (additive) increment in associative 
strength upon successful retrieval is relatively higher. Thus, the 
model predicts that higher presentation rates (i.e. shorter presenta-
tion times per item) should lead to more output interference as was 
found by Smith (1971). Note finally that our model is consistent with 
the result obtained by Roediger (1973) that the output interference 
effect depends on the absolute number of items recalled previously. 
The results of Roediger (1978) may also be explained in the present 
framework. Roediger (1978) found that providing some of the category 
names as retrieval cues increased the number of words recalled from 
the cued categories (i.e. the positive cueing effect observed by 
Tul ving and Pearlstone [1966]), but decreased the number of words 
recalled from the noncued categories (i.e. the negative cueing effect 
observed by Slamecka and others). This decrement in recall was due 
to a smaller probability of gaining access to the noncued categories 
and not to a decreased probability of within-category recall. That 
this result is due to a higher probability of retrieval for the cued 
categories was shown in one of his experiments (Roedigers, 1978, 
Exp. I), in which one group was given the category names with the in-
struction not to recall from those categories and another group was 
given those names with the instruction to recall especially from 
those categories. Relative to a control group a large decrement in the 
number of critical words recalled was observed for the second group 
but not for the first group. These results show that it is the act of 
recall that produces the interference. 
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3.2.3. Interresponse times in categorized free recall 
One advantage of the use of categorized lists is that "chunks" in 
recall (see Miller, 1956) can be easily identified. Therefore inter-
response times can be analyzed both between and within chunks. Pollio 
and his associates (Pollio, 1964; Pollio, Kasschau & DeNise, 1968; 
Pollio, Richards & Lucas, 1969) have shown that interresponse times 
are related to associative relatedness. Pollio (1964) showed that in 
free association high associates were produced faster than low asso-
ciates. He concluded that alternations in overt association rate may 
be attributed to the existence of associative clusters. Pollio et al. 
(1968) used free recall of lists of associated words. It was found 
that words composing a fast output sequence were more interassociated 
than words composing a slow output sequence. Pollio et al. (1969) 
found in free recall of categorized lists longer interresponse times 
between the words adjacent in recall from different categories than 
between two adjacently recalled words from the same category. The 
between-category interresponse times were positively accelerated, 
whereas the mean within-category interresponse times produced an 
essentially flat curve, only a small increase was observed. The inter-
response times for successive items within a category showed a consis-
tent increase. Patterson, Meltzer and Handler (1971) partitioned the 
between-category interresponse time into three components: the time 
between the last word recalled from the first category and the deci-
sion to switch to a category search ("category exit"), the time needed 
to retrieve a new category ("category access"), and the time between 
the retrieval of a new category and the retrieval of the first word 
in the second category ("word access"). In their experiment one group 
of subjects learned the category names before the presentation of the 
list and another group was given in addition the category names on 
cards, which remained in view during the experiment. Thus, this latter 
group was cued with the category names. The results showed that the 
between-category interresponse times for the noncued group increased 
in an approximately exponential manner, while those for the cued group 
did not show any significant increase over successive categories re-
called. Thus, the increase observed in the noncued group may be attri-
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buted to the increasing difficulty of finding a new category. 
It is not too difficult to see that these results are consistent 
with the present model for recall of categorized lists. A sampling-
with-replacement model for retrieval predicts (see section 3.1.2) an 
exponential increase in retrieval time. Therefore such an increase 
is predicted both in the search for a new category as in the search 
for a new word within a category. Cueing with category names elimi-
nates the necessity to retrieve the category name and therefore the 
between-category interresponse times do not show an increase. The 
present model also predicts that successive mean within-category 
interresponse times should show a small increase due to the output 
interference between successive categories. Patterson, Meltzer and 
Mandler (1971) present the results of simulations with a similar 
model and show that such a two-stage sampling-with-replacement model 
can account for the quantitative results obtained. 
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CONTEXTUAL ASSOCIATIONS AND 
LIST-LENGTHS EFFECTS IN RECALL 4 
As yet we have not applied our theory to paired-associate recall. 
It should be evident however that our theory should obviously be appli-
cable to paired-associate recall since this corresponds to the situa-
tion in free recall where an item plus context is used as a cue. 
Most of the paired-associate recall studies however have used quite 
complicated list-structured paradigms. We would like to start to apply 
our theory to a more simple, single-trial paradigm. One thing that 
has to the best of our knowledge never been looked at before, is the 
mixing of free recall and paired-associate recall in a single study, 
and the free recall of paired associates. Moreover, there is a sugges-
tion in the literature (Murdock, 1967a) that some results may be 
different in single-trial paired-associate recall compared to single-
trial free recall, in particular with respect to the list-length 
effect. Murdock (1967a) observed no effect of list length in his 
study, which is rather surprising from our point of view, since our 
theory expects list-length effects whenever contextual cues are used 
in recall. 
In this chapter therefore we will discuss the results of two expe-
riments designed to show (a) the role of contextual associations in 
free (noncued) and cued recall, and (b) the adverse influence of the 
strengthening of the contextual associations for one group of items on 
the retrieval of other items. We will also discuss the application of 
the present theory for retrieval from long-term store to these expe-
riments. The phenomenon that we want to explain may be best illustra-
ted with the results of an unpublished experiment by Shiffrin and 
Gillund (both at Indiana University). In this experiment subjects 
were given series composed of both visually presented words and pictures 
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NUMBER OF I T E M S OF T H E 
OTHER T Y P E IN Е Д С Н L I S T 
Fig. 4.1. Probability of recall for pictures and words as a 
function of the number of items of the same type 
and of the other type. (Data from an unpublished 
experiment by Shiffrin & Gillund). 
of complex scenes. Recall of the pictures was measured by having the 
subjects write down at the time of recall short descriptions of the 
scenes which were later matched by the same subjects with the corres­
ponding pictures (for a more complete discussion of this method see 
Shiffrin, 1973). Fig. 4.1 gives the basic results of this experiment. 
It is evident that performance decreased not only as a function of 
the number of items of the same type or category but also as a function 
of the number of items of the other category. Thus, these results may 
be interpreted as showing a general list-length effect. The problem 
now is how these list-length effects should be explained, what 
mechanism is responsible for these effects. The present theory pro­
poses that these effects should be attributed to the role of contextual 
associations in retrieval from long-term store. We will first present 
and discuss the results of an experiment (section 4.1), and then pre­
sent and discuss (section 4.2) a formal model that describes these 
results. 
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4.1. An experiment with mixed lists of single words and paired asso­
ciates 
4.1.1. Introduotion 
As was described in section 2.4, the present theory proposes that 
two types of associations may be distinguished in (verbal) memory: 
contextual associations and interitem associations. A serious problem 
with studies in the conventional free recall paradigm is that the 
formation of interitem associations can be controlled only in a very 
indirect way, i.e. by using lists of highly associable items. However, 
if one wishes to study the influence of these two types of associations 
separately, one must be able to somehow manipulate the formation of 
interitem associations. 
The present experiment uses a paradigm which makes this possible. 
In this paradigm lists are presented comprised of a number of single 
words and a пипізег of double words. That is, some of the words (the 
single items) are presented in isolation for а пшЬег of seconds and 
the other words are presented in pairs with the instruction to asso­
ciate the two members of a pair. In this way the formation of inter-
item associations may at least be partially controlled and manipulated. 
Thus, in this paradigm elements of the conventional free recall para­
digm and the paired-associate paradigm are combined. 
4.1.2. Method 
Design - In this experiment there were 10 conditions differing in the 
number of single words (denoted by FR) and the number of pairs (denoted 
by PA) on a list. A single-trial procedure was used, so each list was 
studied only once. The 10 conditions were: 
Number of PA items: S 5 15 15 5 15 30 0 0 0 
Number of FR items: 10 30 10 30 0 0 0 10 30 40 
(Note that the number of PA items is given in terms of the number of 
pairs, the number of words is therefore given by twice this number). 
PA pairs and FR items were not presented in blocked fashion but were 
randomly mixed. A latin square design with 10 groups of subjects was 
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used. Each group was given only one list in each condition. Each group 
therefore studied 10 lists (excluding the practice list). For each 
condition, half the subjects were tested first on the PA items (paired-
associate testing) and the other subjects were tested first on the FR 
items (free recall testing). Subjects were not told before study of a 
list which items would be tested first. The words were presented visual­
ly, a single word for 2 sec, a pair for 4 sec. As usual, there was no 
interval between successive presentations, i.e. the next item was pre­
sented immediately after the previous item. Paired words were tested 
either in a forward maimer or in a backward manner: if the pair was 
Α-B it was tested either as A-? or as ?-B. 1/5 of all PA items was 
tested only at an end-of-session test (a test given after all the lists 
had been presented and tested), and another 1/5 of all PA items was 
tested both at the in-session and at the end-of-session test. 
Materials - Each list for a given group consisted of a random selection 
from a master list of 600 monosyllabic English nouns. The list was 
randomized first and then partitioned in 10 groups of 60 words each. 
The η words that were needed to construct the k-th list for a given 
group of subjects, were taken from the first η words of the k-th group 
of 60 words. Thus, if the third condition for group A required a list 
of 40 words and the third condition for group В a list of 10 words, 
then those 10 words were always a subset of the 40 words of group A. 
The items on a given list were then randomized again to get the actual 
presentation order. Note that no word was presented more than once, in 
any of the lists. An additional practice list was constructed consis­
ting of 5 pairs and 5 single items. The same practice list was used 
for all groups of subjects. 
Subjects - The subjects were 79 undergraduates at Indiana University. 
They were given introductory psychology course credit for their parti­
cipation in the experiment. Due to the fact that some subjects did 
not complete the experiment and due to experimenter error, not all of 
the results are based on 79 subjects; however all results are based 
on at least 69 subjects. Subjects were tested in groups of approxima­
tely 8 subjects each. The groups were of unequal size as a result of 
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the procedure for obtaining the subjects, i.e., by posting sign-up 
sheets. The unequal group sizes result from the differential show-up. 
Procedure - Subjects were given instructions regarding the nature of 
the lists and the type of tests that would be given. They were asked 
to allot an equal amount of effort in studying each word. The instruc­
tions emphasized that they should try to link together the two members 
of a word pair into a single unit, by forming a mental image or by 
using some kind of verbal code. After presentation of the list a 20 sec 
arithmetic task was given to eliminate short-term effects. A written 
recall procedure was used. Single words were tested using a 2 min free 
recall procedure, paired words were tested with a paired-associate 
testing procedure. In this case the subjects had 4 sec to write down 
their answer. The next list was always presented immediately (i.e. 
within half a minute or so) after the previous list had been tested. 
After all the lists had been presented and tested, an unexpected 
end-of-session test was given. First, a free recall test was given 
for all the items on any of the lists, both single words and paired 
words. Following this first end-of-session test a second, paired-
associate test was given. In this test 2/5 of all the paired-associate 
items were tested. Half of these items (i.e. 1/5 of all PA items) had 
also been tested in the immediate, in-session test. These latter items 
were tested in the same manner (forward or backward) as they had been 
tested previously. 
4.1.3. Results and disaussion 
Figure 4.2 shows the effect of list length on recall of the PA 
items and the FR items. These data are averaged over order of testing 
and over testing with the A member and with the В member of the A-B 
pair. It is evident that the results are quite consistent. In free 
recall testing the probability of recall decreases not only as a 
function of the number of FR items but also as a function of the number 
of PA items on the list. A similar list-length effect is observed for 
the PA items, and again the probability of recall decreases when other 
items are mixed in the list. 
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Fig. 4.3 shows the effects of order of t e s t i n g on the probabi l i ty 
of r e c a l l in the case of mixed l i s t s . For the PA items there is a 
substantial effect of order of testing, but not for the FR items. 
Overall the probabi l i ty of r e c a l l for PA items when they are te s ted 
f i r s t i s 0.271, and when they are tes ted l a s t 0.189. For FR items the 
overal l probabi l i ty of r e c a l l when free r e c a l l t e s t i n g is f i r s t i s 
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recall and free recall testing. 
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0.211, and 0.191 when second. Note that in the present experiment (see 
Fig. 4.3) we observe an effect of order of testing only when PA = 15, 
and not when PA = 5. Our theory (see section 4.2) predicts exactly 
the reverse: the effect should be higher the higher the level of re­
call. Moreover, it seems as though a list-length effect for the number 
of pairs on the list is observed only when PA is tested second (but 
see also Fig. 4.10, which combines all the data for the case that PA 
is tested first and which shows a clear general list-length effect), 
although in both cases there is an effect of the number of FR items 
on the list. These results are also not consistent with our theory 
and are difficult to explain. It should be noted however that these 
results are not replicated in the second experiment (see Fig. 4.11). 
Therefore, these results (if at all explainable) must be attributed 
to one of the procedural differences between these two experiments. 
Only replication of the present experiment will show whether these 
results are found reliably when the present procedure is used. 
These results might be explained in our framework as follows. 
Suppose for example that during study of a short list the following 
associative structure is developed: 
PAi PA2 
FR·) FR2 
% 
РАз РАД 
FR4 FRS 
"PA" stands for a member of a PA item, "FR" for a FR item. The unbroken 
lines refer to interitem associations between two members of a PA item, 
the broken lines refer to the interitem association between two FR 
items. Not shown are the associations that all items have to the context. 
Thus, interitem associations may be formed between the two members of 
a PA item and between two different FR items. All items are associated 
to the context. List-length effects and effects of order of testing 
are determined by the relative strengths of these contextual associa­
tions (since these contextual associations determine the sampling pro­
babilities of "irrelevant" items). During free recall the item-to-
context associations for the single words that are recalled are in­
creased in strength. Assume that what gets strengthened during paired-
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associate recall are mainly the interitem associations. This might 
explain why there is almost no effect of order of testing for the FR 
items, although there is an effect of the number of PA items on the 
probability of recalling a FR item. In this case it may be assumed 
that the interitem associations between the members of a PA item will 
not be used during free recall since a member of a PA item is never 
used as a retrieval cue in this situation (retrieval of a PA item is 
a failure). PA items do have an inhibiting effect however on free 
recall because they are associated to the context, thus increasing the 
search-sets. On the other hand, during paired-associate recall one 
member of the pair is used along with the context as a retrieval cue. 
But, since the contextual associations of the FR items have been in-
creased during prior free recall, it does make a difference in this 
case whether the PA items are tested first or last. Note that is as-
sumed that a subject is always able to recognize whether a retrieved 
item was a member of a PA item or a FR item. Thus, it is assumed that 
along with specific item features information is stored specifying 
the type (PA or FR) of item. This infomation is part of the temporal-
contextual information associated to the item. 
The list-length effect that is observed for the PA items is contrary 
to results reported by Murdock (1967a), but his procedure differed from 
ours in that he used a multitrial procedure where the lists were 
learned to criterion, and a self-paced response procedure, thereby 
eliminating response-time limitations. Moreover, the results mentioned 
in Murdock's study are based on highly practiced subjects, which is 
not the case in our study. In the experiment to be discussed in section 
4.3 we will determine whether the list-length effect for PA items 
indeed disappears when response time is not limited. 
We did replicate another result obtained by Murdock (see Murdock, 
1974, p. 127) in this kind of single-trial paired-associate procedure, 
namely that we did not find a systematic difference between forward 
and backward recall (see Table 4.1). Moreover, when these results are 
compared to those obtained in the second experiment (see Table 4.4), 
it becomes evident that in three of the seven conditions, the direc-
tion of the difference between forward and backward recall is reversed 
in the second experiment. Thus, it probably makes no sense to try to 
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Table 4.1: Comparison of forward and backward paired-associate 
test order. 
PA 
15 
15 
5 
5 
30 
15 
5 
overall 
FR 
30 
10 
30 
10 
0 
0 
0 
forward 
0.20 
0.22 
0.20 
0.23 
0.23 
0.34 
0.51 
0.255 
backward 
0.18 
0.27 
0.22 
0.41 
0.26 
0.38 
0.44 
0.286 
N 
462 
474 
138 
158 
948 
474 
150 
2804 
Note: N gives the number of cases on which each proportion is 
based. 
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Fig. 4.4. Probability of recall for paired-associate items 
as a function of serial position at study. PA gives 
the number of pairs on the list and FR the number 
of single words. (Each point is the mean of two 
successive serial positions). 
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detect a systematic pattern in the results of Table 4.1 (and those of 
Table 4.4). Neither did we find a primacy effect for the paired asso­
ciates, replicating earlier findings (see Fig. 4.4). Fig. 4.5 shows 
the probability of recall for PA items as a function of test position. 
There does not seem to be a systematic effect of test position, con­
trary to what would seem to be predicted by our model. We will return 
to this finding in the next section. For the moment it suffices to 
remark that the predicted effects may be too small to be detectable. 
Serial position curves for the FR items are shown in Fig. 4.6. In 
this case a primacy effect is obtained, but it seems somewhat reduced 
for the mixed lists. This might indicate that a subject stops rehear­
sing the FR items when a pair is presented for study. 
Fig. 4.7 shows the end-of-session (EOS) results for the FR items. 
The curves in the right-hand panel give the unconditional probability 
of recall, the curves in the left-hand panel contional on recall at 
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Fig. 4.7. Probability of recalling a single item at the end-
of-session (EOS) test as a function of the number 
of single items (FR) and the number of pairs (PA) 
on the list. The left-hand panel gives the data 
conditional on within-session recall; the right-
hand panel gives the unconditional data. 
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the in-session test. Almost all of the items that are recalled at the 
end-of-session test were also recalled at the in-session test. The 
probability of recall at the EOS-test for items that were not recalled 
at the in-session test ranged from 0.005 to 0.015 for the different 
conditions, and there was no effect of list length in this case. This 
dependence between in-session and end-of-session recall is probably 
due to both item-selection effects and to the effects of testing on 
future recall (i.e. the incrementing upon successful retrieval). That 
there seems to be a slight reversed list-length effect in the condi­
tional data might be explained by item-selection effects: items that 
were recalled from longer lists were probably better coded than items 
that were recalled from short lists. 
Fig. 4.8 gives the Ю З results for the second EOS test where a 
sample from the PA items that occurred on any of the lists was tested 
a second time. The left-hand panel gives the results for the repeated 
items, the right-hand panel for the nonrepeated items, the items that 
were not tested at the in-session test. It is evident that there is 
5 15 30 5 15 30 
NUMBER OF PA-ITEMS 
Fig. 4.8. Probability of recall for the paired-associate items 
on the paired-associate end-of-session (EOS) test 
as a function of the number of pairs (PA) and the 
number of single items (FR) on the list. The left-
hand panel gives the data (both unconditional and 
conditional on in-session recall) for items that 
were also tested on the in-session test; the right-
hand panel shows the data for those items that were 
not tested on the in-session test. 
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an effect of testing since the probability of recall is higher for the 
repeated items than for the nonrepeated items. For the nonrepeated 
items there seems to be a list-length effect. It is not clear how this 
effect should be explained. One explanation could be that cues specific 
to the particular list context are used in this EOS recall test. For 
the repeated items it is again the case that about all of the recalled 
items were also recalled at the in-session test. The overall probabi-
lity of recalling an item given non-recall at the first test, was 
0.014 for these PA items. Again a reversed list-length effect is ob-
served if one conditionalizes on recall at the in-session test, probably 
the result of a selection effect. 
In the following section we will apply a model based on the general 
theory for retrieval to the results of this experiment. 
4.2. A model for experimenta aorribining paired-associate reaall and 
free recall 
It is assumed that the two members of a paired-associate item are 
associated during study to each other and to the context. Free recall 
items (single words) are associated to other free recall items that 
are simultaneously present in STS and to the context. For similar 
reasons as for the model for categorized lists described in section 
3.2, it is assumed that all associations (including those between 
members of a paired-associate item and single words) have a residual 
value equal to 63. 
Because we are not primarily interested in the particular rehearsal 
strategy adopted by the subject but only in the long-term retrieval 
processes, we have decided to let our rehearsal assumptions be shaped 
by the observed data. The data of the experiment described above sug-
gest that a subject stops rehearsing any items in the buffer upon 
presentation of a new PA item and that PA items are deleted from the 
buffer upon the presentation of a new item (either PA of FR). These 
assumptions explain why there is no primacy effect for the PA items 
(each PA item is studied equally long) and why the primacy effect for 
the FR items decreases with the number of PA items on the list (see 
Figs. 4.4 and 4.6). Thus, all PA items are assumed to have the same 
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associative strengths: the strength of the contextual association is 
denoted by θ 5t, that of the interitem association (the association 
between the two members of the pair) is given by egt, where t is the 
presentation time in sees per item (in this case t = 4.0). 
A buffer model was used to simulate the rehearsal of FR items. In 
order to avoid a trivial explanation of the effect of the number of 
PA items on the list, it is assumed that the amount of information 
stored in LTS depends on the number of items in the buffer (see also 
Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968, p. 180). Suppose for example that the 
strengths of the associations developed in LTS during study of the FR 
items would depend only on the length of stay in the buffer indepen­
dent of the number of other items in the buffer (as in the model for 
free recall described in the previous chapter). Then these strengths 
would be lower when more PA items are on the list (given the replace­
ment assumptions described above) since the length of stay in the 
buffer depends among other things on the probability that a PA item 
will be presented (remember that upon presentation of a PA item the 
buffer is cleared). Thus, we have assumed that if there are j items in 
the buffer, the increase in contextual associative strength per sec of 
study in STS for a particular item is equal to θι/j. We have also as­
sumed, somewhat arbitrarily, that the increase in interitem associa­
tive strength is equal to 62/3, for each pair of items together for 
one second. After all the items have been presented the buffer is 
cleared since an interpolated task was given between study and recall. 
In recall two types of testing procedures are used: free recall 
testing for the FR items and paired-associate recall testing for the 
PA items. 
For free recall testing the same model is used as described in 
section 3.1, except that in this case retrieval of a PA item counts 
as a failure. As before, the contextual and interitem associations 
are incremented upon successful retrieval of a FR item. The increments 
are denoted by Θ3 resp. ц. PA items that are sampled during free 
recall testing are not incremented. Nòte that it is assumed that a 
subject is always able to tell on the basis of recovered temporal-
contextual features whether a recovered item is a member of a PA item 
or a FR item. This assumption is reasonable since the nunber of PA 
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intrusions in FR recall was very lew (the overall mean number of PA 
intrusions in FR recall, averaged over conditions and subjects, was 
0.39). 
In paired-associate testing a number of searches is made for each 
PA item with the context and the stimulus member of the pair as 
retrieval cues. Let L2MAX denote the number of searches made for each 
PA item. Only recovery of the target item leads to an increase in 
associative strength. The increase in the contextual associative 
strength is denoted by Θ7. Since we assume that after a PA item has 
been tested that item will never be used again as a retrieval cue 
(neither in the recall of FR items nor in the recall of other PA items) 
it follows that the value of the increase in associative strength 
between the two members of a PA item is irrelevant to our calculations 
and predictions. Note that the present model for recall of paired 
associates is identical to the model for cued recall of categorized 
lists described in section 3.2. To recapitulate, the following para­
meters are used: 
ö]/j: contextual associative strength transferred to LTS per sec of 
study in STS for each FR item, when there are j FR items in STS; 
ЪгІУ· interitem associative strength transferred to LTS per sec of 
study in STS for each pair of FR items, when there are j FR items 
in STS; 
3 : increment in the contextual associative strength upon successful 
retrieval of a FR item; 
θ4 : increment in the interitem associative strength upon successful 
retrieval of a FR item; 
Θ5 : contextual associative strength transferred to LTS per sec of 
study in STS for a PA item; 
Θ5 : interitem associative strength transferred to LTS per sec of 
study in STS for a PA item; 
θ7 : increment in contextual associative strength upon successful 
retrieval of a FA item; 
д : residual value of all associations. 
Due to the complexity of the simulation model only a very limited 
parameter search was feasible. The predictions to be reported below 
are based on 1000 simulation runs with the following parameter values: 
θι = 0.3, г = 0.3, з = 3.0, ц = 3.0, Б = 0.09,
 6 = 0.2, Ь7 = 0.8, 
8 - 0.025, г = 4, КМАХ = 30, Ш А Х = 3, and L2MAX = 1. It should be 
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remarked that in this parameter search θι and Θ2 were always assigned 
the same value, as were Θ3 and ц. Furthermore, the values of r, KMAX 
and LMAX were not varied but simply taken from the previous simulation 
results (see chapter 3), and L2MAX was arbitrarily set equal to 1. Note 
that the parameter values θι and θ2 are defined differently than in 
previous applications of the theory due to the slightly different buffer 
model that is used in this application. It is difficult to compare these 
parameter values directly. One possibility is to conpare the information 
transferred to LTS per second of study in a buffer of 4 words in case of 
FR items and 2 words in the case of PA items. For FR items the amount 
of contextual associative strength transferred to LTS per second of 
study in this case equals 0.075 (θ1/4), for PA items this amount equals 
0.09 (Θ5). The amount of interitem associative strength transferred 
to LTS per second of study in a full buffer equals 0.07S (θι/4) for FR 
items and 0.20 (θ6) for PA items. The increment in the strength of the 
contextual association upon successful retrieval is equal to 10 sec of 
study in an otherwise empty buffer in the case of a FR item and equal 
to about 9 sec of study in an otherwise empty buffer (i.e. one pair 
in the buffer) for PA items. Note that in mixed lists the item-to-
item associative strength for FR items drops rapidly as the number of 
PA items on the list increases, since the probability that two FR 
items are together in the buffer decreases with the number of PA items 
on the list. However, for the item-to-context associative strength the 
number of PA items on the list is irrelevant due to the revised 
buffer assumptions. The average stored strength for the contextual 
association equals 0.65 for a FR item and 0.35 for a PA item. 
Fig. 4.9 shows the predicted and observed effects of list-length 
on the recall of PA items and FR items (averaged over testing order). 
The quantitative effects are predicted quite well. Thus, these effects 
can be explained by the assumption that all items are associated to 
the same context and that contextual associations are used in retrie­
val from long-term store. Table 4.2 gives the predicted and observed 
effects of order of testing. It is evident that the model predicts a 
much larger effect of order of testing on PA recall than on FR recall. 
A similar effect was observed in the data. We have suggested earlier 
a mechanism by which the model could predict this effect. Basically, 
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Table 4.2: Effect of order of testing on paired-associate recall 
and free recall. 
FR - 10 
FR - 30 
0BS 
PRE 
0BS 
PRE 
PA RECALL 
l S t 2 n d 
.308 
.296 
.234 
.204 
.227 
.226 
.151 
.143 
PA -
PA -
5 
15 
0BS 
PRE 
0BS 
PRE 
FR RECALL 
1 s t 2 n d 
.234 
.251 
.188 
.J99 
.214 
.243 
.168 
.189 
averag 
OBS 
PRE 
OBS 
PRE 
e difference 
PA FR 
.081 
.070 
.083 
.061 
.020 
.008 
.020 
.OÍ0 
average 0BS .271 .189 
PRE .250 .185 
OBS .211 .191 OBS .082 .020 
PRE .225 .216 PRE .065 .009 
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this argument depended upon the fact that the increment upon success­
ful retrieval must be higher for FR items than for PA items relative 
to the average stored strength. However, if the increment for PA 
items is made 5 times as big as the average stored strength for PA 
items (i.e. Θ7 = 1.60 » 5 χ .35) and therefore relatively similar to 
the increment for FR items (3.00 « 5 χ 0.65), then the difference 
between PA recall first and second is still larger than the corres­
ponding difference for FR recall, although the effect is clearly re­
duced. With Θ7 equal to 1.60 the difference is still about 3 times as 
big for PA recall as for FR recall (used to be about 7 times as big 
with 67= 0.80). Thus, only part of the effect seems to be attribu­
table to the relatively higher increment of the contextual associa­
tive strength upon retrieval of FR items. 
Parenthetically, it may be remarked that this shows once more that 
in order to explain why a particular effect occurs, it is not suffi­
cient to have a theory or model that "fits" the data, that produces 
the same effects as are observed in the data. One must also be able to 
explain why the theory or model produces these effects (this may be 
done by systematically varying certain aspects of the model or by 
varying the parameter values). In the kind of models that are used in 
our simulations there are quite a few interacting processes so that 
this latter task (i.e. explaining why the model produces certain 
effects) is by no means a trivial matter. Note that similar problems 
were encountered earlier,in the application of our model for free 
recall to hypermnesia (section 3.1.3) and to the part-list cueing 
effect (section 3.1.5). 
A rough check on the result obtained with these parameter values 
that the average stored strength for the contextual associations is 
about twice as high for FR items as it is for PA items is provided 
in Fig. 4.10. Shown there are the observed and predicted probabilities 
of recall for PA items and FR items as a function of the total number 
of items on the list, where one pair is counted as one item. In order 
to avoid problems due to differential effects of order of testing, 
only the data of the first recall test have been used. This figure 
shows that the effect of the number of PA items on FR recall is as 
large as the effect of the number of FR items on FR recall and that 
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the effect of the number of FR items on PA recall is as large as the 
effect of the number of PA items on PA recall, under the assumption 
that FR items have a contextual association that is about twice as 
strong as that of a single member of a PA pair (and therefore the 
effect of two members of a pair is about equal to that of one FR item). 
This conclusion is justified by the fact that with this assunption 
it is possible both for PA recall and for FR recall to draw a single 
curve through all the data points. This result is therefore an argument 
in favor of assigning a lower contextual associative strength to PA 
items than to FR items. 
It was mentioned above (p. 108) that our model predicts an effect 
of output order on the probability of recall of a PA item. This 
effect is predicted for exactly the same reasons as in the case of the 
output interference effect between successive categories in cued 
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Table 4.3: Probability ot recall for PA items by test quartiles. 
PA 
15 
15 
5 
5 
30 
15 
5 
FR 
30 
10 
30 
10 
0 
0 
0 
OVERALL 
OBS 
PRE 
0BS 
PRE 
OBS 
PRE 
0BS 
PRE 
OBS 
PRE 
DBS 
PRE 
0BS 
PRE 
0BS 
PRE 
Ql 
.19 
.17 
.22 
.26 
.19 
.19 
.22 
.31 
.29 
.25 
.43 
.36 
.45 
.55 
.283 
.274 
Q2 
.16 
.17 
.28 
.25 
.17 
.18 
.35 
.32 
.27 
.23 
.39 
.34 
.45 
.51 
.286 
.260 
Q3 
.21 
.17 
.27 
.24 
.22 
.18 
.24 
.31 
.23 
.22 
.29 
.32 
.57 
.51 
.262 
.251 
Qi. 
.20 
.17 
.22 
.23 
.28 
.19 
.47 
.30 
.19 
.20 
.32 
.30 
.43 
.47 
.253 
.237 
N 
231 
237 
69 
79 
474 
237 
75 
1402 
Note: N gives the number of cases on which each proportion is 
based. 
recall of categorized lists (see section 3.2.2). The interfering 
effect of other list items is a function of the total strength of the 
contextual associations of these other items. Since it is assumed 
that the contextual associations are incremented upon recall of an 
item it follows that the more items have been recalled the larger the 
interference. Table 4.3 gives the observed and predicted probabili-
ties of recall for PA items from successive quartiles. It is evident 
that the effects are predicted to be quite small. Therefore, the 
observation that no consistent effect of output order is found in the 
data does not contradict the present model. The above results show 
that our model predicts both paired-associate and free recall para-
digms with comron mechanisms. This fact illustrates the advantage of 
a general theory for retrieval over a specific model that only applies 
to one particular experimental task. Starting from a general retrieval 
theory it becomes relatively easy to construct a model that applies 
simultaneously to tasks that have traditionally been treated sepa-
rately and for which separate models have been proposed. 
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4 . 3 . Recall time and the list-length effect in single-trial paired-
associate recall 
4.3.1. Introduotion 
The results of the first experiment showed a clear list-length 
effect in single-trial paired-associate recall contrary to the results 
reported by Murdock (1967a). One of the reasons for this differential 
result could be that Mirdock (1967a) used a self-paced response pro-
cedure so that subjects had more time to search their memory. One of 
the aims of the present experiment is to see whether the list-length 
effect indeed disappears when subjects are given as much recall time 
as they want. The other major aim is to study the effect of prior free 
recall of PA items on subsequent paired associate testing of these 
items. Therefore, in this experiment a free recall test is given for 
both the single words on the list and the paired words. Thus, we may 
conpare the results obtained with cued and noncued recall of paired 
associates. 
4.3.2. Method 
Design - A similar design was used as in the first experiment. There 
were 7 conditions differing in the number of single words (FR items) 
and word pairs (PA items) on the list. The 7 conditions were: 
Number of PA items: 5 5 15 IS 5 15 30 
Munter of FR items: 10 30 10 30 0 0 0 
PA items and FR items were randomly mixed in a single list. Each list 
was presented once and tested twice, a free recall test and a paired-
associate test. In the free recall test subjects were asked to recall 
all the words on the list, both FR items and PA items. In the paired-
associate test subjects were given one of the members of a word pair 
and asked to recall the other member. A latin square design with 7 
groups of subjects was used. Each group was given only one list in 
each condition. Each group therefore studied 7 lists (excluding the 
We would like to acknowledge the assistance of Gary Gillund in the 
collection and analysis of the data of the present experiment. 
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practice list). In each condition half the subjects were given first 
the free recall test, the other half first the paired-associate test. 
Subjects were not told in advance which items would be tested first. 
The words were presented visually, a single word for 2 sec, a pair for 
4 sec. The next item was always presented inmediately after the pre-
vious item. On the paired-associate test either the first or the second 
member of the word pair was given. 1/5 of all PA items was tested only 
at an end-of-session test (a test given after all the lists had been 
presented and tested), and another 1/5 was tested both on the immediate, 
in-session test and on the end-of-session test. 
Materials - The lists were constructed in exactly the same manner as 
in the first experiment (see section 4.1.2). The words that made up 
the lists were taken from the first 7 groups of 60 words that were 
constructed for the first experiment from the master list of 600 words. 
The same practice list was used as in the first experiment. 
Subjecta - The subjects were 53 undergraduates at Indiana University. 
They were given introductory psychology course credit for their parti-
cipation in the experiment. Subjects were tested in groups of approxi-
mately 8 subjects each. The groups were of unequal size as a result 
of the procedure for obtaining the subjects, i.e., by posting sign-up 
sheets. The unequal group sizes result from the differential show-up. 
Procedure - Subjects were given instructions regarding the nature of 
the lists and the type of tests that would be given. They were asked 
to allot an equal amount of effort in studying each word. The instruc-
tions emphasized that they should try to link together the two members 
of a word pair into a single unit, by forming a mental image or by 
using some kind of verbal code. After presentation of the list a 20 
sec arithmetic task was given in order to eliminate short-term effects. 
Two types of tests were given: a free recall test and a paired-asso-
ciate test. In free recall testing subjects were as.ked to write down 
as many words as they could that were on the list they just saw, both 
single words and paired words, the paired words being written to-
gether if the subject recalled them as such. Furthermore, the subjects 
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indicated for each singly recalled item whether they thought it was 
a member of a pair or a singly presented item. In paired-associate 
testing they were given one member of each pair and asked to write down 
the other member. All stimulus members were presented visually at the 
same time. The reason for this was that we wished to give the subjects 
the opportunity to go through the items at their own pace (i.e. a 
self-paced response procedure). Since a group testing procedure was 
used, it was impractical to present the items successively. Simulta­
neous presentation makes it possible for a subject to switch to the 
next stimulus when other subjects are still trying to recall the res­
ponse to an earlier stimulus. The stimulus members remained in view 
until the end of the recall period. Depending on list length, between 
2 and 4 minutes recall time were given in both the free recall test 
and the paired-associate test, although a group was allowed additional 
time when one of the subjects was still writing (which seldom happened). 
The next list was always presented iirnediately (i.e. within half a 
minute or so) after the previous list had been presented. 
4.3.3. Results and discussion 
As in the previous experiment, no systematic difference was observed 
between forward and backward paired-associate test order (i.e. testing 
with the A member or with the В member of an Α-B pair). Table 4.4 
gives the probability of recall for forward and backward testing 
averaged over paired-associate testing first or second. Note that this 
agrees with the result mentioned by Murdock (1974, p. 127) that the 
usual advantage for forward recall is not found when the two members 
of a paired-associate item are common words, selected and paired at 
random, and the subjects know that they may be tested with either member 
of the pairs. 
In Fig. 4.11 are shown the results of the paired-associate test. It 
is evident that the list-length effects that were observed in the first 
experiment do not disappear when more recall time is given. If anything 
they are even more pronounced in this experiment than in the previous 
experiment. A second interesting result is that the probability of 
recall for paired-associate testing following free recall testing is 
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Table 4.4: Comparison of forward and backward paired-associate 
test order. 
PA 
15 
15 
5 
5 
30 
15 
5 
overall 
FR 
30 
10 
30 
10 
0 
0 
0 
forward 
0.33 
0.41 
0.34 
0.45 
0.25 
0.43 
0.55 
0.391 
backward 
0.23 
0.32 
0.38 
0.53 
0.20 
0.39 
0.54 
0.366 
N 
318 
318 
106 
106 
636 
318 
106 
1908 
Note: N gives the number of cases on which each proportion is based. 
lower than for paired-associate testing first. Note that this is 
similar to the result obtained by Tulving and Pearlstone (1966; see 
section 3.2.1.) for cued recall of categorized lists following noncued 
recall, although the effect is much more pronounced in the present 
experiment. As was mentioned earlier, these effects are predicted by 
PAIRED TESTING 
О РД TESTED FIRST 
• PA TESTED SECOND 
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Fig. 4.1]. The probability of paired-associate recall as a 
function of list length and test order. 
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Fig. 4.12. The probability of 
recall on the free 
recall test for single 
items as a function of 
list length and test 
order. 
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our theory for retrieval from long-term store because our theory 
assumes that contextual associations are used in cued as well as 
noncued recall. The interfering effect of other list items depends 
on the total strength of the association between those items and the 
context. Prior noncued recall leads to an increase in the contextual 
(and interitem) associative strengths of those items that were re­
called. Although these items will have a higher probability of recall 
on the cued test, the probability of recall for the other items is 
decreased, producing a net decrease in the probability of recall. 
Fig. 4.12 shows the probability of recall on the free recall test 
for the single items. Again the results of the first experiment are 
replicated: the probability of recall decreases both with the number 
of single items on the list and with the number of paired items; 
secondly, there is little effect of order of testing on the free re­
call of single items. For a discussion of these results we may refer 
to section 4.2. 
Fig. 4.13 gives the probability of recall on the free recall test 
for the paired-associate items. Again the expected list-length effects 
are obtained. Moreover, the probability of recall of a PA item is 
higher if this free recall test is preceded by a paired-associate test. 
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Fig. 4.13. The probability of recall on the free recall test 
for a member of a paired-associate pair as a func­
tion of list length and test order. 
This may be interpreted as a result of the incrementing of the associa­
tions (both contextual as well as interitem) upon successful paired-
associate recall. The incrementing of the contextual associations in 
PA testing has of course some interfering effect on those PA items not 
recalled on the PA test. However, this interfering effect does not 
manifest itself, simply because the number of PA items recalled (and 
thus incremented) on a PA recall test is substantially higher than the 
number of PA items recalled on a free recall test. Note furthermore 
that in free recall the incrementing of the contextual associations in 
the prior PA recall test is only interfering in the sense that it in­
creases the variability in associative strength between the list items, 
and therefore the probability that a particular item will be sampled 
repeatedly on the same recall test (note that in free recall all items 
are target items on any retrieval attempt). In cued recall however 
irrelevant contextual associations are interfering in still another 
sense : they increase the likelihood that the target item will not be 
sampled. Thus, the higher recall following prior cued recall is simply 
a manifestation of the general rule that in free recall more items 
will be recalled when the total strength stored in LTS is higher. 
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Fig. 4.14. The probability of joint recall of both members 
of a paired-associate pair on the free recall 
test as a function of list length and test order. 
Note that these results show the difference in the effects of testing 
between cued and noncued recall tests of paired associates: prior non-
cued recall decreases the probability of recall on a second cued recall 
test, whereas prior cued recall increases the probability of recall on 
a second noncued recall test. In cued recall a specific item in the 
search-set has to be retrieved, so selective strengthening of certain 
items in the search-set by a prior noncued recall test has a negative 
effect on the overall probability of recall, whereas in noncued recall 
any item in the search-set that is retrieved is a "success", so selec­
tive strengthening of certain items by a prior cued recall test, has a 
positive effect on the overall probability of recall. 
Fig. 4.14 gives the joint probability of recall of both members of 
a pair on the free recall test. Conparison with Fig. 4.13 shows that 
this joint probability is somewhat lower than the separate probabilities 
of recall but by far not as much as would be expected if these proba­
bilities were independent. Thus, we may conclude that the interitem 
associations are being used during free recall. This is even more 
evident if one compares Fig. 4.14 with Fig. 4.15. Fig. 4.15 gives the 
probability that both members of a pair were recalled as a pair, i.e. 
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in adjacent positions. This probability is almost exactly the same as 
the probability that both members are both recalled but not necessarily 
in adjacent positions. Fig. 4.16 gives the probability that at least 
one member of a pair was recalled. Again, the result that this proba­
bility is only slightly higher than the probability of recalling any 
particular PA member shows that the separate probabilities of recall 
are highly dependent. 
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Taken together these results inply that in both free recall and 
paired-associate recall contextual as well as interitem associations 
are used in retrieval. These results seem therefore difficult, if not 
impossible, to explain by any model that does not assume that 
(a) contextual associations are used in paired-associate recall as well 
as in free recall (otherwise one would not predict the observed 
list-length effects in paired-associate recall), 
(b) interitem associations are used in free recall as well as in paired-
associate recall (otherwise the probabilities of recall of the two 
members of a pair would have to be independent), and 
(c) successful retrieval leads to an increase in the associations to 
the probe cues, and such increases in irrelevant associations have 
an interfering effect on the recall of items that were not so 
strengthened (otherwise there would have to be no effect of test 
order). 
Since (a), (b) and (c) constitute the basic assumptions of our theory, 
these results are a strong argument in favor of our theory for retrie-
val from long-term store. 
As for the end-of-session tests, similar results were obtained as 
in the previous experiment (see section 4.1.3). In both free recall 
and paired-associate recall the probability of recall on the end-of-
session test given nonrecall at the in-session test was very low. The 
probability of recall for those items that were recalled at the in-
session test was relatively high (on the free recall EOS-test about 
.55 for the single items and .40 for the PA items, and around .80 on 
the EOS paired-associate recall test). The results conditional on 
in-session recall did not show a systematic relationship with list 
length. In some cases a reversed list-length effect was observed (as 
in the first experiment, see section 4.1.3), probably due to selec-
tion effects. The unconditional data did show an effect of list length 
however, as did the results of the EOS paired-associate test of those 
pairs that had not been tested at the in-session paired-associate test, 
again similar to the results described in section 4.1.3. 
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RECOGNITION 5 
In this chapter we will present a preliminary discussion of the 
application of the present framevrork to recognition tasks. Special 
emphasis will be given to comparisons of recall and recognition and 
to the phenomenon of recognition failure of recallable words (Tulving 
& Wiseman, 1975; Flexser & Tulving, 1978). 
5.1. Retrieval processes in recognition and recall 
5.1.1. Strength theories for recognition 
Historically, two different approaches have been taken to the 
problem of the relation between recognition and recall: the so-called 
threshold theory and the two-process theory (see among others: Kintsch, 
1970; Anderson & Bower, 1972). Both these approaches assumed that 
recognition was based on a unidimensional "strength" measure. They 
differed in the way they conceptualized recall. 
5.1.1.1. Threshold theories of recall 
Threshold theories propose that there is a direct access to the 
"memory trace" of an item. It is assumed that this memory trace can be 
represented by a unidimensional strength measure ("familiarity", "res-
ponse strength", "excitatory potential", etc.). Upon presentation of 
a stimulus a response is given when this strength measure exceeds a 
threshold or it is assumed that the probability of a correct response 
is a sijiple function of this strength measure. This model for retrie-
val is implicitly assumed by most older learning theories. The thres-
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hold theory states that there is no essential difference between re-
cognition and recall. Recall requires a higher trace strength than 
recognition, i.e. there is a lower threshold in recognition than in 
recall. This theory was supported by the fact that several variables 
have a similar influence on recognition to the influencé they have on 
recall (for example, study time, spacing of repetitions, etc.). A basic 
difficulty with this approach however is that some variables affect 
recall and recognition in opposite ways (see among others: Murdock, 
1974; Crowder, 1976). The most important of these is probably the fol-
lowing: words of low frequency (as defined by such measures as the 
Thomdike-Lorge word count) are recognized better than high frequency 
words, but are recalled worse. 
5.1.1.2. Too-process théories of recall 
Such results led to the revival of the alternative theory about the 
relation between recognition and recall, the two-process view. The two-
process theory was advocated most strongly by Kintsch (1970). This 
theory assumes that recall and recognition have one process in common 
(i.e. "recognition"), but that recall involves an additional process, 
namely search or retrieval. The simplest version of this theory (Kintsch, 
1970) assumes that in recall possible candidates are generated followed 
by a recognition check. In this theory recognition is a subprocess of 
recall. As in the threshold theory it is assumed that in a recognition 
test the subject has a direct access to the stored representation of 
the stimulus and that a positive response is given when some kind of 
unidimensional strength measure exceeds a criterion or threshold. Since 
the stored representation is always accessed, only a recognition-check 
as in recall is needed in such a theory. Thus, both the threshold 
theory and the two-process theory (at least in its most simple form) 
assume that recognition decisions are based on a single measure, the 
trace strength. 
5.1.2. Recognition as list differentiation 
Anderson and Bower (1972) have presented several decisive arguments 
against this simple model for recognition. Their starting point is that 
130 
in a recognition test the question given to the subject is not whether 
an item "sounds familiar" but whether an item has occurred in a par-
ticular context, on a particular list. Thus, recognition tests are 
essentially list differentiation experiments. As is shown by Anderson 
and Bower (1972, p. 98-101), a strength theory for recognition has 
difficulties explaining the results of experiments in which subjects 
are given a recognition test not for the most recently presented list, 
but for the list that was presented prior to that one. In essence the 
problem for a strength theory for recognition is that items on diffe-
rent lists may be equally strong but still be differentiable with res-
pect to their membership of a particular list. 
Anderson and Bower (1972) present an alternative theory for recog-
nition and recall (see also Anderson, 1972; Anderson & Bower, 1974). 
In this theory they retain the assunption that recognition is a sub-
process of recall but recognition judgments are based on context in-
formation originally stored with the item in question. A detailed 
description of their model for recognition will be given in section 
5.2.1. For the present it suffices to note that according to Anderson 
and Bower presentation of an item gives the subject a direct access 
to the concept node corresponding to that item and that successful 
recognition depends on retrieval of relevant contextual information 
associated with that item. Note that words with multiple meanings 
(homographs) may be represented in memory by different concept nodes 
(Anderson & Bower, 1974). Therefore, the results obtained by Light and 
Carter-Sobell (1970), who showed that homographie nouns were recognized 
poorly when they were presented in a different semantic context (e.g., 
strawberry-JAM presented at study, traffie-JAM presented at test), are 
not inconsistent with the Anderson-Bower recognition theory. 
5.1.3. The episodic eaphory view 
Recently, a different view on the relation between recognition and 
recall has emerged, advocated by Tulving and his co-workers (Tulving, 
1976; Tulving & Thomson, 1973; Wiseman & Tulving, 1976; Flexser & 
Tulving, 1978). This so-called episodic ecphory view (Tulving, 1976) 
was motivated to a large extent by the phenomenon of recognition 
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failure of recallable words (see Flexser & Tulving, 1978) to which we 
will return in section 5.3. 
The episodic ecphory view ("ecphory" means "activation of a latent 
engram") proposes that recall and recognition represent basically 
similar processes. Remembering in both recognition and recall is a 
consequence of the interaction between "trace infoimation" and "retrie-
val information". Recognition and recall differ only with respect to 
the retrieval cues (retrieval information) that are present at test. 
Flexser and Tulving (1978) present a mathematical model for retrieval 
which is supposedly an elaboration of this episodic ecphory framework. 
They assume that retrieval can be represented as a matching process 
between the features of the memory trace and those of the retrieval 
cue. Thus, the probability of recall is determined directly by the 
overlap in the informational contents of the retrieval cues and the 
episodic trace of the target item (and similarly for the probability 
of recognition). 
5.1.4. Récognition as the retrieval of contextual information 
We agree with Tulving (1976) that recall and recognition involve 
basically similar processes, although we are not particularly charmed 
by the approach taken by Flexser and Tulving (1978) for reasons to be 
described below (see section 5.3). 
Our theory assumes that successful recognition depends on retrieval 
of contextual information associated with the item in question. Recall 
and recognition differ in two major respects. First of all, a different 
relationship exists between the retrieval cues and the target item in 
recall and recognition. In paired-associate recall for example the 
stimulus member of the pair in combination with contextual cues is 
used in retrieval, whereas in recognition the retrieval cues consist 
of the item itself and contextual cues. Therefore, the relation between 
the retrieval cues and the target item differs in recognition and re-
call. A second difference between recognition and recall is that in 
recognition a positive response may be given on the basis of only 
partial information, whereas in recall the response involves generation 
of the item which implies that more information (i.e. item features) 
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must be recovered than is necessary for successful recognition to 
occur. It seems likely therefore that decision processes (decisions 
based on incomplete infommation) play a greater role in recognition 
than in recall. It may be remarked that the present theory implies that 
there may be encoding differences between recall and recognition: if 
subjects expect to be tested with a recognition test, they might con-
centrate on item-to-context associations, while if they expect a re-
call test, they might concentrate on interi tem associations. This 
accords with the results obtained by Carey and Lockhart (1973) and 
Tversky (1973), who observed a (small) enhancement in performance if 
subjects were tested in the form they had expected (but see also 
Freund, Breisford & Atkinson, 1969). 
In sunmary then, we believe that recall and récognition are based 
on the same search-plus-recovery retrieval mechanism. The retrieval 
processes differ however sinae the relationship between the retrieval 
CUBS and the target item differs, the information sought differs to 
some extent (i.e. for successful recall primarily item features must 
be recovered, and for successful recognition primarily context fea-
tures must be recovered), and different decision processes may be 
operating in recognition and recall. 
5.2. Towards a model for recognition 
In this section we will show that a simple recognition model can be 
formulated, based on the present theory for retrieval, that is data-
equivalent to the model proposed by Anderson and Bower (1972). We will 
discuss the Anderson-Bower model first since a conparison of the two 
models highlights a basic difference in the conception of retrieval 
embodied in the theory proposed by Anderson and Bower (1972, 1973) and 
the present theory. 
5.2.1. The Anderson and Bower theory for recognition 
Anderson and Bower (1972, p. 103) distinguish three types of memory 
nodes: nodes that correspond to the individual words, nodes that cor-
respond to various contextual stimuli, and nodes corresponding to the 
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context prevailing during the presentation of a particular list. These 
latter nodes are referred to as "list markers" or "list tags". The 
list marker interconnects the set of contextual nodes active at the 
time of study. These list markers serve to keep the various contexts 
in which a word has appeared apart. It is assumed furthermore that 
there exists a set of contextual elements (termed List-η elements) that 
serve to identify List-η. Of course, the set of List-i elements and the 
set of List-j elements may be overlapping (see also Bower, 1972a). 
Anderson and Bower (1972, p. 103) assume that there is a probability 
θ that any particular element in the List-η set of contextual elements 
is active and is associated to the list marker. Furthermore, there is 
a probability α that an association will be formed between the memory 
node corresponding to the presented word and the list marker. Thus, 
each time that a word is presented (in the same list or in different 
lists) there is an independent probability a that this word becomes 
associated to a list marker (there is a distinct list marker for each 
presentation of a word). In this way it becomes possible for the sub­
ject to keep track of the various occurrences of a word. 
At test the subject uses the List-η elements associated to the list 
marker as a measure of evidence for the word's membership on List-n. 
If a List-η marker is associated to the word, the number of List-n 
elements associated to that list marker will have a binomial distri­
bution. Let f
m
(x) be this distribution. Thus,f
m
(x) is the probability 
distribution for x, the amount of List-n evidence, for an item that 
has been associated to a list marker. Let f
u
(x) denote the probability 
distribution for the amount of List-n evidence for items that were not 
on List-n and for items that were on List-n but not associated to a 
List-n marker. Anderson and Bower (1972) do not mention how this in­
formation is retrieved when there is no list marker associated to the 
item. They merely write: "One basis for f
u
M having nonzero values 
could be overlap or generalization between successive list contexts 
in which the test item occurred, and hence confusions. For such reasons, 
a test item may be judged falsely as occurring on List-n when in fact 
it occurred on earlier lists." (Anderson & Bower, 1972, p. 105). The 
probability distribution for the amount of evidence toward List-n (x) 
for items that were presented on List-n is then given by the following 
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probability mixture: 
f 0 M = «fmW
 +
 (1- a)fuW - (5.1) 
For items not presented on List-η the corresponding distribution is 
f
n
(x) = f
u
W - (5.2) 
It was assumed that the number of List-η elements was reasonably large, 
so that the binomial distributions O x ) and f
u
(x) could be approximated 
by normal probability density functions. Note that although both f m M 
and f
u
(x) are assumed to be normal densities, the density function 
f0(x) will not be normal (see Anderson & Bower, 1972, p. 106). 
It now becomes possible to apply the statistical machinery of the 
Theory of Signal Detection. The probability density functions f - M 
and f
n
(x) correspond to the signal-plus-noise and the noise density 
functions in that theory. Note that this model differs from the clas­
sical signal detection model in that the latter model assumes that 
f(χ) is a normal density function too. Anderson and Bower (1972, p. 
115) present data that show that their model with equal variances for 
f (x) and f
u
(x) fits confidence ratings in a recognition situation as 
well as the classical signal detection model with unequal variances 
and much better than the classical model with equal variances for 
f(χ) and f
n
(x)· Note finally that the Anderson and Bower model is 
data-equivalent to the finite-state recognition model proposed by 
Bembach (1967). Bembach's paper should be consulted for details on 
the properties of this model (e.g., the predicted operating charac­
teristics) and a comparison of this model with the classical signal 
detection model as applied to recognition memory (see Wickelgren & 
Norman, 1966). 
5.2.2. A model for veaogn-it-ion 
As was stated above, our theory for retrieval from long-term store, 
when applied to recognition, leads (at least in this simple case) to 
a model that is data-equivalent to the Anderson-Bower model described 
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above. Assume that in a recognition test the (nominal) item in com­
bination with a general context cue is used to retrieve. There are four 
classes of codes that may be retrieved: the stored memory code repre­
senting the item in the relevant (i.e., List-η) context, the item in 
other contexts, other items in the relevant context or other items in 
other contexts. For simplicity, let's assume that the subject keeps 
sanpling until he finds some representation corresponding to the item 
being tested. (Note that this model makes the somewhat dubious assumption 
that there are no confusions between images of different items). 
Let α be the probability of sampling the target code in the relevant 
context. Assume furthermore that the probability of a positive response 
depends on the number of relevant (i.e., List-η) context features that 
are recovered. As in the Anderson-Bower model it is assumed that the 
various contexts in which an item may have appeared, may be represented 
by (possibly overlapping) sets of contextual features. Thus, as in re­
call (see section 2.5.2) the probability of recognition depends on 
both a sampling process and a recovery process. The only difference is 
that in recognition a positive response may be given (and therefore 
possibly a correct response) even when the correct code is not sampled. 
Let f
m
M be the probability distribution for the пшізег of relevant 
(i.e., List-η) contextual features that are recovered given that the 
correct memory code is retrieved, and let f
u
(x) be the corresponding pro­
bability distribution given that the correct code is not retrieved (this 
includes the situation in which no relevant code is stored because the 
item was not presented on List-n). We may assume that £
m
(x) and f
u
(x) 
are normal densities. It is easy to see that these assumptions lead to 
exactly the same equations for f0(x) and fn(x) as in the Anderson-
Bower model (see Eqs. 5.1 and 5.2), i.e.: 
f0(x) = afm(x) + (1-a)fu(x) (5.3) 
f
n
(x) - £
u
(x). (5.4) 
Thus, the two models are data-equivalent. However, the rationale 
given for these equations by Anderson and Bower (1972) differs con­
siderably from ours. First of all, in the Anderson-Bower model the 
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subject has a direct access to the relevant list marker if there is one. 
ito explanation is given why the subject knows that a particular list 
marker is a List-η marker. Moreover, it would seem reasonable to assume 
that the existence of an association between the item and the list 
marker would provide evidence for the occurrence of that item on the 
list over and above the evidence provided by the number of List-n 
contextual elements associated to the list marker. In fact, a model in 
which the existenee of an association between the item and the list 
marker provides sufficient evidence for the occurrence of the item on 
the list would веет to follow more naturally from the mnemonic re-pre­
sentation and the retrieval assumptions postulated by Anderson and 
Bower (19 72). In the present model the contextual retrieval cue takes 
on the role of the list markers. In the present case however activation 
of the relevant memory code (which occurs with probability a, i.e. the 
probability with which in the Anderson-Bower model there exists an 
association between the item and a list marker) does not constitute by 
itself any evidence for the occurrence of the item on the list, because 
there will always be some features that are activated and the subject 
has no way of knowing whether the relevant (i.e. List-η) memory code 
was activated. 
Secondly, Anderson and Bower (1972) give no mechanism to explain the 
retrieval of contextual elements for items that are not associated to 
a list marker. In the present model this follows directly from the 
assumed mnemonic representation and our retrieval assumptions. Dis-
tractor items will have occurred previously in the presence of contex­
tual cues that overlap with the List-η contextual cues. Therefore, 
when a distractor item and the List-η context are used as retrieval 
cues, some of those contextual elements may very well be activated. 
Finally, it is interesting to conciare the two conceptions of re­
trieval from long-term store. Anderson and Bower (1972, 1973) assume 
that presentation of an item (either by the experimenter or as a result 
of retrieving that item, as in free recall) gives a direct access to 
that node in the mnemonic structure. Retrieval is simply the checking 
of the various associative paths radiating out from that node for the 
existence of a list tag or list marker. "If such a marked link is found, 
it is followed to its terminus, which node may be tagged with a LIST 
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tag, in which case the corresponding word is recalled" (Anderson & 
Bower, 1973, p. 443). This conception of retrieval as traveling along 
associative routes looking for list tags contrasts rather sharply 
with our theory of retrieval from long-term store. The present theory 
explains the retrieval of an item that 1) is associated to another 
item, and 2) that occurred in a particular list context, through the 
assunption that the subject uses the other item and the context as 
retrieval cues and that he samples from the items that are associated 
to both retrieval cues. In this way, retrieval can be just as directed 
in our theory as in the Anderson and Bower theory. Note finally that 
our theory gives much more emphasis to the distinction between STS and 
LTS, the active and inactive parts of the memory structure. What is 
retrieved from LTS is determined solely by the contents of STS (the re­
trieval cues) and the existing associative structure. 
It should be noted that the above model for recognition is appli­
cable only to simple recognition situations. It is only a first step 
towards a more complete theory for recognition. For example, suppose 
that the subject has formed interitem associations between different 
list items. In that case the subject may sample not only the image of 
the item being tested but also some associated image, and not be able 
to keep these apart. Thus, if there exists an association Α-B and if 
A is not sampled, A may still be recognized because A leads to В, В is 
confused with A, and В is associated more strongly to the context. A 
number of other factors that may influence recognition judgments (such 
as the judged memorability of the item) are discussed by Brown (1976). 
We may conclude this discussion of recognition with the observation 
that although recognition judgments are always based on the retrieval 
of contextual information, this does not mean that only contextual 
information that is directly associated to the tested item, is relevant 
for those judgments. 
5.3. Récognition failure of теааІІаЫе words 
In this section we will discuss a phenomenon that has attracted a 
great deal of attention in recent years because it seemed to be counter­
intuitive and to contradict many existing theories. This phenomenon 
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of recognition failure of recallable words was described first by 
Tulving and Thomson (1973). It refers to the observation that some 
words may be reoalled in response to another word on a paired-associate 
recall test but not be recognized (in the absence of that other word) 
on a recognition test. In the early experiments the overall probabi­
lity of recall was found to be superior to the overall level of 
recognition (see Tulving & Thomson, 1973), but this result seems to 
occur only when related word pairs are used (Wiseman & Tulving, 1976). 
However, even when recall is not superior to recognition, recognition 
failure can still be observed. Recognition failure of recallable words 
is obtained whenever the probability of not recognizing an item condi­
tional on recall of that item is greater than zero. 
Tulving and Wiseman (1975) showed that there exists a systematic 
relation between recognition and recognition failure of recallable 
words. They analyzed data from a number of experiments, all of which 
conformed to the basic paradigm: study of Α-B pairs, followed by re­
cognition of the В items in the absence of the A items, and then 
followed by recall of the В items with the A items as cues (see also 
Flexser & Tulving, 1978). The results showed that the probability of 
recognizing an item given (subsequent recall of that item could be 
predicted from the overall probability of recognition: 
P(Rn|Rc) =P(Rn) + с tP(Rn) - P(Rn)2] , (5.5) 
with с equal to .5. Note that recall and recognition (within a single 
experiment) would be independent if P(Rn|Rc) = P(Rn). Eq. 5.5 is an 
empirical generalization based on the studies reviewed by Tulving and 
Wiseman (1975), not a prediction from some specific theory. Fig. 5.1 
(from Flexser & Tulving, 1978) shows the results of the studies re­
viewed by Tulving and Wiseman (1975) and the results of a large number 
of additional experiments performed subsequently giving a total of 89 
experimental conditions from 33 different experiments, all of which 
used the recognition failure paradigm described above. The regularity 
of the results is even more striking in view of the large differences 
in these same experiments in the overall levels of recognition and 
recall (see Fig. 5.2). Flexser and Tulving (1978) correctly point out 
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Fig. 5.1. 
Recognition of recallable words 
as a function of recognition. 
The 89 points in the graph repre­
sent different conditions in 33 
experiments (Fig. 1 from Flexser 
& Tulving, 1978). 
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that any theory that purports to explain the recognition failure 
phenomenon, should not only explain why recognition failure of recal­
lable words occurs at all, but also the orderly relation between the 
overall probability of recognition and the probability of recognition 
given recall (Eq. 5.5). 
Tulving and his colleagues (Tulving & Thomson, 1973; Wiseman & 
Tulving, 1975; Flexser & Tulving, 1978) interpret this recognition 
failure result as inconsistent with two-process theories of recall, 
since those theories assume that recognition is a subprocess of recall 
and therefore an item that cannot be recognized should not be recal-
Fig. 5.2. 
Recall plotted against recog­
nition for the same experiments 
as in Fig. 5.1. (Fig. 2 from 
Flexser & Tulving, 1978). 
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lable. Kintsch (1978) has shown however that a two-process theory 
(e.g., Kintsch, 1970; see also section 5.1.1.2) can predict those re-
sults if the reasonable assumption is made that in the recognition 
subprocess of recall a lower criterion is used than in recognition 
testing (see also Santa & Lamwers, 1974, 1976), i.e. if the act of 
retrieval increases the subject's confidence in the correctness of 
the response. It is evident that such an assumption may increase the 
probability of recall relative to the probability of recognition. 
Explanations for the recognition failure phenomenon and the order-
ly relation between recognition and recognition failure have been 
offered by Flexser and Tulving (1978) and by Jones (1978). Jones pro-
poses that there are two routes in recall: a direct-aoaess route 
based on "intrinsic" knowledge concerning the cue-target relation 
(i.e. the cue accesses directly the relevant memory code), and a 
generation-recognition route based on "extrinsic" knowledge concerning 
the cue-target relation (i.e. the route postulated in a two-process 
theory of recall). Although this distinction is not entirely clear, it 
seems as though "intrinsic" knowledge refers to a context-dependent, 
episodic relation and "extrinsic" knowledge to a semantic relation 
between the cue and the target. Jones (1978) gives the example of the 
paired-associate item "bZade-CUT". When "blade" is presented as a probe 
cue, recall may occur in two different ways. "First, blade may access 
directly the intrinsic knowledge of its co-occurrence with CUT. Second, 
extrinsic knowledge can be used to generate a series of words related 
to blade until one of them, CUT, is correctly recognized by means of 
intrinsic knowledge relating this to the context of its presentation" 
(Jones, 1978, p. 465). Jones (1978, p. 466) assumes that these two 
routes are stochastically independent. In the generation-recognition 
route recall is completely dependent on recognition since it is assumed 
that exactly the same recognition process occurs in recognition testing 
as in the recognition phase of the generation-recognition route. If 
one considers however only the direct-access route, recall and recog-
nition are independent. The combination of these two routes leads to 
the mild degree of dependence observed by Tulving and Wiseman (1975). 
Flexser and Tulving propose an explanation of recognition failure 
based on the encoding specificity principle (Tulving & Thomson, 1973): 
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they assume that in both recognition and recall tests retrieval cues 
are effective only to the extent that they overlap with the encoded 
episodic memory trace. They assume that the memory trace can be re-
presented as a set of features. Each input event has a set of N fea-
tures that potentially characterize that event. On a study trial only 
a subset of these N features are encoded. The number of encoded fea-
tures is not fixed but has a certain probability distribution. Flexser 
and Tulving (1978) propose that retrieval may be conceptualized as a 
matching process between the features of the memory trace and those of 
the retrieval cue. In their model retrieval cues are also encoded in 
terms of the N possible features. The number of overlapping features 
may be defined as the number of features that are encoded [in the same 
way) at both study and test. Successful recognition occurs if the 
number of overlapping features exceeds some criterion value. For 
recall a similar criterion value is defined. Flexser and Tulving (1978) 
assume that the probabilities of encoding a feature at study, on the 
recognition test, and on the recall test are all mutually independent. 
This assumption is termed the retrieval independence assumption. 
Flexser and Tulving (1978, p. 164) showed that a model based on these 
assumptions can generate (for different parameter values) data points 
that lie close to the Tulving and Wiseman (1975) function (our Eq. 5.5), 
while producing large variations in overall recognition and recall 
probabilities, thus simulating the results of a large number of experi-
ments (see Figs. 5.1 and 5.2). It is not too difficult to see why 
the Flexser and Tulving model predicts the Tulving and Wiseman (1975) 
function. Given a fixed number of features encoded in the episodic 
memory trace, recall and recognition are independent because of the 
retrieval independence assunption. However, due to the variability 
in the number of features that are encoded in the memory trace more 
features will have been encoded for one item and less for another. 
Since both retrieval cues are matched to the same memory trace and 
since successful recognition and recall depend on the number of 
features that are encoded at both test and study, there will be some 
deviation from stochastic independence. Thus, this explanation attri-
butes the deviation from independence to a kind of selection effect. 
Or, stated differently, recognition and recall are assumed to be 
142 
locally independent; averaged over subjects and items recall and recog­
nition vri.ll be dependent due to differential storage effects. 
As noted above, we are not particularly charmed by the Flexser and 
Tulving model. First of all, it should be evident that their model 
simply assumes what needs to be explained. I.e., a large amount of in­
dependence is observed and they therefore make an assumption of retrie­
val independence. They do not give any justification for this rather 
remarkable assumption. Secondly, it is not at all clear how their 
crucial concept of feature sets should be interpreted. If there is not 
a substantial overlap between different feature sets (not even for the 
same item in a different context), then why are the sets of features 
that may be encoded for the recognition cue (B) and for the recall cue 
(A-?) identical? If there is an overlap between different feature sets 
and if the encoding of a cue is completely independent of the encoding 
of the item at study, then why is there such a high probability that 
the correct memory trace is retrieved? If the encoded features are 
matched against every memory trace, one would under the assumption of 
independence expect a rather high probability of false alarms (contrary 
to the observed false alarm rates). Moreover, it is not necessary to 
assume that the features are independently encoded at study and test. 
Exactly the same equations result if one assumes 1) that each feature 
that was encoded at study has a certain probability of being encoded 
at test independent of the other encoded features; and 2) that each 
feature that was not encoded at study has a different (possibly zero) 
probability of being encoded at test. It is only necessary that the 
probability of a feature encoded at study being encoded on the recog­
nition test, is independent of the probability that on the recall 
test that same feature is encoded. 
We will now show that the same predictions follow from a model 
formulated in terms of the present framework in which the independence 
is not the result of independent encodings but of a probabilistic 
retrieval mechanism. Assume that after study of a pair Α-B the strength 
of the interitem association equals Sj and the strength of the as­
sociation between В and the context equals S2. On the recognition 
test relevant contextual information must be retrieved. In some expe­
riments (e.g., Tulving & Thomson, 1973) the context at the recognition 
143 
test is changed from the context at study. This will be represented by-
assuming that the context at test has an overlap (in contextual fea­
tures) with the context at study, in such a way that the association 
between the context at test and the code representing the item В in the 
context at study has a strength equal to ys2 (0 < γ < 1), or more sim­
ply, this association has a strength that is lower than the associa­
tive strength between the original context and the stored memory code. 
Assume furthermore that if not enough contextual information is reco­
vered to exceed the criterion, the subject guesses with a probability 
correct equal to g. That is, a high-criterion model is assumed. Let d 
denote the probability of a 'true' recognition. This probability is, 
as usual, composed of the probability of sampling the code represen­
ting В in the relevant context times the probability of recovering 
enough contextual features to exceed the criterion (see section 2.5.2). 
Furthermore, let w represent the interfering effect of other list items 
and of occurrences of В in different but related contexts. The proba­
bility of a recognition hit is then given by: 
P(Rn) = d + (1-d)g 
where d = [ 1 - βχρ(-γ52)] . (5.6) 
YS2 + w 
Thus, in this model récognition is determined largely by the recall of 
contextual information. 
We will assume that the contextual associative strength is incremen-
ted upon successful recognition. The increment is denoted by a. Wiseman 
and Tulving (1976) and Flexser and Tulving (1978) argue against this 
notion of increased associative strength after correct recognition. 
Their conclusion was based on the results of an unpublished experiment 
by Flexser and the results of Postman (1975b) and Wiseman and Tulving 
(1976). Flexser varied the rate with which items were tested in the re-
cognition test and obtained only a nonsignificant effect on subsequent 
recall performance. It seems doubtful however that this manipulation 
has a large effect on the probability of successful recognition. The 
present model does not predict an effect on recall performance if the 
probability of recognition remains unaffected. Postman (1975b) did find 
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a testing effect (although of borderline significance) and interpreted 
his data as showing that items tested for recognition were more easily 
recalled than items not so tested. Indeed, Wiseman and Tulving (1976, 
p. 353) concede that this experiment showed some evidence of a testing 
effect, although Flexser and Tulving use the same results as evidence 
against this notion. Wiseman and Tulving (1976) did not find a testing 
effect, but in their experiment the recognition probability was quite 
low (.26). Moreover, in a recent experiment Humphreys (1978, p. 181) 
observed that the probability of recalling an item that had been pre­
sent on the recognition test was much higher that the probability of 
recalling an item that was not so tested (.583 vs. .426). Therefore, 
in case α might be >0, we will explicitly allow for this possibility 
in the model. 
On the subsequent recall test A is given as a retrieval cue in ad­
dition to the context cue. Let ν denote the interfering effect of 
other items on the probability of sampling the correct code. We then 
have 
ÍS2+a.)si 
P(Rn&Rc) = d [1 - expi-Sa-a-Si)] 
[ (52+0)5! + ν ] 
S2S1 
+ (1-d)g [1 - ejq>(-S2-Si)] (5.7) 
(saSi+v) 
POE&Rc) = (1-d)(1-g) — [1 - «q>(-S2-Si)] . (5.8) 
(S2SJ+V) 
The remaining probabilities can be calculated from these three proba­
bilities: 
P(Rc) - P(Rn&Rc) + P(Rñ&Rc) (5.9) 
P(Rn|Rc) = P(Rn&Rc)/P(Rc) (5.10) 
Note that for fixed associative strengths recall and recognition are 
in this model predicted to be (locally) independent (except for the 
dependence introduced by the incrementing icon successful recognition) 
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due to the probabilistic nature of the retrieval process. That is, ac­
cess to the correct code in recognition does not guarantee access to 
that code in recall. The independence between the probabilities of re­
covery is assumed to be the result of the fact that in recall testing 
different retrieval cues are used (i-e., the A member of the paired-
associate item). Note that exactly the same assunptions were made in 
our model for free recall (see section 3.1). In that model it was as­
sumed that the recovery probabilities for successive samplings of the 
same item were independent if and only if the probe cues were diffe­
rent. Wallace (1978) showed that the critical factor in the recogni­
tion failure paradigm is the removal of original study cues from one 
testing context and restoring them in another testing context. He was 
able to demonstrate not only recognition failure of recallable words, 
but also recall failure of recallable words and recognition failure of 
recognizable words. 
In order to show that our model does indeed predict similar results 
as the Flexser and Tulving (1978) model, the model was used to gene­
rate data points over a wide range of parameter values, where (as in the 
simulations of Flexser and Tulving) a wide range is defined as a vari­
ation of sufficient magnitude to produce large variations in recall and 
recognition. In these calculations it was assumed that si and S2 have 
independent two-point distributions. The parameter g was given a fixed 
value equal to 0.04 (this corresponds to the false alarm rate observed 
by Wiseman and Tulving [ 1976, Table 1]). The increment α was made pro­
portional to the mean contextual associative strength. The remaining 
parameters were adjusted in such a way that the overall recognition 
probability varied between 0.05 and 0.95 and the overall recall proba­
bility between 0.00 and 0.95. In these calculations lOO'data points' 
were generated, each data point based on a different set of parameter 
values. These parameter values were sampled from uniform distributions. 
Thus, our procedure for generating a set of data points corresponding 
to a set of imaginary experiments is the same as the procedure used by 
Flexser and Tulving (1978, p. 163). 
Fig. 5.3 shows a scatterplot of the overall probability of recog­
nition versus the overall probability of recall. As can be seen there, 
the model generates data that are similar to the observed data in this 
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paradigm in two major ways: (a) both recognition and recall vary over 
a wide range, and (b) there is no systematic relationship between the 
levels of recognition and recall (see also Fig. 5.2). Fig. 5.4 gives 
the probability of recognition given recall as a function of the pro-
bability of recognition. The solid curve gives the Tulving and 
Wiseman function [our Eq. 5.5) with c=0.5, and the dashed line gives 
the values expected if recall and recognition (within a single expe-
riment) are completely (i.e., not just locally) independent. Compa-
rison with Fig. 5.1 shows that our model generates (over a wide range 
of parameter values) a set of possible data points that corresponds 
closely to the set of data points that is observed empirically. Clear-
ly, the present model can handle these data equally well as the 
Flexser and Tulving (1978) model. However, because our theory for re-
trieval from long-term store is much more general and can be applied 
(with considerable success, see chapters 3 and 4) to several other 
experimental paradigms, and because our approach provides a rationale 
for the Flexser and Tulving independence assumption, we believe that 
our model is to be preferred to that of Flexser and Tulving. 
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EPILOGUE 6 
In this epilogue we will briefly discuss some extensions of our 
framework for retrieval from long-term store. We will also make a 
comparison between our theory and several other theories. Finally, we 
will discuss some metatheoretical issues in theories of this kind. 
6.1. Some generalizations 
6.1.1. Multitrial free recall and multiple presentations of the same 
item 
As yet we have not extended our theory to multitrial free recall. 
Before the theory can be applied to multitrial situations, one has to 
make a decision on how to represent repeated presentations of the same 
item. Generally speaking, theorists have proposed two radically diffe-
rent representations of multiple presentations. Firstly, each new pre-
sentation may add some "strength" to the same memory trace. Secondly, 
each new presentation may form a new memory trace, a new replica. We 
would like to propose the following representation, which is consis-
tent with our general theory. On each new presentation the item is 
associated to the present context. Moreover, on each new presentation 
an (implicit) retrieval attempt from long-term store is made (as in 
cued recall). This retrieval attempt may result in the recall of 
other items with which the item was associated on previous presenta-
tions. Whenever this occurs some items still present in STS will be 
replaced by those items that were retrieved. Note that this leads to 
the prediction that a repeated item will in general be more strongly 
associated to the items that surrounded that item on its first pre-
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sentation than to those that preceded the item on its second presenta­
tion (since those items are kicked out of the buffer). Furthermore, 
the Cold) interitem associations between the item and those other 
items will be strengthened. If this implicit retrieval attempt does 
not result in the retrieval of other items from the list however, 
the item will be associated to the items present in STS and therefore 
new interitem associations will be formed. Thus, either a "new" or 
and "old" trace may be laid down in memory depending on the probabi­
lity that items previously associated to the item in a similar context 
are retrieved. 
This, as yet still somewhat vague, hypothesis is able to explain 
two important empirical results. First of all, the hypothesis will 
explain the development of subjective organization in multitrial free 
recall (Tulving, 1962; see also Anderson, 1972): on the first recall, 
some of the interitem associations will be strengthened. For example, 
if item A had led to retrieval of item B, the interitem association 
between A and В will be strengthened. Presentation of either A or В 
on the second study trial will then probably lead to recall of the 
other item, and therefore the strength of the associations between 
A and В will be increased again. Retrieval of one of the items on the 
second recall will therefore with a high probability lead to subse­
quent recall of the other item. Thus, pairs of items recalled adjacent­
ly on the first recall trial, will also tend to be recalled adjacently 
on the second recall trial (i.e., the measure for subjective organi­
zation used by Tulving [1962] ). 
Secondly, the hypothesis gives an explanation for the spaaing 
effect in free recall. This spacing effect refers to the observation 
that the probability of recall in single-trial free recall with two 
presentations of the same item in different list positions, is higher 
when the lag between the two presentations is increased. This spacing 
effect is predicted because an item repeated after a long lag will 
tend to become associated to a different set of items on the two pre­
sentations. Moreover, assuming that contextual features become less 
and less correlated with increasing lag (see also Bower, 1972a), it 
follows that there will not only be more item cues after a long lag, 
but also more contextual cues. Therefore, with increasing lag between 
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presentations more different access routes will be available. Note that 
this explanation of the spacing effect is similar to the hypothesis 
proposed by Melton (1970) and Glenberg (1976, 1977), although both 
Melton and Glenberg do not emphasize the critical role played by the 
contextual retrieval cues. We may refer to those papers for a discus-
sion of the evidence in favor of this explanation. 
6.1.2. Proactive and retroactive inhibition 
Any theory that purports to explain forgetting (such as ours) 
must be able to handle the basic facts of proactive and retroactive 
inhibition. Briefly, proactive inhibition refers to the observation 
that recall of a given list of items (usually paired-associate items) 
is decreased if this list is preceded by another list. Similarly, 
retroactive inhibition refers to the observation that recall of a 
given list is decreased if it is followed by another, interpolated 
list. Interference theorists assumed that all forgetting was due 
to proactive and retroactive inhibition. The most recent version of 
interference theory (see Postman, Stark & Fraser, 1968; Postman & 
underwood, 1973; Postman, 1976) assumes that retroactive inhibition 
is caused to a large extent not by item-specific interference, but 
by "response-set interference": it is assumed that study of an inter-
polated list establishes a tendency to suppress the first-list res-
ponses and to selectively arouse the second-list responses. The res-
ponse-selector mechanism has some "inertia" which results in a 
tendency to arouse the second-list responses even when the experimen-
ter asks for the first-list responses, thus producing retroactive 
inhibition. With the passage of time, this tendency to suppress first-
list responses is reduced, leading to "spontaneous recovery" of the 
first list responses (see also Kolk, 1974, p. 23-31). 
Generally speaking, our theory assumes that "forgetting" in long-
term store is a manifestation of retrieval failure. Nothing is ever 
"lost" from LTS, it just becomes inaccessible because the appropriate 
retrieval cues are absent. We may identify two possible causes of 
retrieval failure: 
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(a) The probe cues that are used may activate other information besides 
the sought-after information, although the features of the probe 
cues have not changed substantially from study to test. This is 
similar to the effects of list length in free recall. Thus, in this 
case the locus of retrieval failure is in the sampling process. 
(b) The features of the probe cues that are used may be different from 
the features that are associated to the to-be-retrieved item. In 
this case the locus of retrieval failure is in both the sampling 
process and in the recovery process, since the strength of the 
associations to the actual probe cues used is lower than the 
strength of the associations between that item and the (contextual) 
features present during study. Thus, in this case the retrieval 
failure is due to the change in context from study to test. 
Clearly, these two causes are similar to the "response competition" 
and "unlearning" concepts in interference theory. In our account of 
proactive and retroactive inhibition the concept of contextual asso-
ciations is of pivotal importance. Retrieval failure (and hence for-
getting) will occur to the extent that the contextual features that 
are used as retrieval cues at test differ from the contextual features 
associated to the item. In order to be able to apply our theory we 
have to make two assumptions concerning the relation between succes-
sive list contexts: 
(a) Different (but possibly overlapping) sets of context features are 
associated to items from different lists. This assumption is 
necessary because without it the subject would be unable to dif-
ferentiate the lists and to restrict his responses to those from 
the particular list studied. 
(b) The longer the retention interval the lower the probability that 
the set of contextual features that are used as probe cues at 
test will consist of features uniquely specifying a particular 
list. Thus, list discrimination becomes increasingly difficult 
with the passage of time (see also Bower, 1972a). 
These intuitively reasonable assumptions enable us to account for both 
proactive and retroactive inhibition. Proactive and retroactive inhi-
bition are an inverse function of the probability that the probe cues 
at test will lead to retrieval of items from the appropriate list. 
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Thus, our explanation of interference phenomena parallels our expla­
nation of list-length effects in recall. This provides for a theo­
retical continuity between single-list and multiple-list studies. 
Our assumption of list-related context features also explains the 
ability of subjects to restrict their overt responses to those from 
the tested list. 
Proactive inhibition is caused by the fact that the context cues 
at test activate not only items from the second list but also items 
from the first list. The shorter the retention interval between 
learning of the second list and the final test of the second list, 
the greater the overlap between the contextual retrieval cues at 
test and those present during second-list learning. Thus, it is 
correctly predicted that proactive inhibition increases with the 
length of the retention interval between second-list learning and 
the final test of that list. 
Similarly, retroactive inhibition is assumed to be caused by the 
fact that the context cues at test overlap with those present during 
second-list learning. Thus, the degree of overlap will favor retrie­
val of second-list items, thereby decreasing the probability of 
recall of the first-list items. It is therefore predicted (again 
correctly) that retroactive inhibition will decrease with the length 
of the retention interval between second-list learning and test of 
the first list. The difference in retroactive interference between 
the A-B, Α-C and the A-B, C-D paradigms is also explained in this 
framework by a consideration of the role of contextual associations. 
In the case of the Α-B, Α-C paradigm the same stimulus is paired 
with two different responses. In that case, the subject will have to 
change his contextual cues during learning of the Α-C list in order 
to avoid intrusions from the Α-B list, which increases the likeli­
hood that contextual retrieval cues at test will be more similar to 
those used during second-list learning. In the Α-B, C-D paradigm, 
the subject does not have to change his context cues during second-
list learning, since list differentiation is not necessary in this 
case. In this way we may account for the better performance in the 
Α-B, C-D paradigm. Note that the role of contextual associations 
emphasized in our theory parallels the response-set interference 
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approach advocated by Postman and others (see also Postman & Stark, 
1969; Postman & Underwood, 1973; Crowder, 1976). 
Finally, it should perhaps be enphasized that our theory predicts 
both specific and nonspecific interference. It predicts specific 
interference since a given stimulus that has been associated to dif-
ferent responses in different lists, will give rise to retrieval com-
petition at recall (due to the sampling process) given that the 
contextual features associated with the two responses have at least 
some overlap. Thus, we believe that it makes no sense to create an 
artificial distinction between specific and nonspecific interference 
in the sense that postulation of nonspecific factors should lead to a 
dismissal of specific factors, as some authors seem to suggest (e.g. 
Postman & Stark [1969] and Postman & Underwood [1973] use specific 
factors only for conditions in which nonspecific factors alone cannot 
account for the results). 
It will be evident that our account of interference phenomena is 
closely related to the analysis of paired-associate learning proposed 
by McGovem (1964). She emphasizes the critical role played by con-
textual associations in the response-learning stage postulated in the 
two-stage theory of Underwood and Schulz (1960). There is however one 
basic difference between our theory and that of McGovem. McGovem 
(1964) assumed that contextual associations are unlearned during inter-
polated learning. Thus, it was implicitely assumed that the contextual 
features do not change very much with the passage of time and between 
successive lists. Our theory on the contrary assumes that no associa-
tion is ever unlearned, but that different sets of contextual features 
are associated to items from different lists. In our opinion, McGovem 
(1964) did not sufficiently distinguish between the contextual retrie-
val cues used at test and the contextual features associated to the 
stored memory code, a consequence of the rather vague analysis of 
encoding and retrieval processes common to all interference theorists. 
McGovem's assumption of contextual associations was criticized by 
Postman (1969) on the grounds that in order to explain the results of 
the experiments on response-set interference by Postman and his co-
workers (Postman, Stark & Fraser, 1968; Postman & Stark, 1969) it must 
be assumed that contextual associations undergo unlearning far more 
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rapidly than forward and backward associations. Ironically, the ana­
lysis proposed here assumes that neither contextual nor interitem 
associations are unlearned. The apparent unlearning of contextual 
associations is simply the result of a change in context from study 
to test. 
6.2. Relation to other theories 
In this section we will briefly consider some communalities and 
differences between our theory for retrieval from long-term store and 
several other theories of learning and memory retrieval. 
First of all, our theory is of course closely related to the search 
model proposed by Shiffrin (1970a; see also section 2.5.13· The pre­
sent theory is however considerably more powerful than the simple 
model proposed by Shiffrin (1970a). In our theory both the basis for 
selection of a particular search-set and the sampling probabilities 
for items within this search-set are explicitly defined and related 
to the probe cues used and to the associative network stored in LTS. 
Because rules are given for combining probe cues, it becomes possible 
to simulate directed search strategies based on the information retrie­
ved thus far (see for example our model for free recall, section 3.1), 
and, perhaps, even more significant, to treat experimental paradigms 
such as free recall and paired-associate learning within a common 
theoretical framework (see section 4.2). Thus, the present theory is 
much more general than the model proposed by Shiffrin (1970a). 
As described in section 2.4, the assumption of contextual associa­
tions is common to many theories of learning and memory, see for 
ехалріе Anderson and Bower (1972, 1973) and McGovem (1964). The im­
portant novel aspect of the present theory is that it specifies par­
ticular mechanisms that describe the role of the general situational 
context in retrieval from LTS. As discussed in the previous section, 
this assumption enables us to predict proactive and retroactive inhi­
bition. Our account of these interference phenomena is of course 
closely related to that given by Postman and his co-workers (Postman, 
1969, 1976; Postman & Stark, 1969; Postman, Stark & Fraser, 1968; 
Postman & Underwood, 1973). We doubt that it will be possible to dis-
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tinguish experimentally between our theory and theirs. One advantage of 
our theory however is that it stresses the theoretical continuity 
between single-list and multiple-list studies and between different 
verbal learning paradigms. 
Several recent theories stress certain aspects of retrieval, most 
of which are compatible with the present framework. For example, 
Tulving (1976) stresses the importance of the relation between the 
probe cues at test and the information stored in memory, whereas 
levels-of-processing theorists (e.g. Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik 
& Jacoby, 1975; Craik & Tulving, 1975) stress the influence of the 
type of processing in STS on later recall from LTS. However, unless 
specific mechanisms are postulated, such proposals merely state the 
obvious and do not add much to our knowledge (see also Baddeley, 
1978). 
In section 5.2.2 we have already criticized the general concept 
of retrieval embodied in the theory of Anderson and Bower (1972, 1973). 
Besides these objections, it seems evident that their simulation 
model (HAM) cannot explain the list-length effect in cued recall of 
paired associates observed in our experiments (see chapter 4). Al-
though Anderson and Bower (1973, p. 485-486) try to accomodate similar 
difficulties encountered in the application of HAM to interference 
phenomena by a rather complex and unlikely mechanism for using the 
list context as a probe cue, it should be emphasized that this assump-
tion is completely ad hoc and should also have been applied in other 
situations, which would require a rather drastic change in their 
model. In our view this failure of HAM is a consequence of the assump-
tion that retrieval in long-term store is simply the checking of 
associative pathways. 
Finally, there is some similarity between the present theory and 
the theory proposed by Marton (1970), in that in both theories the 
probability of activation is a multiplicative function of stimulus 
and context information (see Morton, 1970, p. 209). However, Morton's 
Logogen model is primarily a model for word recognition. Although 
it may be assumed that word recognition also involves retrieval from 
LTS, it is by no means evident that the same retrieval model would 
apply in both cases. Our LTS would correspond to Morton's Cognitive 
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System, the only part of his model that involves 'memory': "It should 
be emphasized that the Logogen System can in no way be regarded as an 
associative net All associative phenomena that involve any seman-
tic relationship are seen at the moment as proceeding via the Cognitive 
System." (Morton, 1970, p. 247). 
6.3. Some metatheoretiaal reflections 
6.3.1. The -problem of central control 
The present framework for information processing assumes that in-
formation processing is controlled by an executive monitor. In our 
opinion, the postulation of an executive monitor (or the central role 
assigned to intervening variables) is one of the main features distin-
guishing the cognitive or information-processing approach in psycho-
logy from a strictly behavioristic approach. It seems that this assump-
tion was motivated by an attempt to explain the obviously organized 
character of human (and animal) behavior (Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 
1960; Lashley, 1951). The following quote from Miller et al. is typical: 
"The problem is to describe how actions are controlled by an organism's 
internal representation of its universe. If we consider what these ac-
tions are in the normal, freely ranging animal, we must be struck by 
the extent to which they are organized into patterns" (Miller et al., 
1960, p. 12). 
Most contemporary theories for human memory assume (either impli-
citly or explicitly) the existence of such an executive monitor in or-
der to account for the organization of higher mental processes (see for 
example: Anderson & Bower, 1973, p. 60-61; Bjork, 1975a, p. 153-154; 
Broadbent, 1971, p. 461-475; Neisser, 1967, p. 292-296). More hard-
headed psychologists fear that such ^  monitor becomes a kind of homun-
culus. As Neisser (1967, p. 295) puts it: "In any case, the law of 
parsimony would hardly explain the very unparsimonious hypotheses erec-
ted by stimulus-response theorists to explain away what seem to be 
executive processes. Their real motive is a more serious one. They are 
afraid that a separate executive would return psychology to the soul, 
the will, and the homunculus; it would be equivalent to explaining be-
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havior in terms of a 'little man in the head'. Such explanations seem 
to lead only to an infinite regress, which must bar further research 
and frustrate theory. If the actions of the executive account for 
behavior, what accounts for those actions in turn? Does the ego have 
an ego?" However, as Neisser showed, the fact that computer programs 
have been constructed incorporating such an executive monitor proves 
that there is nothing mysterious about this concept (see also Kempen, 
1978). 
Although we do not think that a theory such as ours should neces-
sarily explain not only the "programs" that the executive uses, but 
also the rules that characterize the "behavior" of the executive 
itself, it might be illuminating to consider some speculations on 
this issue. We assume that the executive initiates strategies or con-
trol processes, which are conceived as learned modes of information 
processing stored in LTS. Moreover, it monitors these processes and 
stops them when they prove fruitless. The choice of strategies is not 
unpredictable but determined by the current input to the system and 
by the previous experiences in similar tasks. Thus, we may assume that 
there exists a set of strategies which have a certain probability of 
being selected depending on task and subject variables, somewhat 
similar to the transformation-stack or T-stack assumed by Prytulak 
(1971) or the hypothesis-testing models for concept identification. 
Execution of a particular strategy may modify that strategy depending 
on its success. It should be noted finally that the actions of the 
executive are controlled not only by external inputs and the past 
history of the subject, but also by the outcome (feedback) of the 
actions of the executive itself. 
In sunmary: "The fundamental difference between the executive and 
the homunculus is that the executive is a mechanistically specified 
computational algorithm: its designer knows exactly the "rules" by 
which it operates. On the other hand, the homunculus is just another 
unanalyzed man, whose behavior can be predicted no better than that 
of the person within which the homunculus resides." (Anderson & 
Bower, 1973, p. 61). 
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6.3.2. On the relation between general theories and specific models 
In this dissertation a distinction is made between the general 
theory for retrieval from long-term store and the specific models ap-
plied to particular experimental paradigms. We feel that this dis-
tinction is often overlooked in current psychology, and that this 
neglect is a source of many futile controversies (e.g. the contro-
versy between two-store theorists and levels-of-processing theorists). 
The general theory for retrieval presented in section 2.5.2 gives 
a set of rules that is applicable to any situation, task, or paradigm. 
Given a specification of the associative network stored in LTS and 
the probe cues present in STS, the theory can be used to generate 
quantitative predictions. Particular models, specific to a particular 
task, have to specify the associations stored in LTS and the retrie-
val cues used at test. The general theory however is only testable 
after such an associative network and the retrieval cues to be used 
are specified by a specific model applicable only to a particular 
paradigm. 
Given this limitation on the ability of the general theory to gene-
rate specific predictions, the reader may wonder why general theories 
are proposed at all, why not merely specific models are put forward. 
The answer is of course that general theories enable us to integrate 
the various models proposed for specific experimental paradigms into 
one, coherent framework. Moreover, the goal of psychological theories 
should be to account for behavior across paradigms: a theory of memory 
should not be restricted to one specific task, but should be appli-
cable to any situation in which "memory" is involved. 
In contrast to the general theory for retrieval, the specific 
models are directly testable. However, as in practically all mathema-
tical models, a number of parameter values have to be estimated from 
the data before the model can be tested. Of course, these parameter 
values may be estimated from a different set of data, but even in that 
case they are not assigned a particular value a priori. To the extent 
that the sets of data are consistent with each other, there is no 
fundamental difference between this latter approach and the more usual 
approach of estimating the parameter values from the same set of data 
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on vdiich the model is tested. As long as there are enough degrees of 
freedom left in the data, this does not pose a serious problem (note 
that this approach is also used in more conventional techniques for 
analyzing data such as analysis of variance or regression analysis). 
A more serious problem is whether the models proposed are restric-
tive enough in the sense that the model should never, for no set 
of parameter values, be able to predict the opposite of certain well 
known empirical effects. This question is relevant since some of 
our models (e.g., the model proposed in section 4.2) contain quite a 
few parameters which decreases the vulnerability of the model. 
However, as has been emphasized repeatedly, most of the qualitative 
predictions of our models do not depend on the particular set of 
parameter values used. Using a different set of parameter values would 
only change the magnitude of the predicted effects, not the qualita-
tive features. To mention just a few examples, no set of parameter 
values would fail to predict list-length effects in cued or noncued 
(free) recall (section 4.2), the output interference effect in recall 
of successive categories (section 3.2.2), or the effects of cueing 
with category names in categorized free recall (section 3.2.1). Thus, 
these effects are a consequence of the basic structure of the models, 
not the particular set of parameter values used. 
6.3.3. Advantages and disadvantages of the simulation method 
The mathematical models proposed in this dissertation are too complex 
to be analyzed by conventional analytical techniques. In order to still 
be able to "derive" quantitative predictions, we have chosen the 
method of simulation. In this method an exact process model is written 
in the form of a conputer program specifying every detail of the pro-
posed "behavior" of the subject. Next, this computer program is run 
with a particular set of parameter values to simulate a number of 
quasisubjects. In this way the model generates sets of data to be com-
pared to real, observed data. This method has both advantages and dis-
advantages conpared to the conventional analytical approach. 
One obvious disadvantage of simulation is that it becomes extremely 
laborious to find a suitable set of parameter values. For example, our 
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standard program for free recall takes 1 à 2 min (depending on list 
length) to simulate 100 "subjects". In order to obtain a reasonable set 
of parameter values however, one has to run the program with a large 
number of different sets of parameter values. Moreover, to obtain good 
estimates of the predicted probabilities of recall, we must increase 
the number of simulated subjects as we approach the optimum set of pa-
rameter values. Another related disadvantage is that we do not have a 
formal method for estimating the parameters such as for instance the 
maximum likelihood method. Thus, we have no information on such pro-
perties of our estimates as unbiasedness, consistency, etc. However, 
since we are not interested in the particular values of the parameters, 
the accuracy of our estimation procedure is not very crucial. We have 
no intention of using the parameter estimates as measurements of cer-
tain aspects of the tasks used. 
The advantages of the simulation method are the following. First of 
all, it is in general easier to adapt a simulation program to changes 
in the experimental paradigm, as was done in this study for example in 
the application of the model to the part-list cueing paradigm (see 
section 3.1.5). Secondly, the program can be used to study systemati-
cally the influences of certain independent variables on various de-
pendent variables. Thus, by systematically varying the parameter values 
or by varying certain process assumptions in the model, we may deter-
mine which variations are predicted to have a large effect on a parti-
cular empirical phenomenon. For example, by varying a number of aspects 
of our model for free recall we were able to determine the aspects of 
the model that are crucial for the prediction of hypermnesia (see sec-
tion 3.1.3). Finally, because the writing of a simulation program re-
quires a specification of every assumption made, it becomes necessary 
to discuss explicitly every detail of the model. It is therefore un-
likely that there remain some hidden crucial assumptions as may be the 
case in a more abstract model as for instance a Markov chain model. 
6.3.4. Introspection as a heuristic device 
The astute reader will have noticed that several aspects of our mo-
dels are based not primarily on empirical data but on intuition or in-
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trospection. Although introspection has a bad reputation in psychology 
we believe that introspection is extremely valuable as a heuristic de-
vice in the construction of plausible psychological process models. To 
give just a few examples of assumptions in our models that are based 
primarily on our psychological intuition, we may note that the concept 
of "rechecking" as a final attempt at recall of additional items in 
free recall, our rules for combining probe cues, and our conception of 
recognition as the retrieval of contextual information, are all based 
primarily on introspection. Moreover, whenever our general theory is 
applied to a specific experimental paradigm, there have to be made 
various decisions as to the assumptions made concerning rehearsal du-
ring study and the probe cues used during retrieval. In order to avoid 
an uneconomical trying out of all kinds of possibilities, it is per-
fectly sensible to use intuition as a heuristic device. 
Thus, we do not assume that introspectionist "data" can or should 
be used as a substitute for empirical data (in the usual sense), but 
we do think that assunptions that are based on psychological (or com-
mon sense for that matter) intuition are more likely to prove fruitful. 
Moreover, we believe that this view is a straightforward extension of 
the principle that mathematical models should have a psychological in-
terpretation in order to be understandable and useful as a tool in 
psychological research. 
6.4. Conalusion 
We believe that the general theory for retrieval from long-term 
store presented in this dissertation represents an interesting new 
approach to theorizing on problems in learning and memory. There are 
of course still problems that remain to be tackled by future research. 
We might think of (a) further experimentation on retrieval problems 
and the role of contextual associations in recognition memory, (b) the 
construction of experimental paradigms to study changes in context, 
i.e. the extent to which contextual features change within and between 
subsequent lists, and (c) the application of the general theory for re-
trieval to threshold item identification studies, since this may also 
be conceptualized as a (automatic) retrieval from long-term store. 
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In conclusion, we believe that our theory may provide a general 
framework to guide memory research and the development of process mo-
dels for human memory. 
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SUMMARY 
In the present study, a general theory for retrieval from long-term 
store is presented. The theory is embedded within the general framework 
for information processing proposed by Shiffrin (1975, 1976). In chap-
ter 1 a brief review is given of the most important theoretical ap-
proaches in the area of verbal learning and memory. Special emphasis 
is given to the theory of Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) and its various 
modifications. In the remainder of this chapter we briefly discuss the 
kinds of experimental paradigms used in verbal learning research and 
memory research: free recall, paired-associate learning, and recogni-
tion. 
In chapter 2 a review is given of the framework for information 
processing proposed by Shiffrin (1975, 1976). This theory distinguishes 
two memory stores: a short-tenn store (STS) and a long-term stove 
(LTS). Information is said to be in STS if it is currently active. 
Thus, STS is not physically separate from LTS, but consists of the 
currently activated subset of LTS. Memory is represented as an asso-
ciative network, a large collection of nodes with complex interasso-
ciations. Incoming information activates through an automatic process 
corresponding nodes in memory. By definition, this information is en-
tered in STS. The information is however rapidly lost unless it is 
maintained in STS through rehearsal processes. In this framework, lear-
ning is the formation of new associations or the enrichment of old as-
sociations. Information in LTS is assumed not to be subject to decay 
processes. Observable performance is however determined not only by 
the information stored in LTS, but also by the retrieval processes used 
to get the sought-after information into STS. Thus, in this framework 
forgetting is not the result of memory traces becoming weaker as a re-
sult of disuse (decay) or interference, but is a consequence of the 
fact that information in LTS can only be recovered through retrieval 
cues in STS at the time of testing. 
Following a discussion of the earlier search model for memory retrie-
val proposed by Shiffrin (1970a), we present our new theory for retrie-
val from long-term store. Our general theory assumes that the associa-
tive network stored in LTS consists not only of associations between 
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different items but each item is also assumed to be associated to the 
context present during study. Thus, two types of associations are dis-
tinguished: interitem associations and oontextual associations. In our 
theory for retrieval the activation of inactive material in long-term 
store depends on the information active in STS at the time of testing 
(the probe cues or retrieval cues). The probability of recalling a par-
ticular item on a single retrieval attempt is determined by the asso-
ciations of that item to the probe cues. As in Shiffrin (1970a) two 
processes are distinguished: a sampling process in which features cor-
responding to a particular item in the set of items associated to the 
probe cues are activated, and a recovery process in which features re-
lated to the sampled aggregate of features are activated and enter STS. 
The sampling probabilities depend on the relative associative strengths 
to the probe cues, the probability of recovering enough features to en-
able the production of a response depends on the amount of information 
stored for the sampled item. An important novel aspect of our theory 
that enables us to predict a number of interesting empirical results, 
is a set of rules to be used when a combination of probe cues is used. 
This is important because we assume that in any retrieval attempt con-
textual information present in STS at the time of retrieval is part of 
the probe information, in addition to any specific cues the subject uses 
to direct retrieval. It is proposed that the probability of sampling an 
item is proportional to the product of the associative strengths to the 
probe cues, and that the probability of recovery is dependent on the 
sum of the associative strengths to the probe cues. In this way, the 
search is limited to the intersection of the sets of items associated 
to each cue separately, while the probability of recovery is dependent 
on the total number of features that may be activated with a given set 
of probe cues. 
In chapter 3, a model is developed for single-trial free recall, ba-
sed on the general theory for retrieval described above. It is assumed 
that an associative network that consists of both interitem and contex-
tual associations is developed in LTS through rehearsal in STS. A buf-
fer is used as a model for the rehearsal process in STS. At the begin-
ning of recall the subject first dumps the contents of this STS-buffer 
(unless there is some task interpolated between study and test). Fol-
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loving this, the subject uses a general context cue to retrieve items 
from LTS. Whenever a new item is recalled that item is used as a new 
retrieval cue in combination with the context cue. When this probe item 
does not lead to retrieval of new items (i.e., after a certain criteri-
on number of failures with that probe item has been reached), the sub-
ject switches back to only the context cue. Recall goes on until a cri-
terion of a certain total number of failures has been reached. Follow-
ing this, each of the recalled items is used as a retrieval cue in a 
last attempt at recall of additional items. Finally, we have assumed 
that upon successful retrieval of an item the strengths of the asso-
ciations between that item and the probe cues are incremented. 
It is shown that this model is able to account for a large number 
of empirical phenomena such as serial position curves, list-length ef-
fects, effects of presentation time, interresponse times, hypemmesia, 
and the part-list cueing effect. The prediction of the part-list cueing 
effect is especially remarkable since it is generally assumed that this 
effect is not consistent with associative network models. We have shown 
however that at least one reasonable associative network model is able 
to predict this result, and we propose that the effect is a consequence 
of the fact that in these studies a random sample of the list items is 
presented as cues. 
Following this discussion of free recall of uncategorized lists, we 
present a related model for free recall of categorized lists. This mo-
del is shown to be able to predict the results of a study by Tulving 
and Fearlstone (1966) on the effects of cueing with category names. 
Moreover, the model is able to account for the output interference ef-
fect between successive categories recalled observed by Smith (1971) 
and Roediger (1973). The prediction of this output interference effect 
is a powerful property of the theory since no other theory has been 
able to account for this effect. The effect is predicted by our model 
because it is assumed that contextual cues are used in cued recall and 
because the associations to the context are incremented upon successful 
retrieval. 
In chapter 4, we present the results of two experiments designed to 
show the role of contextual associations in free and cued recall, and 
the influence of strengthening of the contextual associations for one 
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group of items on the retrieval of other items. Contrary to the results 
reported by Murdock (1967a), we do find a strong list-length effect in 
cued recall of paired associates, a result that is consistent with our 
assumptions concerning the role of contextual associations in cued re-
call. We also observe a detrimental effect of prior noncued recall on 
subsequent cued recall of paired associates. We also present an appli-
cation of our theory for retrieval to these kinds of experiments. The 
model is shown to be consistent with the major effects observed. Thus, 
our theory can be applied simultaneously to tasks that have traditio-
nally been treated separately and for which separate models have been 
developed. 
In chapter 5, a preliminary discussion is given of the application 
of our theory to recognition tasks. We assume that recognition may be 
conceptualized as recall of contextual information. After a discussion 
of several theories for recognition, we compare our theory for recog-
nition to the one proposed by Anderson and Bower (1972). It is shown 
that their model for recognition contains a number of assumptions that 
seem to be inconsistent with their general approach to memory. We also 
criticize their general conception of retrieval as a kind of travelling 
along associative routes looking for list tags. We conclude this chap-
ter with an application of our model to the phenomenon of recognition 
failure of recallable words. It is shown that our model is able to ac-
count not only for the effect itself but also for the systematic rela-
tion between recognition and recognition failure of recallable words 
observed by Tulving and Wiseman (1975). 
We conclude this study with an epilogue in which we briefly discuss 
the application of our framework to multitrial free recall and the ef-
fects of multiple presentations of the same item, followed by a dis-
cussion of the explanation of proactive and retroactive inhibition 
within the present theory for retrieval from long-term store. Finally, 
we discuss several metatheoretical issues in theories of this kind. 
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SAMENVATTING 
In deze studie wordt een algemene theorie voor het ophalen van in-
formatie uit het lange-termijn geheugen gepresenteerd. De theorie is 
geformuleerd binnen het door Shiffrin (1975, 1976) voorgestelde alge-
mene kader voor de verwerking van informatie. In hoofdstuk 1 wordt een 
kort overzicht gegeven van de meest belangrijke theoretische benade-
ringen op het gebied van verbaal leren en geheugen. Speciale aandacht 
wordt geschonken aan de theorie van Atkinson en Shiffrin (1968) en de 
verschillende aanpassingen daarvan. In de rest van dit hoofdstuk wor-
den kort de verschillende experimentele paradigma's besproken die ge-
bruikt worden in onderzoek op het gebied van het verbaal leren en ge-
heugen: vrije reproduktie, het leren van gepaarde associaties, en 
herkenning. 
¡ f 
T
"fhoofdstuk 2 wordt een overzicht gegeven van de theorie voor de 
I IrJh 
rking van informatie zoals gepresenteerd door Shiffrin (1975, 
De theorie onderscheidt twee geheugentoestanden: een korte-
termijn toestand (STS) en een lange-termijn toestand (LTS). Alleen 
die informatie verkeert in het STS die op dat moment geaktiveerd is. 
Het STS staat dus niet los, gescheiden, van het LTS, maar bestaat uit 
de geaktiveerde deelverzameling van het LTS. Het geheugen wordt gere-
presenteerd door een associatief netwerk, een verzameling 'knopen' 
met komplexe interassociaties. Binnenkomende informatie aktiveert au-
tomatisch korresponderende elementen in het geheugen. Deze informatie 
wordt dus (per definitie) in het STS geplaatst. Deze informatie gaat 
echter snel verloren tenzij deze in het STS vastgehouden wordt door 
middel van 'herhaling'. Binnen dit kader is leren de vorming van 
nieuwe associaties of de verrijking van oude associaties. Informatie 
in LTS wordt verondersteld niet verloren te gaan. Observeerbaar ge-
drag wordt echter niet alleen bepaald door de informatie opgeslagen 
in het LTS, maar ook door de processen die gebruikt worden om de ge-
zochte informatie op te halen uit het LTS. Vergeten is in deze theo-
rie dus niet het resultaat van het zwakker worden van geheugensporen 
als gevolg van onbruik (verval) of interferentie, maar is een gevolg 
van het feit dat informatie in het LTS alleen teruggevonden kan worden 
door gebruik te maken van de informatie in STS ten tijde van de toet-
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sing (de zgn. 'retrieval cues'). 
Na het door Shiffrin (1970a) voorgestelde zoekmodel voor het op-
halen van informatie uit het geheugen besproken te hebben, presente-
ren wij onze nieuwe theorie voor de aktualisering van kennis in het 
lange-termijn geheugen. Onze algemene theorie veronderstelt dat het 
associatieve netwerk dat in het LTS opgeslagen is, niet alleen be-
staat uit associaties tussen verschillende items, maar dat elk item 
ook geassocieerd is met de context die aanwezig was tijdens de bestu-
dering van het item. D.w.z., twee typen associaties worden veronder-
steld: interitem assooiatiea en aontextnele associaties. In onze theo-
rie hangt de aktivatie van inaktief materiaal in het lange-termijn 
geheugen af van de informatie die aktief is in STS ten tijde van de 
toetsing. De kans dat een bepaald item herinnerd wordt na een enkele 
ophaalpoging wordt bepaald door de associaties van dat item met de 
retrieval cues. Evenals in Shiffrin (1970a) worden twee processen on-
derscheiden: een selektie proces waarin kenmerken of attributen ge-
aktiveerd worden van een bepaald item in de verzameling van items die 
geassocieerd zijn met de retrieval cues, en een rekonstmktie proces 
waarin kenmerken gerelateerd aan het geselekteerde aggregaat van ken-
merken geaktiveerd en in STS geplaatst worden. De selektiekansen wor-
den bepaald door de relatieve sterkte van de associaties met de re-
trieval cues; de kans op rekonstruktie van voldoende kenmerken om het 
geven van een respons mogelijk te maken hangt af van de hoeveelheid 
informatie die opgeslagen is voor het geselekteerde item. Een belang-
rijk nieuw aspekt van onze theorie is een stel regels dat toegepast 
wordt ingeval een kombinatie van retrieval cues gebruikt wordt. Dit 
aspekt stelt ons in staat een aantal interessante empirische resulta-
ten te voorspellen. Dit is van belang aangezien wij aannemen dat bij 
elke ophaalpoging de contextuele informatie die op dat moment in STS 
aanwezig is, deel uitmaakt van de retrieval cues, tezamen met even-
tuele specifieke cues die het subjekt gebruikt om richting te geven 
aan het zoekproces. Er wordt verondersteld dat de kans op selektie 
van een item proportioneel is met het produkt van de sterktes van de 
associaties van dat item met de retrieval cues, en dat de kans op ge-
slaagde rekonstruktie afhangt van de som van deze associatieve sterk-
tes. Op deze wijze wordt het zoekproces beperkt tot de intersektie 
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van de verzamelingen van de items die geassocieerd zijn met elk van de 
retrieval cues afzonderlijk, terwijl de kans op geslaagde rekonstruk-
tie afhangt van het totale aantal kenmerken dat geaktiveerd kan worden 
met een bepaald stel retrieval cues. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een model voor vrije reproduktie ('single-trial 
free recall') ontwikkeld dat gebaseerd is op de hierboven beschreven 
algemene theorie voor het ophalen van informatie. Verondersteld wordt 
dat door bestudering in STS zich een associatief netwerk in LTS ont-
wikkelt dat bestaat uit interitem en contextuele associaties. Een 'buf-
fer' wordt gebruikt als model voor het proces van het herhalen van de 
items. Bij de aanvang van de testperiode noemt het Subjekt eerst de 
items op die nog in de buffer zitten (tenzij er een geïnterpoleerde 
taak is). Vervolgens gebruikt het Subjekt een algemene context cue om 
items uit het LTS op te halen. Steeds wanneer een nieuw item opgehaald 
is, wordt dat item gebruikt als een extra retrieval cue in kombinatie 
met de context cue. Wanneer een dergelijke kombinatie niet tot het 
vinden van nieuwe items leidt (d.w.z., wanneer een kritisch aantal 
niet geslaagde ophaalpogingen met die kombinatie overschreden wordt), 
schakelt het Subjekt weer over op het werken met uitsluitend de con-
text cue. Dit zoekproces gaat door tot een kriterium van een bepaald 
totaal aantal mislukkingen bereikt wordt. Vervolgens wordt elk van de 
herinnerde items gebruikt als retrieval cue in een laatste poging om 
nog wat extra items op te halen. We hebben tenslotte verondersteld dat 
na het met succes ophalen van een item uit het geheugen de associaties 
tussen dat item en de gebruikte retrieval cues versterkt worden. 
We tonen vervolgens aan dat dit model in staat is een groot aan-
tal empirische verschijnselen te verklaren, zoals seriële positie 
curves, lijstlengte effekten, het effekt van presentatietijd, inter-
responsie tijden, hypermnesie, en het zgn. 'part-list cueing' effekt. 
Met name het feit dat dit 'part-list cueing' effekt voorspeld wordt, 
is opmerkelijk aangezien algemeen aangenomen wordt dat dit effekt niet 
verenigbaar is met associatieve netwerk modellen. Wij tonen echter aan 
dat tenminste één aannemelijk associatief netwerk model in staat is 
dit resultaat te voorspellen, en wij stellen dat de oorzaak van het 
effekt gezocht moet worden in het feit dat in dit soort studies de 
items die gepresenteerd worden als cues op aselekte wijze gekozen 
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worden. 
Volgend op deze bespreking van het model voor vrije reproduktie 
van niet-gekategoriseerde lijsten presenteren wij een gelijksoortig 
model voor vrije reproduktie van gekategoriseerde lijsten. Dit model 
blijkt in staat te zijn de resultaten van het onderzoek van Tulving 
en Pearlstone (1966) naar de effekten van het beschikbaar stellen van 
de kategorienamen te verklaren. Het model is bovendien in staat het 
outputinterferentie effekt tussen opeenvolgend getoetste kategorieën 
dat geobserveerd werd door Smith (1971) en Roediger (1973), te ver-
klaren. Het feit dat ons model in staat is dit outputinterferentie ef-
fekt te voorspellen, is een belangrijk resultaat aangezien geen enkele 
andere theorie in staat is geweest dit effekt te verklaren. Het effekt 
wordt voorspeld doordat in ons model aangenomen wordt dat contextuele 
cues ook gebruikt worden wanneer de kategorienamen als geheugensteun-
tjes gegeven worden (zgn. geholpen reproduktie), en doordat de asso-
ciaties met de context cue versterkt worden na een geslaagde ophaal-
poging. 
In hoofdstuk l* worden de resultaten van een tweetal experimenten 
gepresenteerd die opgezet zijn om de rol van contextuele associaties 
in vrije en geholpen reproduktie aan te tonen en om de invloed te be-
palen van het versterken van de contextuele associaties voor één groep 
items op het ophalen van andere items. In tegenstelling tot Murdock 
(1967a) vinden wij een sterk lijstlengte effekt in geholpen reproduk-
tie van paarsgewijs geassocieerde items, een resultaat dat konsistent 
is met onze assumpties met betrekking tot de rol van contextuele asso-
ciaties in geholpen reproduktie. Er wordt bovendien een nadelig effekt 
geobserveerd van eerdere vrije reproduktie van paarsgewijs geassoci-
eerde items op een daaropvolgende geholpen reproduktie van die items. 
Onze theorie voor het ophalen van informatie wordt eveneens toegepast 
op dit type experimenten. Het model blijkt konsistent te zijn met de 
belangrijkste geobserveerde effekten. Onze theorie is derhalve toepas-
baar op taken die gewoonlijk afzonderlijk behandeld worden en waarvoor 
afzonderlijke modellen ontwikkeld zijn. 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt de toepassing van de huidige theorie op her-
kenningstaken besproken. We nemen aan dat herkenning gezien kan worden 
als het ophalen van contextuele informatie. Na een bespreking van ver-
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scheidene theorieën over herkenning wordt de huidige theorie vergele-
ken met de door Anderson en Bower (1972) voorgestelde theorie. Er 
wordt aangetoond dat hun model voor herkenning een aantal assumpties 
bevat die niet konsistent lijken te zijn met hun algemene benadering 
van het menselijk geheugen. Bovendien wordt hun algemene opvatting 
bekritiseerd dat het ophalen van informatie beschreven kan worden als 
een tocht langs associatieve paden op zoek naar lijstlabels. Dit hoofd-
stuk wordt besloten met een toepassing van ons model op het verschijn-
sel van het niet herkennen van woorden die wel herinnerd kunnen worden. 
Ons model blijkt in staat te zíjn niet alleen het verschijnsel zelf 
maar bovendien de systematische relatie tussen de kans op herkenning 
en de kans op het niet herkennen van herinnerde woorden te verklaren 
die geobserveerd werd door Tulving en Wiseman (1975). 
We besluiten deze studie met een epiloog waarin we de toepassing 
van de huidige theorie bespreken bij meerdere presentaties van dezelfde 
lijst items of van één item in dezelfde lijst, gevolgd door een bespre-
king van de verklaring van proaktieve en retroaktieve inhibitie binnen 
de huidige theorie voor het ophalen van informatie uit het lange-ter-
mijn geheugen. Tenslotte worden nog enkele metatheoretische aspekten 
van dit type theorieën besproken. 
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S T E L L I N G E N 
1. Het ophalen van informatie uit het geheugen kan beschreven worden 
als een random zoekproces in associatieve netwerken. 
2. In tegenstelling tot de opvatting van Slamecka (1968) kan het zgn. 
'part-list cueing' effect wel degelijk verklaard worden door een 
associatief netwerk model. 
Stameokaj N.J. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1968, 76, 
b04-bl¡. 
3. Het door o.a. Roediger (1973) aangetoonde outputinterferentie ef-
fect tussen opeenvolgend getoetste categorieën kan verklaard wor-
den door de assumptie dat bij het ophalen van informatie context 
cues gebruikt worden en dat tijdens de testfase de associaties tot 
die context cues versterkt worden. 
Roediger, U. L. III Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 
1973, 12, 644-857. 
4. Het verschijnsel dat soms woorden wel herinnerd maar niet herkend 
kunnen worden is een gevolg van het probabilistische karakter van 
het ophaalproces uit het lange-termijn geheugen. 
5. De door Brodie en Murdock (1977) geconstateerde verschillen tus-
sen nominale en functionele seriële positie curves worden door hen 
ten onrechte geïnterpreteerd als strijdig met de theorie van 
Atkinson en Shiffrin. 
Brodie, D.A. S Murdoch, В.В., Jr. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behavior, 197?, 16, 185-200. 
6. 'Vergeten' is het gevolg van het ontbreken van context informatie. 
7. Het door Chumbley (1972) voorgestelde Markov model voor conjunc-
tieve concept-identificatie taken is strijdig met hot door Chumbley 
veronderstelde proces model. 
Chumbley, J.I. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1972, 9, 17-35. 
8. Het oplossen van complexe concept-identificatie problemen kan be­
schreven worden door een twee-proces theorie die een dimensie-se­
lectie en een associatie proces veronderstelt. 
RaaijmakerSj J.G.W. Techniaal Reports 77MA04 en 77MA0b, Nijmegen, 
1977. 
9. De door Millward en Wickens (1974) vermelde formule voor de vari-
antie van een variabele die een samengestelde verdeling volgt is 
niet juist. 
Millward, R.B. & Wiakens, T.D. In D.H. Krantz et al. (Eds.), Con­
temporary developments гп mathematical psychology (Vol. 1), 1974. 
10. Anterograde en retrograde amnesie kunnen gezien worden als het ge­
volg van een in de hippocampus gelocaliseerd defect in het hante­
ren van contextuele informatie zowel bij de opslag als bij het op­
halen van informatie in het geheugen. 
cf. Hirsch, Я. Behavioral Biology, 1974, 12, 421-444. 
11. De verzameling van kleuren die noch roodachtig noch groenachtig 
zijn, is gesloten onder additieve kleurmenging en intensiteits­
verandering. 
Raaijmakers, J.G.W. & De Veert, Ch.M.M. Peroeption & Psyohophysics, 
197b, 18, 474-480. 
12. Uit een oogpunt van inkomensgelijkheid is het wenselijk dat bij 
het berekenen van de belastbare som voor de inkomstenbelasting 
van niet-kostwinners niet zozeer een lagere belastingvrije som 
als wel een hogere mate van progressie wordt gehanteerd. 
13. Er dient een afstudeerrichting theoretische psychologie te zijn 
waarvan de mathematische psychologie een wezenlijk onderdeel is. 
cf. Roskam, E.E.Ch.I. Inaugurale rede, Nijmegen, 1972. 
14. In Nederland schijnen proefschriften in meerdere opzichten als 
"levenswerken" te worden opgevat. 
Nijmegen, 26 juni 1979 J.G.W. Raaijmakers 


